

**NATO AFTER ENLARGEMENT:
NEW CHALLENGES, NEW MISSIONS,
NEW FORCES**

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
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FOREWORD

In 1999 NATO will formally admit three new members and adopt a new strategic concept. In so doing, it will take giant strides towards effecting a revolutionary transformation of European security. On the one hand, it could be said that NATO enlargement closes the immediate post-Cold War period that began with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But on the other hand, enlargement raises a host of serious new issues for the Alliance and for U.S. policymakers that they must begin to address now. Bearing this fact in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) organized a conference with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in January 1998 to explore the new challenges confronting the NATO Alliance. These essays are the product of that conference.

Undoubtedly, considerable future debate on all of the issues addressed here will take place. But that is precisely why SSI, in fulfilling its responsibility to contribute to and shape debates over national security, is presenting these essays. We hope that this collection will stimulate our audiences to reflect more deeply upon these issues which affect the vital interests of the United States and its allies.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Stephen J. Blank

In April 1999, NATO members will celebrate in Washington the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty and the founding of NATO. At that time they will enroll three new members: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, decide upon NATO's new strategic concept, and raise issues connected with the possibility of further enlargement. In the wake of the Paris and Madrid conferences of 1997 that consummated agreements with Russia and Ukraine on their relationships with NATO and resolved to admit the three aforementioned states as members, NATO is moving forward to reshape the European security agenda. But, as in other situations, we may ask "*Quo Vadis* NATO?" and even more sharply make the same inquiry of individual members and of Russia. In fact, it is quite clear that, despite the American claim that enlargement is merely projecting stability eastward, it actually constitutes a radical transformation of the European agenda and of both U.S. and European history. And, as such, NATO enlargement raises a host of issues for future consideration.

But nobody can say for sure where enlargement will lead, or, more importantly, how it will be enforced, though hopes for and prognostications of the ultimate point of arrival abound. Nor can we resolve with any certainty the myriad issues involved in extending NATO both in terms of its organizational scope and its future missions. That extension, particularly in terms of territory or geographical scope is immense in its implications, but the final outcome or resolution of all those issues necessarily remains unclear. That uncertainty is not surprising. It is commonly the case that major restructurings of international politics are undertaken by statesmen and politicians who have only a

partial notion at best of where they hope go. As Napoleon would have said, "*on s'engage et puis on voit*," (One commits himself and then sees where he is). Precisely because the process of NATO enlargement is itself such a transformation and raises probably more issues and questions than it answers, the Strategic Studies Institute undertook a conference in Washington on January 26, 1998, to begin the process of seeing where the United States and where NATO are going. The following chapters are the fruits of that conference, but obviously they can only deal with some of the issues. Questions like the Baltic littoral's future, the nature of peace operations in the future, or the emerging situation in Bosnia and, more recently, in Kosovo, are not specifically included. But many other fundamental issues have been addressed. Simon Serfaty addresses the larger issue of where European security institutions in general, i.e., not just NATO, but the European Union and its hoped-for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are going. Robert Dorff assesses trends in both American and European public opinion regarding issues raised by enlargement and possible future military contingencies. Stephen Blank probes the rival visions of America, Russia, and Europe concerning the future missions and roles of NATO and of these three sets of governments. Sherman Garnett and Rachel Levenson analyze the complicated situation on Russia's Western frontier where Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine all interact in a complex way with Russia and the members of NATO. Rachel Bronson and Glen Howard track the little-discussed but increasingly important strategic interaction of NATO and the United States with the Transcaucasian and Central Asia states. General Edward Atkeson (U.S. Army Retired) discusses issues of burdensharing among allies and the military implications of the Partnership for Peace program within the expanded NATO. And General Frederick Kroesen (U.S. Army Retired) raises the important question of how NATO actually should go about building a true military coalition.

All of these are fundamental issues that will be addressed, either by conscious design or by default, in the years to come. But it is essential to realize that their importance, along with that of other issues not covered here, represents a transformation but not a repudiation of NATO's and the allies' past histories. As Kosovo shows us, and other issues would do so as well, conflict, interstate rivalry, and states' efforts to maximize their influence in Europe have not disappeared from the agenda. Far from ending European political history, enlargement only opens a new chapter with elements of continuity existing besides elements of profound innovation. It will certainly be an interesting and probably exciting adventure to watch or participate in this new evolution. We organized the conference in January 1998 and present the following essays with the intent of contributing to the debate and to our audience's ability either to understand or take part in at least some of the major issues in Europe's future. We hope that the analyses and information contained here will be enlightening to laymen and experts alike, and increase the informed debate over some of the most critical security issues the United States will face in the near future.

CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC OPINION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

Robert H. Dorff

INTRODUCTION

The process of NATO enlargement has thus far followed a curious path. For what is clearly a decision of enormous magnitude with potential implications for global as well as regional security, the silence is deafening. In the United States and in Europe, little if any meaningful public debate has occurred on the many critical dimensions of the issue.¹ Why such debates have not occurred is itself an interesting and important question, and the answer more than likely varies across the different countries. But it is not the central question addressed in this essay. Rather, the focus here is on the nature of public opinion (content, intensity, stability) on the issue of enlargement and the possible implications of that opinion for the future of the enlargement process and the Alliance itself.

The fact that very little, if indeed any *meaningful* debate has occurred within the existing NATO member countries is itself somewhat surprising. Yet one could argue that this generally reflects the preoccupation of the publics and their elected officials with domestic issues. Much has been made in the United States of President Clinton's near exclusion of foreign and security policy from his list of priorities. And certainly among many Western European countries today basic economic issues such as unemployment and growth, not to mention the soon-to-be created European Monetary Union, occupy center stage, making discussions of NATO

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enlargement at best a second-tier priority for both the mass and elite publics. But what is perhaps even more striking for this analysis is the fact that virtually no real debate has occurred not just in the current NATO member states but even in the countries that aspire to NATO membership. As we shall see, public opinion about enlargement in the new member countries is almost as formless and potentially unstable as it is in many of the current member countries.

The thesis embedded in this analysis is certainly not that public opinion will or even should play a determinative role in the decisions to proceed with enlargement or to seek membership. Rather, the thesis is that the nearly complete absence of serious attempts by policymakers and opinion leaders to inform and thereby shape the public debate will have potentially deleterious consequences for the Alliance at some as yet unspecified period down the road. For the absence of a broader public debate is simply an indicator of the more important absence of an underlying strategic consensus on such critical matters as the role and purpose of the Alliance, the responsibilities of individual members to it, and the conditions under which the Alliance can and should be called into action. In terms of grand strategy, this issue is hardly trivial. If there is very little context within which the policymakers can explain and justify the core functions of the Alliance to their respective publics, then the political will that must underlie such an Alliance to ensure its timely and effective action will be largely absent. The approach taken to date seems to presume that we can address the strategic questions later, if and perhaps only when the need actually arises. And it is in the critical area of the context for such a future debate that the current nature and role of public opinion deserve attention.²

This essay examines the issue of NATO enlargement from the perspective of public opinion. It begins with some general observations about the role and nature of public opinion in democracies. Then it looks at some of the specific public opinion survey data that address public opinion and NATO enlargement in current and future NATO members.

Finally, it concludes with a discussion of possible implications that current opinion and the enlargement process might have on the future of enlargement and the future of NATO.

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION

Studies of public opinion in democracies have long noted the contradiction between the democratic ideal of an informed public shaping public policy and the practical reality of an ill-informed general public rarely attuned to their country's foreign and security policy decisions.³ At the same time, studies have demonstrated that at critical moments in history, public opinion (both mass and elite) plays an important role in determining if, when, and how a democracy responds to crises.⁴ So while one body of evidence suggests that the mass public is largely unaware of and uninterested in foreign and security policy as a general rule, another body of evidence nonetheless points to situations in which public opinion has in fact played an important role in shaping policy outcomes in this broad issue area. In fact, these somewhat contradictory findings are not incompatible, as an informed understanding of the nature and role of public opinion would reveal. Therefore, it is important to begin this analysis with a brief examination of public opinion in a democracy.

The study of public opinion has to some extent suffered from the advent of nearly universal and instantaneous polling capabilities and techniques. The use of polls to predict election outcomes has created a false sense of public opinion as something that is inherently "knowable," concrete, and stable. First, sophisticated research has shown that this is not even true for election analysis. Second, and most important for the purposes of this essay, much of that view is based on the rather unique conditions under which election polling occurs. Consider the following:

- In the United States, for example, voter choice is often essentially dichotomous. Potential voters are basically choosing between two major candidates.

- In highly visible races (such as the presidency), candidates enjoy relatively high name recognition among the voters. When asked, the public knows what the choices are.

- Most individuals have preexisting (some stronger than others, of course) dispositions to choose one candidate over the other. These dispositions are anchored in a belief system generally learned at an early age and reinforced over time through contacts with events and individuals. It includes both an individual's general philosophical orientation (liberal-conservative) and a more specific partisan orientation (party identification).

None of these unique qualities obtain when one moves into the general realm of public opinion and public policy. As study after study has shown, public opinion on matters of general public policy is at best quite fluid and at worst completely unanchored. Only for the perhaps 10-15 percent of the most informed and most ideologically consistent individuals does "constraint" across policy issue areas exist in substantial amounts.⁵ Why is this? Consider the unique conditions about voting choice listed above. For one thing, real public policy is not about simple dichotomous choices. The issue is not whether "more" or "less" should be spent on a particular problem (although this is frequently how such questions are worded), but also how it should be spent (if at all). Moreover, individuals frequently have very little idea about the content of existing policy, so questions purporting to tap their preferences often tap "doorstep" or "induced" opinions because the individual has no clear sense of what the choices really are.⁶ Finally, at any level other than the most general (whether one is in favor of social security, for example), most individuals have little or no guidance from their philosophical orientations (liberal, conservative, etc.) on which to rely. Consequently, opinions on matters of

public policy (as opposed to voter preference) are much more likely to be weak and therefore unstable. Measuring the content and impact of public opinion on public policy is inherently more complex and problematic than voting behavior research implies.

The critical dimension of public opinion is not its content per se (what opinion one holds) but the intensity with which it is held. Careful study reveals that almost everyone has some kind of opinion on an issue when asked. But the intensity with which one holds an opinion reflects how clearly the opinion is formed (its substantive content) and how likely that opinion is to endure (its stability). Individuals with strongly held, lasting opinions are quite unlikely to change them, and far more likely to base their behavior on those opinions (to act on them). That is why we find that intensely held, enduring opinions are the most likely to influence the policy process.⁷ Despite the attention that short-term, volatile opinions often receive from the media, there is little evidence to suggest that they have substantial influence on the policy-making process beyond some very minor, often symbolic pronouncements by policymakers. Moreover, evidence is abundant that elected policymakers in democracies who assume that the people have "spoken" on a particular issue frequently get punished by those same people who appear to have "changed their minds" when a specific bill or action is undertaken. Absent a stable opinion on the issue, the people respond to specific, concrete actions when they are put on the table, not to policy in the abstract.

Returning to the NATO enlargement debate, these general observations about public opinion help shed light on the current situation. Many individuals in all of the countries will have basic opinions on the dichotomous questions of enlargement (should NATO enlarge, should our country join), especially when they are asked for them. At the same time, there will be little context underlying those opinions. In the absence of a meaningful debate, shaped and led by an informed policy elite, most public

opinion will be shallow, weakly formed and held, and consequently highly unstable. People will willingly express an opinion on whether they are for or against NATO enlargement, or their country joining NATO. How they will in fact react to a future decision to commit NATO forces, or to increase spending in order to meet Alliance obligations, or to defend a new member if attacked, or to some kind of internal crisis within NATO, and so on is anything but clear. A critical decision about the use of the Alliance may have to be made in the nearly complete absence of any underlying public comprehension of the general strategic necessity and purpose of the Alliance. This is hardly a model for successful policymaking in a democracy. And perhaps more important, it is hardly a model for successful grand strategy formulation and implementation in modern democracies.

PUBLIC OPINION AND NATO ENLARGEMENT: SOME DATA⁸

New NATO Members.⁹

As noted in the introduction, one of the most surprising features of public opinion and NATO enlargement is the relative absence of any serious public debate in the new member countries. In fact, and perhaps reflecting the view held by policymakers in these countries that the public might not desire NATO membership, only one of the countries has held a public referendum on the issue. In that referendum, held in November 1997 in Hungary, approximately 85 percent of those voting expressed approval for joining NATO. However, in that same referendum barely over 50 percent of the eligible citizenry voted, the minimum threshold required for the referendum to be valid. Poland and the Czech Republic have not held, and do not plan to hold, any popular votes on the issue of joining NATO. In essence, then, we are left with the publicly available survey data to consider in assessing the nature of public opinion on the enlargement issue. Let us now turn to those data.¹⁰

If (survey country) had the opportunity to become a full member of NATO, would you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose our country doing so?

	Favor	Oppose	Don't Know
Czech Republic			
1997	60%	32%	8%
1996	51%	33%	16%
1995	59%	27%	14%
Hungary			
1997	55%	34%	11%
1996	57%	27%	16%
1995	58%	27%	15%
Poland			
1997	83%	9%	8%
1996	72%	12%	16%
1995	81%	8%	11%

Table 1. Support for NATO Membership.

Table 1 presents the results of the survey that asked individuals from each of the countries to indicate whether they strongly favored, somewhat favored, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed their country joining NATO if the opportunity were presented. In the table these categories were further collapsed into three categories (favor, oppose, and don't know). Only in Poland does the expressed public support for joining NATO achieve convincingly strong levels; 83 percent of those surveyed expressed support, while only 9 percent were opposed and only 8 percent expressed no opinion. In 1996 the level of support was 72 percent, and in 1995 it had been 81 percent. Although the data reveal a little "bounce" over the 3-year period, there does appear to be fairly consistent support among the Polish public for joining NATO. Data are available from 1996 that break the results down into the original four categories and "don't know," and it is useful to note that of the 72 percent who expressed support, 28 percent strongly favored and 44 percent somewhat favored

Poland joining NATO. Although this represents a reasonably healthy level of general support, it is hardly a ringing endorsement for the proposal to join NATO.

The results for Hungary and the Czech Republic are less encouraging. In Hungary support has remained fairly steady in the mid- to upper-50 percent range (from 58 percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 1997). But of the 57 percent that expressed support in 1996, 19 percent strongly favored while 38 percent somewhat favored. In this case, more than twice the total supporters fell into the "somewhat favor" category as into the "strongly favor" category. And perhaps most significant is the fact that fully 34 percent (just over one-third) of the respondents in 1997 expressed opposition to Hungary joining NATO (up from 27 percent in the previous 2 years). In the Czech Republic support appears to be somewhere around the 60 percent level (although it also was lower in 1996 at 51 percent). Of that 51 percent support in 1996, 17 percent consisted of strongly favor and 34 percent of somewhat favor; here again, twice as many supporters expressed some as opposed to strong support for joining NATO. And as in Hungary, expressed opposition in the Czech Republic to joining NATO constituted about one-third of all respondents. If, as a number of observers have argued, the time for NATO enlargement has indeed come, it is more than a little surprising that significant percentages of citizens in these new member countries seem either not to recognize it, or to acknowledge it only in a lukewarm fashion. And of course, we should note that respondents were not asked anything about costs, missions, risks, or any of the potential "burdens" associated with joining—they are simply asked, in a very general way, whether they would support their country joining NATO if the opportunity arose. By most standards of survey research, such a question is biased toward the "favor" end of the response spectrum.¹¹

And indeed this shows up when questions are asked concerning the public's willingness to support specific security-related actions. Questions were posed to

respondents concerning four such actions: sending their own troops to defend another NATO country; hosting regular, routine NATO exercises in their country; allowing regular, routine overflights of their country by NATO aircraft; and stationing NATO troops in their country. (See Tables 2-5.) As with the general question concerning support for NATO membership, the highest levels of support are found in Poland, with 70 percent of the public expressing some support for sending troops and hosting exercises, and 54 percent and 55 percent for allowing overflights and stationing troops respectively.¹² But even in Poland nearly one-fourth of those surveyed (23 percent) expressed opposition to sending troops and hosting exercises, while more than a third were opposed to overflights (37 percent) and stationing troops (35 percent). The next highest levels of support are found in the Czech Republic, as was also the case for NATO membership generally. Here we find just over half of the respondents expressing support for sending troops (52 percent), not even half supporting exercises (47 percent), just over one-third supporting overflights (36 percent), and less than one-third for stationing troops (29 percent). But a matter of genuine concern emerges here when we look at levels of opposition to these actions. Fully 44 percent expressed opposition to sending troops to support another NATO country, 48 percent opposed hosting exercises, a clear majority (60 percent) opposed allowing overflights, and an overwhelming majority of two-thirds (66 percent) opposed the stationing of NATO troops on Czech soil. In Hungary only one-third (33 percent) supported sending their own troops to support another NATO member whereas nearly two-thirds opposed it (63 percent), around one-third (35 percent) supported hosting exercises whereas 60 percent opposed the notion, 46 percent supported and 50 percent opposed allowing overflights, and a clear majority was opposed to the stationing of troops in Hungary (58 percent to 38 percent). With perhaps the exception of Poland, the publics in these countries seem to be expressing moderate support for joining NATO, but with a corollary qualification that their

country not have to fulfill any real obligations as part of that membership.

As you may know, if we join NATO there are certain things we MAY be asked to do. Please tell me if you would strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the following: Sending our troops to defend another NATO country.

	Support	Oppose
Czech Republic		
1997	52%	44%
1996	45%	48%
1995	42%	50%
Hungary		
1997	33%	63%
1996	32%	60%
1995	26%	69%
Poland		
1997	70%	23%
1996	68%	24%
1995	55%	35%

Table 2. Support for Sending Troops.

Regular, routine exercises by NATO forces in our country.

	Support	Oppose
Czech Republic		
1997	47%	48%
1996	34%	61%
1995	33%	60%
Hungary		
1997	35%	60%
1996	26%	67%
1995	28%	67%
Poland		
1997	70%	23%
1996	67%	25%
1995	45%	45%

Table 3. Support for NATO Exercises.

Regular, routine overflights by NATO aircraft over our country.

	Support	Oppose
Czech Republic		
1997	36%	60%
1996	30%	63%
1995	26%	67%
Hungary		
1997	46%	50%
1996	36%	57%
1995	35%	58%
Poland		
1997	54%	37%
1996	53%	37%
1995	41%	47%

Table 4. Support for Overflight by NATO Aircraft.

Stationing NATO troops in our country.

	Support	Oppose
Czech Republic		
1997	29%	66%
1996	31%	63%
1995	30%	63%
Hungary		
1997	38%	58%
1996	44%	49%
1995	34%	59%
Poland		
1997	55%	35%
1996	52%	38%
1995	56%	34%

Table 5. Support for NATO Troops in Country.

The opposition to stationing NATO troops in these countries is certainly understandable, especially given the oft-expressed official position that there is no need, no intention, and no plan to do so (the so-called "three NO's"). But the majority opposition in Hungary is perhaps a bit curious given the fact that NATO troops are in fact currently based in that country in support of the operations in Bosnia, and had been for more than 2 years at the time this question was asked. But putting the issue of stationing NATO troops aside, there is still ample reason to be concerned when we consider this pattern of opinion. What if a NATO member (new or old) were to feel threatened and the Alliance moved under Article 4 to consult about possible actions to be taken? And what if an attack on a NATO member actually led to an attempt to mobilize for an Article 5 collective action? Leaders in Poland would probably be able to galvanize the necessary public support to join in. In the Czech Republic a *battle royale* could ensue as the public would apparently split virtually down the middle. While in Hungary, elected officials could face a monumental uphill fight against a

public that is nearly 2-1 against providing such assistance.¹³ Perhaps most disturbing is the possibility that such politically volatile debates could occur in the near term in countries whose democratic institutions and processes are barely a decade old. To observe that such crises might severely strain those fledgling democracies is surely to engage in understatement.

Before looking at public opinion in the existing NATO member countries, one other related issue requires attention: spending. As noted previously, the general question about joining NATO had no "burdens" attached to it—no mention of requirements, costs, risks, and so on. One of the frequently mentioned issues, however, is cost, and it is worth considering how the publics in these countries react when issues of spending are raised. In the surveys conducted by USIA this was done in two ways. First, respondents were asked whether they would support or oppose increased defense spending. Second, and generally an even more reliable measure of public support for specific spending policies, respondents were asked if they would support or oppose increasing the percentage of their national budget spent on defense as opposed to education and health care (the classic "guns versus butter" comparison). On the general question of increased defense spending, only in Poland was a majority in support of an increase; 55 percent supported the idea, while one-third (33 percent) opposed it, and 12 percent responded "don't know." In the Czech Republic fully two-thirds of the respondents opposed the idea (66 percent), whereas only 27 percent expressed support and 6 percent were undecided. In Hungary, only one-third (33 percent) supported an increase, whereas 58 percent opposed it and 8 percent were undecided. When posed as a potential trade-off between increasing defense spending and decreasing domestic spending, public support for increasing defense spending not surprisingly dropped off precipitously in all three countries (and expressed opposition rose accordingly). In Poland only 29 percent expressed support for an increase in

defense spending while 62 percent were opposed. In the Czech Republic only 16 percent were in favor while 80 percent were opposed. And in Hungary only 10 percent of the public expressed support while 88 percent were opposed. If joining NATO means expending scarce resources on improving defense capabilities in order to enhance security, elected policymakers in these three countries are not in an enviable position. The domestic politics of such policy decisions could get very testy, indeed.

Once again, this distribution of opinion is wholly understandable. These countries and their peoples are faced with some daunting economic challenges. The harsh realities of economic reform, not to mention the perceptions of individuals that they are being unfairly and unjustly treated, are enough to ensure widespread opposition to anything that would compete with domestic programs, especially education and health care. Moreover, the legacy of the Cold War and memories of the military machinery underlying it are themselves probably sufficient for high levels of lingering skepticism about increased defense budgets. And, as many observers have noted, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have made it very difficult to justify such increases (and in many cases to justify the status quo) in defense spending. If the rhetoric among current NATO members is correct that the majority of the costs of NATO enlargement will be borne by the new members themselves, then one must hope that the "cost optimists" are correct and the "cost pessimists" are wrong.¹⁴ If not, then we are in for a nasty political struggle within and between old and new NATO members over burden-sharing issues. If one thought some of the old NATO burden-sharing debates were acrimonious, just wait until the rifts emerge between the new and the old members (at both the elite and mass levels). And this observation brings us to the next question: How do things look in the current NATO member countries?

Old NATO Members.¹⁵

Among some of the startling aspects of the NATO enlargement debate, at least when compared to discussions that were occurring shortly after the end of the Cold War, is the virtual resurrection of NATO itself. Not that long ago serious doubts existed as to the future utility and viability of the Alliance. According to some analysts, the Alliance was doomed to disappear completely or at least fade into irrelevance.¹⁶ Today, and especially in the aftermath of the Dayton Accords and the ongoing NATO operations in Bosnia, the future existence of NATO seems assured well into the next century. And public support for the Alliance in the NATO member countries certainly indicates no near-term problems for that existence. In Germany approximately 6 of 10 respondents expressed confidence in NATO to "deal effectively with European problems," while in France and Great Britain at least 7 of 10 respondents expressed such confidence. Moreover, in 1997, 74 percent of German, 69 percent of British, and 58 percent of French respondents considered NATO "essential to their countries' security."¹⁷

But the picture for NATO enlargement is significantly murkier, characterized by greater fluidity and uncertainty in publicly held opinions. For example, public skepticism is increasing, with less than half of the respondents in these three European countries believing that enlargement generally will benefit the overall security of Europe. In France, 39 percent think enlargement will benefit overall European security while 41 percent think enlargement will harm it. In Germany, 38 percent think enlargement will be a benefit while 37 percent think it will be harmful. And in Great Britain, 42 percent think it will benefit and 36 percent think it will harm overall European security. In all three countries, at least 20 percent of the respondents "don't know" whether enlargement will benefit or harm overall European security, indicating that there is a significant amount of uncertainty among the public.

As with our discussion of enlargement in the new member countries, though, we must also look at more specific aspects of enlargement in our assessment of public opinion in the existing NATO members. In Germany, for which we have more detailed survey data, the tension between enlargement in the abstract and enlargement in the concrete has been evident for a number of years. In 1994-95, 33 percent of German respondents favored NATO enlargement, 25 percent opposed it, and 42 percent were undecided when asked only about the general prospect of enlargement. When the question was reframed to focus specifically on Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, support rose to 47 percent and opposition declined to 20 percent. But when asked if they supported the admission of these three countries knowing that Germany would be bound to come to their defense if they were attacked, 41 percent now opposed enlargement and only 27 percent supported it.¹⁸ In other words, evidence suggests that a substantial subgroup of the German public supports NATO enlargement as long as NATO is never called upon to do anything.

And in 1997, when Germans were asked whether they supported the admission of specific countries "keeping in mind that our country must defend any NATO country that comes under attack," 35 percent supported and 51 percent opposed the admission of Poland, 36 percent supported and 44 percent opposed Hungary, and 39 percent supported and 48 percent opposed the Czech Republic.¹⁹ The results in Great Britain were: Poland (49 percent supported-26 percent opposed), Hungary (37 percent supported-37 percent opposed), and Czech Republic (44 percent supported-30 percent opposed). In France the results were: Poland (43 percent supported-44 percent opposed), Hungary (37 percent supported-46 percent opposed), and Czech Republic (34 percent supported-52 percent opposed). In no country did any of the new members receive a majority of expressed support for joining NATO (although Poland came very close in Great Britain at 49 percent, which is

probably not a statistically significant difference from 50 percent). In two cases (Poland in Germany and the Czech Republic in France) majority opposition to admission obtained, while significant levels of opposition (over 40 percent) were found in three other cases (Czech Republic and Hungary in Germany, and Hungary in France). What is especially noteworthy in this is that Germany, where public enthusiasm for specific action in support of new NATO members appears to be consistently the lowest among the three current members, is widely viewed as the country that has pushed the hardest for the enlargement process.²⁰ If ever there appeared to be a divergence of opinion between elected officials and the mass public, the current situation in Germany is one. Given the national elections to be held in that country in the fall of 1998, one has to wonder just what this divergence will mean for the future of NATO (even if it appears to have had no influence on the formal enlargement decision).

A similar situation is found when we examine public opinion and possible new roles and missions for NATO. Of the Germans surveyed on this issue in 1993-94, 74 percent expressed support for "NATO involvement in new crises on Europe's periphery." However, there was no specific indication of just what that "periphery" was; it could be seen as very broad (to include the Middle East and North Africa, for example) or very narrow (to include only Western Europe). But taking enlargement into consideration, it would seem logical that the periphery would include at a minimum the new NATO members. And yet 55 percent of the same respondents in Germany who expressed support for this expanded NATO mission "agreed that the *Bundeswehr's* role should remain limited to territorial defense and that Germany's allies must assume responsibility for such missions [crisis management] themselves."²¹ Should the need arise to employ NATO in either a new crisis management or even in a traditional territorial defense role (with an expanded NATO territory), a difficult domestic political debate could ensue. The effects

of such a debate on the cohesiveness and effectiveness of the Alliance is difficult to predict, but it is likely to be all the more acrimonious in the absence of significant prior discussion and debate as part of the enlargement process.

Overall, the picture for public opinion and NATO in the existing member countries is also perplexing. While general support for and confidence in NATO remains strong among these publics, the issue of enlargement is much more complex. Generally speaking, a substantial plurality and perhaps an occasional majority of the publics support enlargement. But as can be seen from the data, these pluralities and certainly any majorities disappear when the issue of specific countries joining NATO is raised and is linked with the obligation to defend them. Underlying this subtle but important shift in opinion is a public that is very split on the notion of whether enlargement will be a net plus or minus for European security. All in all, we conclude that public opinion on the issue of enlargement is at best characterized as "fragile support." This fragility stems from the fact that the support exists largely at the general level, and as more specifics are added to the equation (countries, obligations, and costs) that support begins to dissipate. Even more significant is the fact that expressed opposition begins to increase. This sets the stage for what could be some very highly charged and difficult debates about Alliance decisionmaking and participation in meeting obligations in the future, a point to which we shall return later in this essay.

The United States.

By now it should hardly surprise anyone that a similar situation is found in the United States in terms of public opinion and NATO enlargement. First, as was found in the European NATO countries, there is broad support for NATO generally. In a survey conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes in September 1996, fully two-thirds (67 percent) of the American public viewed

NATO favorably, while only 20 percent had an unfavorable view. Moreover, two-thirds (67 percent) "believed NATO is still essential to our country's security," whereas only 30 percent did not. And finally from this same study, a majority felt that the United States should "either maintain its commitment to NATO at present levels (59 percent) or increase its commitment (5 percent)" with only 24 percent in favor of decreasing that commitment and 5 percent in favor of withdrawing completely.²² In short, despite some of the post-Cold War calls for reducing American commitments abroad, including commitments to Europe and NATO, a significant majority of Americans seem satisfied with U.S. involvement in NATO and with the Alliance itself.

But here, too, the picture changes somewhat when we turn our attention to the issue of NATO enlargement. In a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in April 1997, Americans appeared largely uninterested in the issue. Only about a fifth stated that they were following the issue very closely (6 percent) or somewhat closely (16 percent), while more than three-quarters were either following it not too closely (27 percent) or not at all closely (50 percent). In terms of opinion content, the American public was split on the issue. In the same Pew Center poll in April 1997, 44 percent were in favor of expanding NATO "to include some countries from central and eastern Europe" while 41 percent felt NATO should "stay as it is." When the question was altered to mention specific countries (namely, the three now being admitted), American respondents were "somewhat more likely to support enlargement (47 percent) than to say the Alliance should stay as it is (39 percent)."²³ But when asked whether they supported enlargement to include the three proposed countries "thereby committing the United States to defend them against attack in the same way as we are committed to defending western Europe," Americans responded only somewhat more favorably than Europeans: 44 percent supported the idea and 47 percent opposed it.²⁴ Once again, this is hardly a ringing public endorsement for the

enlargement process, and there also appears to be a similar contradiction as observed among the European publics: the public supports enlargement under the condition that the Alliance never be called upon to perform its core mission.

But perhaps these data reflect the public's views and level of attention prior to the Madrid summit and the formal launching of the enlargement process. Is there any evidence that the public is better informed or that opinion has crystallized more in the intervening months? In a word, "No." In another poll conducted by the Pew Center (this one in the fall of 1997), 63 percent of the respondents indicated that they supported NATO enlargement. And yet only 10 percent of those same respondents "could name even one of the candidates" who were already selected as new members (Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary).²⁵ And in the most recent Pew Center survey, conducted in March 1998 and released in early April, "only 5 percent of those questioned were following the NATO enlargement issue very closely" and nearly one in three Americans "admitted that they did not know if enlarging NATO was a good or bad idea." This led the Pew Center director, Andrew Kohut, to observe that "as an issue that matters, it's dropped off the screen," and the reporter to conclude that "the biggest extension of U.S. security commitments since the end of the Cold War is likely to pass into reality with little awareness on the part of most Americans."²⁶ Even if we accept Ambassador Hunter's observations that an extensive and lengthy debate has occurred, it appears hardly to have registered with the vast majority of the American public.²⁷

In Sum.

To summarize what we have found in this general overview of the survey data on public opinion and NATO enlargement, it appears that in all three subsets of countries, support for NATO enlargement is at best quite soft. General support for enlargement exists, but it weakens considerably when some of the potential costs and risks

associated with the Alliance are brought into focus. Levels of information on the central issues involved in the debate are very low, leading to the obvious conclusion that such opinions as do exist are very weakly held and therefore potentially highly unstable. As one European analyst observed in a 1997 study of public opinion, ". . . whereas there may, for instance, be consistent support for NATO in certain countries, public opinion is generally complex and has weak cognitive foundations. . . ." ²⁸ For an issue considered so important and of such historical and strategic consequence, it is remarkable how little interest the subject generates among the general publics. And perhaps most surprising in this review of the data is the fact that some of the weakest public support of the enlargement process is found in the very countries that now aspire to full-fledged membership in the Alliance.

IMPLICATIONS

Having now described some of the content and attributes of public opinion and NATO enlargement in the new and the existing member countries, including the United States, the question remains: So what? What are some of the implications for the future of the enlargement process and for the future of the Alliance?

First, and as stated at the beginning of this analysis, the weak levels of support for enlargement are highly unlikely to lead to a collapse of the enlargement process. In fact, weakly formed and held opinions have contributed to a policymaking environment in all of the countries in which political elites enjoy considerable latitude to proceed with the process. Nowhere was this more evident than in Germany where the *Bundestag* voted on March 27, 1998, 555-37, with 30 abstentions, in favor of enlargement, despite the fact that its public remains among the most skeptical about the desirability of the process. ²⁹ Similarly, the U.S. Senate voted 80-19 (1 "not voting") in favor of enlargement, but only following a debate that the Senate

leadership had great difficulty even getting on the schedule. As one Senate aide put it: "The only people who care about this are the think-tank folks and the academics—not much of a voting constituency."³⁰ In the end, enlargement is unlikely to encounter any serious opposition based in public opinion. If the proposed enlargement does fail, it is unlikely to be the result of any nonconsenting publics.³¹

This overview of public opinion suggests that only in the concrete details is public opposition likely to crystallize, such as actual costs and how they will be borne, the extent of member obligations to defend other members, and decisions to participate in NATO missions, especially out-of-area. Given this context, it is therefore highly unlikely that political elites will push to have these details considered as part of the decisionmaking process surrounding enlargement. Instead, most political leaders will be content to debate and decide the issue at the mostly symbolic level. So phrases like the "historic moment" and "extending peace and prosperity" to Europe are likely to be heard in the remainder of the debate, not costs, risks, and new missions. Simply put, the objective for political elites has been reduced to obtaining approval for enlargement; the moment to debate the issues and to build public understanding of and support for the content and purpose of an enlarged Alliance has either passed or, as I believe, been deferred to the future.

But although political elites enjoy considerable latitude today, there are some dangerous hurdles and potential obstacles lying in the road ahead. Perhaps foremost among these on the most practical level are clashes over costs. Because we have largely deferred meaningful discussions of who pays how much, when, and for what, it is only a matter of time before these questions come into play. And because they will occur after the formal entry of the new members into the Alliance, they may become acrimonious. The acrimony is likely to be visible both within and across countries; within countries where publics are at odds about overall levels of defense spending and the social opportunity

costs that spending entails, and across countries where the possibility is very real that there will be a clash between the demands of current NATO members that the new members "pay their fair share" of the burden and new members' domestic spending agendas.

This potential rift within and between member countries is likely to heighten not only as NATO enlargement proceeds but also, and perhaps especially, as EU enlargement goes forward. NATO enlargement will confront all countries with some serious economic challenges that will be magnified by the requirements of EU enlargement and the creation of the single European currency (the Euro). For current NATO members there will be a double crunch: fighting about the costs of enlargement and what that means for defense-spending levels in the face of requirements to meet the fairly strict Maastricht criteria for the Euro. And this of course will take place in the context of domestic economies that are anything but robust at the moment. Given the picture of public opinion portrayed here, it is at best difficult to be confident that the NATO side of the debate will hold its own.

For new NATO members the challenge is even more daunting, perhaps consisting of a triple crunch: costs of NATO enlargement clashing with the costs of joining the EU, and both of them clashing with economies that are not only weak in performance but weak institutionally and socially. It is one thing to challenge the German economy and people to support the costs of enlargement and joining the Euro while at the same time maintaining the social programs they consider entitlements; after all, the German public has a deeply embedded and reinforced psychological commitment to its economic and political system. It may be quite another challenge for the economies and people to undertake such adjustments in countries that have only recently made the change from command economies and centralized political systems to market democracies. Consequently, the deferred debates at this stage of the process may have some serious consequences for the future

of the Alliance and the overall success of enlargement as we move down the road and are forced to address some of the more specific costs.

Yet most of these issues related to costs (how much, who pays, with what tradeoffs, etc.) may pale in comparison to the even larger and more important issues related to Alliance and member responsibilities: What is it that we expect NATO and NATO members to do? We have seen in the survey data that the support for NATO membership and enlargement drops off considerably when the public is reminded of the responsibility of Alliance members to come to the defense of other member countries. The data suggest that for much of the public in all of the countries (old and new members alike) a larger NATO is only desirable if it (or more accurately their individual country) never has to do anything. For an Alliance that even at the height of the Cold War had some serious debates about the credibility and reliability of the NATO guarantee, generating the political will to go to the military assistance of Prague, Warsaw, or Budapest may be a bridge too far. And if the new members themselves appear to be less than enthusiastic about upholding that same end of their Alliance responsibilities, it is quite possible that the other member countries will find it impossible to generate and sustain even the appearance of Alliance solidarity. Who in the United States will be enthused about the prospect of going to the aid of a Czech Republic that has openly expressed its unwillingness to defend Germany? Perhaps this will be of little consequence as long as there are no challenges to the security of any NATO country. But that approach places all of the eggs in one basket, namely the hope that Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will never have to be invoked. And if that is in fact what we think is quite likely, then the entire necessity for NATO itself, let alone an enlarged NATO, comes into question.

A second issue related to NATO responsibilities concerns the most recent NATO strategic concept and the role of peace support operations out-of-area. Although this

question was not asked directly, we saw in Germany that there was very little enthusiasm for using German troops in support of "NATO involvement in new crises on Europe's periphery," let alone in regions outside of Europe. It seems reasonable to conclude that similar public views exist in other NATO countries, including the proposed new members. In general, there is public support for NATO operations in Bosnia, and we see little reason to believe that this support will weaken in the absence of any significant change in the situation; as long as there are no substantial increases in casualties or general risk, NATO will continue to garner public support for the role it is playing there.

But other out-of-area operations are unlikely to meet the same fate. The Albanian crisis in 1997 and the tensions in Kosovo in early 1998 once again illustrate the difficulty in all of the European countries of generating the political will to act. And when the United States floated the idea of the "new" NATO focusing on nonproliferation in the Middle East, even usually supportive Great Britain responded that the Middle East "has never been" a focus of NATO. French desires to reorient some of NATO's focus to the south (i.e., toward North Africa), which already tends to split the Alliance along a North-South axis, is similarly likely to generate little enthusiasm on the part of old and new members alike. These publics are at best interested in Europe only, and a Europe rather narrowly defined at that.³³ Publics that appear less than willing to come to the defense of other NATO members are hardly expected to support their own military joining in out-of-area operations beyond the traditional European boundaries. Consequently, what NATO can agree to do, and where, are likely to be the sources of future and potentially acrimonious debates within the newly expanded Alliance. The absence of any significant debate in the pre-enlargement phase, which could serve to heighten public awareness of the issues and to build some pre-crisis consensus (or at least to prepare the public for such a future

debate), will make these battles over how and where NATO acts even more difficult to manage in the future.

In the end, the implementation phase of this process, not the approval phase, will be critical in determining the success of the overall enlargement process. Though to some extent this would have always been the case—one can hardly deal with the toughest issues until they have been laid on the table in concrete, specific form—it is even more the case because of the conscious decision of policymakers today to defer the debates on such details to some unspecified future time frame. As I observed earlier, the underlying assumption has been that these details, some fairly minor (interoperability) and some of grand strategic importance (the core mission of the Alliance), can and should be left to the future, at which time they will be readily resolved. In my view this “ready resolution” will occur only if policymakers handle the implementation phase with great aplomb, a conditional assumption that I am at best uncomfortable making. If, on the other hand, NATO enlargement issues get all wrapped up with EU enlargement and its requirements, the Euro and its requirements, and a host of other existing and as yet unforeseen sources of friction, the enlargement process may succeed only at this, the most symbolic level, i.e., who joins.³⁴ At the most important level—how, when, and where the Alliance acts, and what are the members’ responsibilities when it does—the light at the end of the enlargement tunnel might well turn out to be a fast-moving, oncoming train.

History tells us that effective grand strategy in democracies, especially Alliance management, requires some substantial levels of public understanding and support for that strategy. At a minimum this entails some minimal consensus on the objectives, if not on the actual concepts employed in pursuit of those objectives and the resources those concepts or policies require. Democracies have been most successful in planning and implementing grand strategy when public support was cultivated and

opinion elites helped shape and frame public understanding. In the United States, the Cold War strategy of containment provides a clear case in support of this assertion. And if anything, the end of the Cold War and the end of this century have witnessed an increased role for public opinion in democracies. As one European official observes,

... security issues are no longer the preserve of high office but must increasingly involve public opinion, for reasons that pertain to both democratic consensus and international legitimation. . . . Politicians and policy-makers must therefore involve the public in the new security culture that circumstances suggest, *inter alia* in order to steer the cooperative projects through the log-jam of structural reforms, budgetary adjustments and institutional enlargements that is looming ahead.³⁵

Yet the overview of public opinion provided in this analysis suggests that this cultivation of public opinion on what may be the most significant shift in grand strategy since the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War has simply not taken place. Whether that is the fault of opinion elites (including politicians and policy-makers) or of inattentive publics is neither particularly relevant nor a focus of this essay. The point is simply that the lack of a clearer and deeper understanding of the central issues in the enlargement debate is undesirable and potentially dangerous for the success of enlargement and for the future of the Alliance. Sinnott concluded in 1997 that "policy-makers ignore public opinion at their peril; that they should be highly critical of data from polls; that there is not just one public but a series of publics; that the stratification of public opinion is not rigid; and that attitude changes are likely to occur as a result not only of public information campaigns, but also politicizing events. . . ." ³⁶ The peril that lies beneath the shallow surface of the public views outlined in this essay is simply that policymakers face a very difficult challenge of turning the symbol of NATO enlargement into the reality of an effective, cohesive security Alliance for the 21st century.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The author acknowledges that not everyone agrees with this assessment that little meaningful debate has occurred. Of the few who argue that such a debate has taken place, perhaps the most notable is former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert E. Hunter who recently wrote: "Rarely has any major foreign policy been developed over such a long period, displayed so fully before the public and considered so comprehensively with so many members of Congress." *The Washington Post*, March 23, 1998, p. 19. However, even if we grant the length of the development process, as well as the attempts to display it to the public and members of Congress, doubt remains as to the real quality of the debate that has to date taken place. For example, consider the following description of the debate in the U.S. Senate: "Confused efforts to shoehorn the final hours of discussion on expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into gaps in a floor debate on education last month reflected the fact that the issue, although enormously important for the United States, has barely raised the average American's eyebrow." Or, "Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) eventually suspended the embarrassing on-again, off-again debate, saying he would try again later. . . ." Tyler Marshall, "US Public Acutely Uninterested in Vote on NATO," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 1998.

2. This argument is rooted in Clausewitz's concept of the "remarkable trinity." The effective use of military power in support of national strategic objectives rests in a healthy relationship among the people, the government, and the military. Although Clausewitz was obviously concerned with military power, his analysis applies for all of the elements of national power in a democracy. The effective use of that power, whether political/diplomatic, economic, or military, depends on the balance among the three parts of this trinity.

3. Among the voluminous literature on this topic, a classic remains Gabriel A. Almond's *The American People and Foreign Policy*, 1st Edition (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950). James N. Rosenau's *The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1968) is another classic. From the many contemporary analyses of public opinion and democratic government, see Robert S. Erikson, Norman R. Luttbeg, and Kent L. Tedin, *American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact*, 4th Edition, New York: Macmillan, 1991.

4. For example, see John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*, New York: Wiley, 1973.

5. See Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin, *American Public Opinion*.

6. Using the same general example, respondents are often asked whether the country is currently spending too little, too much, or about the right amount on a specific item (such as defense). Research has consistently shown that in most cases people who express an opinion by choosing from among these three choices can rarely come close to specifying just how much is currently being spent. While one can debate the meaning and implications of this lack of specific information, the purpose for the present analysis is twofold: first, to illustrate that the existence of a measurable opinion is independent of substantive knowledge underlying it, and second, to reinforce the fact that measuring public opinion on public policy issues is not as easy as simply asking a question.

7. Note that this explanation accounts for the influence of both broadly held mass opinion and the actions of well-organized interest groups. The former holds sway because of its breadth, and the desires of elected officials not to lose the next election. The latter is frequently influential because the broader mass public is largely indifferent to the specific policy issue area, and the organized interests are therefore much more intense and stable (both relatively and absolutely).

8. The purpose of this section is to use some of the relevant poll data to illustrate the current content and nature of public opinion on this issue. This is not a systematic analysis of survey data; consequently, there will be no lengthy discussions of methodology or detailed comparison of survey results over time (trend analysis). While all of these methodological issues deserve treatment in a detailed analysis of public opinion, our more limited purpose here makes such a methodological discussion unnecessary.

9. For purposes of this analysis, "new NATO members" are Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Although other countries aspire to membership, and the possibility remains that additional countries will be invited to join in the future, these three countries were given the official invitation in July 1997 at the Madrid Summit. Moreover, the current official debate on enlargement, necessitating the formal concurrence of all sixteen current member nations and hence votes by their legislative branches, is specifically limited to the accession of these three countries. No formal vote has as yet been called on any other new members, either specifically or in general.

10. Unless otherwise noted, all of the following survey data are from USIA surveys conducted during the period 1995-97. Specific polls and the results can be found in USIA Reports, the numbers of which are available from the author on request.

11. Similar but somewhat different results were found in a Eurobarometer poll conducted in March 1997 in which respondents were asked how they would vote "if there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of your country's membership of NATO." In Poland 65 percent said they would vote in favor, 14 percent against, and 5 percent were undecided. In Hungary 32 percent would vote in favor, 17 percent against, and 23 percent were undecided. And in the Czech Republic 28 percent said they would vote in favor, 25 percent against, and 21 percent were undecided. These results are reported in George Cunningham, "EU and NATO Enlargement: How Public Opinion is Shaping Up in Some Candidate Countries," *NATO Review*, May-June 1997, pp. 16-18. With the exception of Poland, perhaps the most significant point here is the very substantial number of undecided individuals. Given the fact that only about one-third and one-fourth of the publics in Hungary and the Czech Republic respectively said they would vote in favor of joining NATO, there is obviously a significant amount of potential volatility in the levels of public support.

12. For these questions we report only the 1997 data. In almost all cases the expressed support in the three countries has increased somewhat over time since 1995, whereas only in Poland has that increase been fairly dramatic (with the notable exception of the stationing of NATO troops which has remained at or near the 55 percent level). See Tables 2-5 for all 3 years.

13. To be consistent with the argument of this essay, it is only fair to acknowledge that a specific attack on another NATO member could reconfigure public opinion in all of these countries. If, as we argue here, these opinions are very weakly held and potentially unstable, then it is certainly possible that public support could shift very quickly in the face of a real crisis. However, and also consistent with the argument presented here, hoping for such a serendipitous crystallization of public support after a crisis has broken out is hardly what one would recommend as sound strategy.

14. U.S. cost estimates alone have ranged from a low of \$1.5 billion by the Administration (certainly the cost optimists) to a high of \$125 billion by the Congressional Budget Office. Other U.S. cost pessimists have even scoffed at this latter figure as grossly underestimating the total costs to the United States of NATO enlargement, pointing out that such figures do not include the massive aid and low-cost loan programs that are already going to these countries. As with so many aspects of this debate, the approach being taken seems to be one of proceeding with enlargement and then hashing out these specifics in later political battles.

15. An examination of public opinion in all 16 current NATO members is obviously impossible in this essay. Therefore, we shall limit this overview to the three major European members (France, Great Britain, and Germany) and the United States (which will be covered in a separate section). Additional survey data are available through USIA on Italy, and a number of the smaller NATO countries have had independent studies of public opinion conducted. So a more comprehensive analysis would be possible if time and space allowed.

16. "Out-of-area" or "out-of-business" was one of the many slogans heard in the early 1990s that characterized this debate. If the Alliance did not redefine its strategic purpose, there would be no reason for it to continue. According to Josef Joffe, alliances die when they win or when they lose. Joffe drew the analogy between a dying alliance and a firm that faces a "severe downward shift of the demand curve for its classical wares." In order to survive it had four basic choices, two of which entail "marketing a new product and conquering new markets," precisely what he says NATO has done since the Cold War ended. See Josef Joffe, "NATO After Victory: New Products, New Markets, and the Microeconomics of Alliance," in David G. Haglund, ed., *Will NATO Go East? The Debate Over Enlarging the Alliance*, Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, 1996, p. 58.

17. As reported in "NATO Enlargement: Public Opinion on the Eve of the Madrid Summit," Washington: U.S. Information Agency, May 1997, p. 9.

18. These data are reported in Franz-Josef Meiers, "Germany's 'Out-of-Area' Dilemma," in *Force, Statecraft and German Unity: The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices*, Thomas-Durell Young, ed., Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996, p. 17.

19. It is important to recall in our discussion of this question that these three countries were widely known to be the most likely new members of NATO at the time this survey was conducted. In other words, there is every reason to believe that respondents did not see these three countries and the issue of their membership in NATO as mere speculation. These and the following 1997 survey data are reported in "NATO Enlargement: Public Opinion on the Eve of the Madrid Summit," p. 10.

20. See, for example, "Much of the credit for the smooth legislative ride [for NATO enlargement] in Europe goes to Germany, where support for expansion was overwhelming. The treaty passed parliament today by a 555 to 37 vote, with 30 abstentions." *The Washington Post*, March 27, 1998, p. 30.

21. Meiers, "Germany's 'Out-of-Area' Dilemma," p. 17.
22. As reported in "NATO Enlargement: Public Opinion on the Eve of the Madrid Summit," p. 16.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
24. *Ibid.* These results are from a survey sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and conducted by Frederick Schneiders Research (FSR) in April 1996.
25. These findings have been reported in numerous newspaper articles and editorials over the past several months. This particular quote is from Carla Anne Robbins, "How Little-Debated Expansion Plan Will Alter the Structure of NATO," *Wall Street Journal*, March 12, 1998.
26. Tyler Marshall, "U.S. Public Acutely Uninterested . . .," *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 1998.
27. See Ambassador's Hunter's comments quoted in Note 1. Alexander Vershbow, Ambassador, U.S. Mission to NATO, makes an argument similar to Hunter's when he observes that "More than 1,000 articles published during the past year and a half have covered all aspects of NATO's evolving role. More than 300 conferences have been held in Europe and North America, including several in Russia. Twelve hearings before Congress in the past six months—with more than 550 pages of testimony—have explored the details of NATO's mission and membership and examined arguments from every point on the political spectrum." While I don't dispute the factual basis of the Ambassador's statements, I find the inference that a serious and meaningful public debate has taken place unsubstantiated by the evidence. For whatever reasons (and recalling that the "Why" question is not the focus of this analysis), the public has remained largely uninterested in and uninformed about the enlargement issue, and the opinions are weakly formed and held. See Alexander Vershbow, "The Case for NATO Expansion," *The Washington Post*, April 7, 1998, p. A22.
28. Richard Sinnott, "European Public Opinion and Security Policy," Chaillot Paper #28, Paris: Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, July 1997, p. vii.
29. Something similar occurred in the Czech Republic where the 200-member lower house of parliament voted 154-38 in favor of NATO enlargement on April 15, 1998. (*Reuters*, April 15, 1998.) However, the vote was taken in an "emergency session" of the lower chamber, called for the specific purpose to vote on NATO membership and "thus avoid

any delay caused by early June elections and the political stalemate that is likely to follow." *European Stars & Stripes*, April 15, 1998, p. 4.

30. Quoted in Katharine Q. Seelye, "Arms Contractors Spend to Promote an Expanded NATO," *New York Times*, March 30, 1998, p. 1.

31. The potentially interesting debates on the issue, and perhaps the only ones that could lead to a derailment of the entire process, may occur in Turkey and Greece where enlargement can conceivably become linked to the Cyprus issue and the continued unwillingness of the EU to extend an offer of membership to Turkey.

32. This despite the fact that 74 percent of German respondents supported NATO involvement in such crises, once again illustrating the point that the public is happy to be a part of NATO as long as their country does not have to act as part of the Alliance.

33. In this narrow view, Bosnia probably qualifies as part of Europe whereas other parts of the Balkans are more questionable, and potentially serious trouble spots where very important, if not vital, interests may be involved (for example the Caucasus) do not.

34. Consider, for example, the potential friction that lies down the road between the United States and its European allies over trade and finance issues when the Euro begins competing with the dollar for status as an international currency. See for example, Martin Feldstein, "EMU and International Conflict," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, November/December 1997, pp. 60-73; and C. Fred Bergsten, "The Dollar and the Euro," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 4, July/August 1997, pp. 83-95.

35. Guido Lenzi, Preface, in Sinnott, "European Public Opinion and Security Policy," p. v.

36. Sinnott, "European Public Opinion and Security Policy," p. vii.

CHAPTER 3

THE CHANGING FACE OF NATO AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN RESPONSIBILITIES

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In his book, *Diplomacy*, Dr. Henry Kissinger describes the art as one of balance, principally between moral and efficacious approaches to international problems. His model for the moral is Woodrow Wilson's concept of universal law. "[Neither] equilibrium, nor national trustworthiness, . . . [nor] national self-assertion were, in Wilson's view, the foundations of international order," Kissinger wrote. Instead, "Wilson argued that binding arbitration, not force, should become the method for resolving international disputes." And this would be achieved through the establishment of his greatest prize, the League of Nations.

For the efficacious, Kissinger selected Theodore Roosevelt and his notion of "muscular diplomacy." Kissinger asserted that:

Roosevelt commands a unique historical position in America's approach to international relations. No other president defined America's world role so completely in terms of national interest, or defined the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power.

Kissinger went on to quote Roosevelt in a private letter to a friend as saying, "If I must choose between a policy of blood and iron and one of milk and water . . . I am for the policy of blood and iron. It is better not only for the nation but in the long run for the world."

If we can accept Kissinger's construct of Wilson and Roosevelt as the poles, then most of our discussion lies somewhere in between. The North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Alliance is neither a comprehensive collective defense on the Wilsonian model, nor is it a cynical figleaf for exercise of U.S. unilateral interests. Yet it has aspects of both. On the one hand, NATO operates on the principle of one-for-all and all-for one. On the other hand, very little happens within the NATO structure that is not either initiated by Washington or done with Washington's approval. The United States is the clear leader in the organization, and, if any member wishes to develop some new aspect of European or Mediterranean security—or in some cases, in areas well beyond those regions—it must make a point to check things out with the Americans.

Our question today is not whether it is good policy to enlarge the Alliance or not. Expansion is a given. Our task is to examine the security challenges and to determine our force structure requirements in the wake of the decision. But to do that, we need to have a firm understanding of what we are dealing with.

The emphasis which the expansion initiative places upon enhancement of a strong military alliance, amenable to U.S. direction, would seem to place it considerably closer to Roosevelt's "muscular diplomacy" than to Wilson's "universal law." Chancellor Bismarck, the all-time champion of "blood and iron," would like that. But the line has not been so clearly drawn. If the pro-expansionist school is sincere in its wishes to "stabilize" Central Europe and rejects placing limits upon how far membership might eventually go, the "universal law" school can take heart. President Clinton has specifically refused, for example, to rule out Russia as an eventual member. Perhaps it is a matter of timing: Theodore Roosevelt today, Woodrow Wilson tomorrow.

There is a secondary argument about costs, but in my view that can be overdone. There was no *a priori* debate about costs in the original formation of NATO, nor in any previous expansion. The discussion of costs is like the discussion of a gas in a closed container. The gas will expand

or contract to accommodate any allowance or limitations of space. Clearly, expansion costs may be higher or lower according to how much the Alliance wishes to accomplish among the new members and how expeditiously. It may also depend rather heavily upon esoteric factors in the black art of cost accounting. As in the law and religion, costs may be interpreted to support almost any case one wishes to make. Engineers may point out that compressed gasses generate heat and pressure, but, in my view, that is not the same thing as light.

More important, I believe, is an understanding of what has happened to NATO since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO of yesteryear was an instrument of collective military deterrence and defense, with a multinational political structure resting on top of a hard core of national military formations. The latter provided the real strength of the organization. For the most part, national ground forces below army group level had little to do with one another.

In sharp contrast to this pattern, we now see the operations in Bosnia being conducted with a much higher degree of international intimacy, even though 18 of the countries represented in the force are not members of NATO. Some units are integrated at the platoon or detachment level. And this is not unique to the Balkans. International exercises, dealing with a much wider range of possible contingencies, are under way somewhere in Europe virtually all the time. And, as in Bosnia, participants are drawn from a much longer list of countries than that defining NATO. Further, not all the participants aspire to NATO membership. As General William Nash has pointed out, a Finnish major served on his Eagle Task Force staff in Bosnia in an international capacity last year, although Finland has not elected to apply for membership in the Alliance.

What has happened? It may be too early to discern the full dimensions of the phenomenon, but clearly this is not

the NATO we all grew up with. The organization has been downsized, reorganized, redeployed, and regenerated under starkly different concepts. Currently deployed outside its normal area of operations are 33,000 of its troops, and it has picked up an association with 28 other countries.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the precious words which provide that "... an armed attack against one or more of [the member states] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all ..." still apply, but the milieu in which the organization exists has changed. Almost all of the countries of Europe—including Russia—have expressed a common wish to belong to a new continental regime which features democratic governments, free market economies, and military forces organized and operated along Western lines, well interconnected with one another. While many aspire to formal NATO membership, others do not, and there is no obvious set of characteristics determining the difference.

Countries from Slovenia to Kyrgyzstan have accepted invitations to join a new organization dubbed the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP is a grouping launched in 1994 to assist countries interested in developing closer association with NATO. The surprise is that, while a number of states have looked upon PfP primarily as a path to NATO membership, the program has developed a dynamism of its own, even among those without clear NATO ambitions.

Early last year the Alliance moved to enhance the PfP concept by strengthening the political consultative machinery, increasing the operational roles of the participants, and providing for their greater involvement in decisionmaking and planning. National delegations at NATO Headquarters may henceforth be accredited to the new Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at the ambassadorial level, and general officers from the PfP countries may serve as chiefs of their staff delegations, paralleling the NATO Military Committee. The list of areas

of PfP cooperation have been increased to almost 1,000 different activities, encompassing virtually all of those of a full member of the Alliance, including defense policy and strategy, air defense, and service in combined joint task forces (CJTF).

In the words of the U.S. representative to NATO, Ambassador Robert Hunter, the difference between full membership in NATO and participation in PfP is becoming "razor thin." Similarly, a senior Finnish official described his country's present strategy as coming within a "whisper" of NATO membership while ensuring that the country would be prepared to cross that line should the circumstances warrant it. Finland belongs to the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as PfP.

Dr. Paul Cornish, lecturer in defense studies at King's College, London, describes the changes in NATO as a shift from "an alliance of necessity" (under the threat of Soviet attack) to "an alliance of choice." If this is true, it should not be surprising to see increasing numbers of NATO operations undertaken by an assortment of NATO members and nonmember PfP participants under the CJTF concept, according to their individual interests. In some cases, we may find that some PfP states are more ready, willing, and able to play important roles in local or regional contingencies than some allies of long standing.

While most of the funding for PfP reorganization and training must come from their own resources, limited amounts of aid may come from the Western Alliance. The United States has pledged support to the extent of \$100 to \$150 million per year. One can imagine that, if certain PfP countries become especially supportive of the common interest, such funding may increase.

There is no question that formal membership in NATO is the front burner issue for some of the PfP participants—particularly the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These countries are among those which have

historically suffered as much as any as a result of their location between major warring powers or from chronic local instabilities. They are looking to a new era of peace through association with Western strength and organized civility to protect them from similar depredations in the future. Others, such as the neutrals of recent decades, are less interested in NATO membership, but recognize both economic and security benefits in other structures. As Bundestag member Klaus Francke, chief German delegate to the North Atlantic Assembly, wrote recently,

... in the long term, EU membership and hence participation in the European area of economic prosperity, will offer as much stability, and therefore security, as the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

And this is the point to be grasped from the great changes which are happening on the European continent. Barring reemergence of a totalitarian threat from the east, NATO expansion may be overtaken by a related, but much broader, development impacting many more countries. As they develop, many PfP forces will become virtually indistinguishable from those of the lesser NATO partners. The sole difference will be the applicability of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Yet this trend is in motion at the very time when there is no visible existential threat to anyone, member or nonmember. Hence, the instrument which is supposed to make the difference (Article 5), while important psychologically, is likely to become less defining of a nation's security than other aspects of association with the West.

Fortunately, most analysts agree that the Alliance has time to assess and adjust its course over the next few years. There is no acute threat in Europe. If Russia can survive the internal assaults of its fringe politicians, the likelihood of European continental polarization will decrease substantially. A deemphasis by the West on NATO expansion over the next few years may be just the matter which would most help the moderates to hold on to power. In the meanwhile, a broad array of countries, together with their armed forces,

will be drawing closer to the Western model. What, then, does this analysis suggest to us for our force shaping?

First, it suggests that there is a wealth of potential power contained in the forces now seeking to identify themselves with NATO. While many of them may appear to have limited combat capabilities by big-war standards, they are proving themselves capable of more modest operations, especially peacekeeping. As they gain experience and further develop their capacity for interoperability with Western forces, they should be capable and willing to play a larger role in such undertakings of common interest.

Second, commensurate with a larger role for the smaller states should be a gradual reduction in the requirements for major power involvement. Undoubtedly, forces from one or two of the major powers will be required to provide the critical nucleus for successful operations under the NATO standard, but the requirements for a high density of U.S., British, and French forces should diminish.

Third, the seachange in NATO's functions and capabilities does nothing to diminish requirements for U.S. forces elsewhere in the world in pursuit of U.S. national interests. The United States should encourage the gradual shift of weight of military responsibilities in Europe, and possibly beyond into neighboring regions, to its NATO partners, to include the forces of the PfP. U.S. forces should be more carefully husbanded to emphasize their capabilities for responding to the national strategy, featuring a capability for dealing with two near-simultaneous major contingencies, either unilaterally or in conjunction with friendly states.

Finally, we do not have the comfort of a clear choice between Wilsonian idealism and Roosevelt's brand of "blood and iron." The world will remain a complex environment in which there will be occasions for the exercise of a full range of political, economic, and military initiatives and policies, either in conjunction with allies or unilaterally, for the protection of our interests. As far as military options are

concerned, they may extend from such limited undertakings as the protection of our shores against hoards of unwelcome migrants, to the deterrence or execution of intercontinental nuclear exchange with a mid-level state of a revanchist bent, or with a major peer-level power. And yet, we have not devised an economic system or social structure willing, or able, to underwrite all of the costs.

We have shrunk our forces to the point where they can no longer reasonably shoulder all of the responsibilities we have so glibly assigned to them. The tempo of their operations in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres is approaching the breaking point. We must allow them to shed some of the missions which are in the common interest but which impinge most sharply on their capabilities for meeting others less cogent to our friends in the NATO regions of concern.

We have, of course, spoken of burdensharing for many years, but never before have we had such an opportunity for divestiture of tasks which have threatened to overload our military capabilities. There are many more potential load-bearers today than in the past. Wilson's concept of comprehensive international engagement in the peace-keeping business, while still, perhaps, beyond the reach of the world community in all its particulars, is becoming much more feasible in the NATO area than when he first suggested it. Whether that may eventually come to embrace a larger area of the globe, or to be suitable in a broader range of international problems, remains to be seen. Unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, we must continue to depend on "blood and iron," as we do on milk and water, but we may be able to shift the balance somewhat.

CHAPTER 4

THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF NATO EXPANSION

Frederick W. Kroesen

The pros and cons of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion have received wide attention in the past many months, with no diminution effected by the decisions made to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join. If anything, the arguments have heated up, and the predictions have been stated with greater conviction. Absent still, however, is much serious attention to the military aspects associated with the addition of new territory, the introduction of new forces, and the absence of common military doctrine.

The Dilemmas of Coalition Command.

NATO, since its inception, has faced a number of organizational and operational demands that can be referred to as the dilemmas of coalition command. Among the many challenges associated with the planned expansion—money, materiel, combined training, and operational doctrines—these dilemmas form a foundation from which to consider the requirements of the future. Even collectively they do not present insurmountable obstacles, but they do demand sober consideration and an understanding that costs, resources, and change are part and parcel with expansion.

First is the requirement for an organizational structure that can respond rapidly to a military crisis and effect the command and control of a force adequate for resolving an issue. NATO has such a structure, made up today of national commitments of like-minded people, equipped, trained, and organized in similar units and organizations that have become, if not interchangeable, certainly

interoperable on the battlefield. Their communications are linked, they are supported by certain common logistics systems, and their weaponry is compatible with the employment doctrine and munitions of NATO. In effect, the NATO armed forces have been shaped into round pegs provided by many nations to fill the round holes of the NATO structure. And they can be controlled by international headquarters schooled and practiced in common operational doctrine.

All of the newly invited nations have armed forces designed and organized generally as they were when they were members of the Warsaw Pact. They lack familiarity with the role of the military in a democratic society and for a democratic government. Their equipment is incompatible with the NATO systems, both operationally and logistically, they cannot communicate with NATO forces, their operational concepts and doctrine are different, and the functioning of their staffs and other headquarters agencies does not link them with common NATO entities.

None of these characteristics presents an unsolvable problem, nor do they imply inferiority of either system, but each is a major change that will require time, money, and a psychological acceptance that may be in short supply. The willingness of each nation, both old and new members, to contribute to the solutions of integrating the organizational structure must be assured, and some positive effort must be initiated to fit things together.

Second, there is the need for common understanding, a language with which to exchange thoughts, ideas, and directives. There is no more unifying human attribute than common language and no more divisive influence than an inability to communicate, to understand. In NATO, the adoption of a single language, English, has provided the common understanding necessary for coalition operations. This, despite the fact that NATO's current 16 nations speak at least 10 different languages as their native tongues.

The original NATO agreement decreed that all orders, directives, etc., would be published in both French and English. Although time and effort at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) is still spent in preparing translations of documents, all work in the field at the international headquarters level is in English, and proficiency in English is expected as a criterion for assignment to a NATO headquarters. Conferences, meetings, training exercises, and NATO schools' instruction all are conducted in English, whether in Oslo, Izmir, London, or Mons.

Three factors have contributed to this condition. First, the United States and Great Britain, long the principal contributors to NATO, distributed manuals, maintenance directives, and training literature for their equipment that was printed only in English, and the armed forces of other nations, equipped with this materiel, had to accommodate to the available documentation.

Second, the German armed forces, from the date of their incorporation into NATO, have required their officer corps to develop a working knowledge of English. Over the years, this has resulted in a German officers school system in which NATO officers can address, lecture, and answer questions in English as readily as German and in German headquarters in which a foreign liaison officer can operate with no difficulty using the English language. The Germans' willingness to adopt English has made common understanding commonplace.

The third factor was the withdrawal of French forces from the military alliance. Following their departure, there was little practical reason for continuing the dual-language effort. As a consequence, the ability at the various echelons of NATO command to conduct activities in two languages atrophied over time to an almost complete ignoring of the original demand.

The ultimate impact of this development is that the new nations of NATO must be prepared to operate in English,

not internally among their own forces, but certainly whenever they are to be employed in coalition and when their officers and noncommissioned officers are assigned to NATO headquarters. We must presume that they are aware of this need, but the capability to fulfill it is another time-consuming demand.

The third dilemma is a question of loyalty—not as contrasted with disloyalty, but rather as a function of split loyalties. No one takes an oath to serve the NATO Alliance. In every Army, Navy, and Air Force, the officers and noncommissioned officers serve first their national responsibilities and serve NATO only as they are directed by their national authorities. The international command must develop, then, a belief in a common cause and rely on the voluntary commitment of forces and people to the resolution of a crisis.

Often these interests are in conflict. National forces train to their own standards, and not all are seen to be equally proficient. The limitations of some, because of less modern equipment, less intensive training, or less responsive logistic systems, affect the collective confidence of a coalition and thereby, perhaps, influence a commander's decisions in the field. Will an American commander hesitate to employ a Czech (or Belgian or Italian) artillery unit in a "danger-close" fire mission in front of American troops because he knows they have not trained as intensively as his own troops? Will he overwork his own helicopter pilots because other armies have not perfected night operations?

Prejudice grows easily when collective confidence is suspect. Troops have a natural affinity for their own even when there is no animosity among the nationalities engaged, but when a commander must make decisions regarding priorities for allocating a dwindling ammunition supply or medical evacuation missions, the observation that "He's taking care of his own first!" is always a threat to morale and to a commitment to a coalition mission.

There is also, at times, a conflict between missions assigned by national authorities and the demands of a NATO commander. Often a nation's forces have an area defense or security mission in their own country assigned by their own national command authority. When a NATO commander, given operational command of these forces, orders them to conduct operations out of their assigned territory, the national commander may have to abandon one responsibility or plead for some higher authority to change its requirement. In either case, operations are affected, and critical time may be lost.

The current NATO commands are aware of these conflicts and work in the environment with sympathy for each other's problems and an understanding that coordination, cooperation, and interoperability are goals that demand constant attention, practice, and good will. But this current status is the result of years of exercises, combined training, and diligent staff work that the new nations have not been party to. Their education in this regard is an essential task.

A fourth NATO dilemma has always been the complications of international requirements as they are affected by national capabilities. It has long been an axiom that logistics are a national responsibility. The absolutism of that requirement has been softened over the years as NATO built petroleum oil lubricants (POL) pipelines (none of which, incidentally, reach into the new territories) and standardized its munitions so that ammunition depots and supply points can serve all forces, but the fundamental policy remains in effect.

When a commander commits forces to a combat mission, he has an obligation to assure that the force is supportable, that is, he must be confident that national intelligence, logistics, and other support will be available. In NATO for the past almost 50 years, there has not been a major problem because forces were located generally in the areas in which they would fight, and each nation built its systems

to support its forces in those areas. In effect, the obligation prevented an Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) commander from transferring the Canadian brigade from Central Army Group (CENTAG) to Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) or from committing a Dutch brigade to a mission in Bavaria. It also required an American commander to give pause to a plan for using a German brigade in an American corps because American maintenance units were not equipped or trained to repair German tanks. And everyone was aware that most troops do not want to subsist very long, if at all, on rations provided by another nation, nor do they want to wake up in a medical facility where nurses and doctors speak another language.

A final dilemma is the matter of political controls. In World War II, the directive to General Eisenhower stated, "You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with other Allied Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."

Such a directive is unthinkable today unless it is accompanied by book-length explanations of how-to-do-it, rules of engagement, cautions regarding casualties, the employment of minimum force, and the expending of minimum resources. Decisions controlling operations, the allocation and employment of firepower, and the direction of the intelligence effort are today made at national political levels strongly influenced by the views, concerns, and sometimes vetoes of coalition partners.

In NATO such controls always limited the employment of nuclear weapons in exercises, always ignored questions or policies relating to chemical warfare, and always prohibited plans for cross-border operations regardless of the military requirements relating to such subjects. The addition of three more voices at the policy and decision-making levels now extant does not promise any reduction in the limitations now suffered by field commanders. Nevertheless, training as part of a coalition functioning

under these kinds of restrictions is a necessary exercise, and the plans and resources needed to conduct such training are a fundamental requirement.

The Founding Act.

These national and international commitments become extremely important when considering the varying interpretations of the Founding Act (NATO-Russia Founding Act signed in Paris, May 27, 1997). Whether or not there are limitations on the movement or location of forces, weapons systems, or NATO infrastructure in the new territories will have a major impact on coalition plans for operations and for national limitations, restrictions, or requirements to be assigned to their own forces.

The Founding Act, itself not a particularly limiting document, has given rise to complex statements regarding what it says, or should say, or is believed to mean. In general these comments express three positive statements:

- Adding new members will not over-extend NATO or demand military commitments beyond its current capabilities.
- No additional Army divisions, air wings, or naval carriers and submarines will be required to defend the new territories.
- There is no military requirement to station combat forces or nuclear weapons in the territories of the new members.

Unfortunately, these statements, usually associated with studies or reports projecting very modest "cost estimates," are not quite believable if one gives any thought to conducting military operations. NATO does not now have a power projection capability that can deploy and sustain a combat force. It relies exclusively on U.S. assets and capabilities for any crisis reaction, and there is no indication that any nation plans to expand its current arsenal to

provide the mobility needed to operate in the new territories. Given this lack, the third statement is just incorrect—there is a requirement anytime actual military operations are to be contemplated, let alone carried out. Furthermore, the addition of new frontiers and the incorporation of many square miles of land area make the first statement suspect if there is any credence to the original Article 5 statement that an attack on one is an attack on all.

Operations.

NATO no longer must maintain a monolithic defensive wall along a geographic boundary against an enemy whose total power approached equivalency, even superiority in some areas. It now must think more in terms of the rapid movement of forces to cope with a smaller threat or to reinforce the efforts of a member nation engaged against its neighbor. One can envision Turkey requesting NATO assistance against an Iraqi attack or if Azerbaijan and Armenia go to war on her border.

The need for NATO in Bosnia might someday be a pattern for settling a Rumania-Hungary dispute or another outbreak of hostilities in Cyprus. These kinds of operations will require the maintenance of quick-reaction forces, trained, well-equipped, and supplied, that are not delayed by questions of whose forces can be committed or encumbered by political restrictions established by individual nations.

There is also a problem of geography and the military weaknesses associated with a lack of contiguity. The Swiss have always been a nonthreatening island of nonmembership, but with the extension of NATO boundaries eastward, the Austrians became another neutral zone, benefiting from their association with NATO, but not contributing to its resources. If and when the Baltic States join, the Swedes and Finns will also be "behind the lines." And then there is the small enclave that used to be East

Prussia, now seen as belonging to Russia. Each of these areas presents military complications, blocking transportation routes, flight paths, and waterways. The states of the former Yugoslavia divide NATO from Greece and Turkey. Except for Slovenia, no mention is made of these states joining NATO, but their military potential presents concerns for operational planning.

Requirements.

The following, in general terms, express requirements facing SHAPE and the national military establishments of NATO.

First is the reshaping of the whole to guarantee that NATO compatibility is created and furthered with the introduction of new forces. Doctrine, the functioning of systems, plans for operations, and common training standards all must be incorporated in a single program whose purpose is the infusion of new military forces into the whole. That program then must be the base upon which combined, integrated training and exercises are developed and practiced routinely.

Secondly, the reorientation of all forces to the needs of force projection. The employment of a Dutch brigade on the Polish frontier or a British contingent in Turkey demands a revised and revamped NATO capabilities plan. The demands for transport, supply and service, medical support, postal service, rear area security, etc., will require the projection of these functions into operational areas, a projection exercised now only by the Americans and to some extent by the British. Importantly, such projections must consider the operational and security aspects of those territories not a part of NATO but which encroach or influence NATO operations.

As stated earlier, none of these requirements present insurmountable obstacles, and many have been addressed in the commitment of NATO forces to Bosnia and to the

Partnership for Peace activities engaged in by the forces of many nations in many locations. What is needed, primarily, is recognition and support for a long-term program that will address and reconcile the dilemmas of coalition operations to assure NATO compatibility of all of the forces of all of the nations of the Alliance.

CHAPTER 5

SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AFTER NATO ENLARGEMENT

Simon Serfaty

The post-Cold War years are over. A quick thought for the years lived since the reintegration of the two Germanys into one, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union into many, serves as a reminder that they have proven to be less demanding than in 1919-24, when the post-war system emerged only in the aftermath of the ill-fated French occupation of the Ruhr, or than in 1945-49, when the post-war structure began to settle with the signing of the Washington Treaty and, subsequently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The future is about to begin. Moving the clock forward to April 1999, when revisions to the Washington Treaty will be formally signed, helps anticipate issues of European security beyond the first phase of NATO enlargement, which can also be declared as over.

But what future—one that will resurrect the worst features of the distant past or one that will strengthen the best legacies of a more recent past? The evidence gathered to date remains contradictory. As should have been expected, the post-Cold War era in Europe was fraught with many instabilities and much uncertainty. These were seen and endured most visibly and most painfully in the Balkans, including but not limited to Bosnia and what used to be known as Yugoslavia. They have to do, too, with future conditions in what used to be known as the Soviet Union, including Russia, the defeated state, but also many of the countries that fell under its domination before and after the Revolution of 1917. On the whole, though, these post-Cold War instabilities and uncertainties have little to do with the Cold War. Rather, they mainly grow out of earlier wars, including the two world wars that conditioned the

distribution of power in Europe and beyond, during much of the 20th century.

As a result of these instabilities, the debate over the post-Cold War future of NATO proved to be stillborn. With the post-war expectations quickly exhausted, calls for new structures that would substitute for wartime alliances quickly faded: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gained a new name and then disappeared. For a short while after 1989, calls for a dissolution of NATO were heard, mainly from those who had been making the same calls during the Cold War as well. Since 1993, however, these calls have become less frequent and the centrality of NATO has been less and less challenged. Concomitantly, expectations of a quick and full completion of the European construction have lost the intensity they had after the Maastricht Treaty which had been signed in December 1991. Instead, the war in Bosnia has confirmed that this is not Europe's time after all, whether for its separate nation-states or for the European Union (EU), to which 15 nation-states already belong, with more to come. At best, the time is half-before-Europe, pending on Europe's ability to take further and better care of its security needs.

Nor are there many questions raised any longer over the centrality of the U.S. role and power within NATO, and hence in post-Cold War Europe. If anything, compared to the aftermath of either one or both of the previous two world wars, there have been fewer calls for a return home, fewer indications of a collapse or a fragmentation of the victorious wartime alliance, and fewer indications of new hegemonial bids from either the defeated states or new contenders for regional or global hegemony.

In and of themselves, therefore, the legacies left from the long reprieve from history imposed by the Cold War are sound. These are especially in evidence in the West—the part of the continent, that is, that begins mainly where the Ottoman and Russian empires used to end. The legacy,

there, is that of a new European space that has been modified by five major events that have truly changed the established course of Europe's history: the collapse of colonial empires; the erosion of the nation-state; the end of the the Left-Right cleavage; the de-legitimation of wars; and the return of the New World into the Old.

Considered separately, these changes are well-known. The colonial wars that followed the two world wars provided a global stage in which conflicts in East-West relations could erupt at the least cost for its main protagonists, but they also served frequently as a catalyst for discord in transatlantic and intra-European relations. The Left-Right cleavages, which had been a recurring source of serious instabilities from within each European state since 1919, became an invitation for destabilizing political intrusions from without after 1945. After Europe's nationalisms were protectively forced into the cage loosely called "Europe," the progressive transformation of nation-states into member states has imposed the institutional obligations made to the collective "We" by all member states on the sovereign "I" of each nation-state. On the western side of the continent at least, Europe's taste for armed conflicts, too, has soured after the orgy of violence endured during both world wars, but also because of the impotence showed during the Cold War when the countries of Europe could neither gain their autonomy nor regain their independence, let alone whatever control they used to hold over distant lands. Last but not least, the post-war U.S. decision to stay in Europe, which defined Europe after 1945, proved to be far more entangling than the Truman administration had envisioned, both during the Cold War when the U.S. commitments grew steadily and since the Cold War as these commitments could no longer be reversed.

These developments were all linked, and how these linkages worked has not been discussed as fully as the ways in which each emerged and unfolded separately. For example, it is after the small states of Europe had lost their empires in Africa and Asia that their quest for space took

the more civil form of European integration. Thus, the colonial wars end at about the time when a small European Community is launched and the political wars within each of its six initial members begin to recede—say, between 1958 and 1963. In turn, the sense of an ever wider European “community” of states enlarged to nine and more states, coupled with the rise of never-ending affluence and the end of increasingly debilitating colonial conflicts, helped delegitimize the use of force both from within and from without. Such prosperity and stability among the allies in turn emerged as an open invitation for the United States to disengage from the “over there” of yesteryears, or at least achieve a more equal and more equitable sharing of the many burdens of the West, whether in defending its values in the East or in extending its interests in the South.

As the century ends, sustaining the changes that have conditioned the transformation of Europe since the century began represents a defining challenge for the years to come. A reversal of the trends inherited from the Cold War could take different forms. Thus, with regard to countries at the periphery of the continent, there is little danger, of course, of the European states attempting to rebuild their empires in Africa or in Asia—at least not by force. These days are over. Still, the South will continue to play a central role in the life of Europe, as well as in Europe’s relations with the United States and Russia. This role is especially decisive on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, where lies an arc of Islamic crises extending from Algeria and the balance of North Africa and farther south, to Turkey and the Muslim republics of the defunct Soviet Union.

The return home of Europe’s old empires can take many forms. Most evident is the fact and the threat of large inflows of immigrants intent on leaving the harsh economic and political conditions that prevail in their respective countries to settle in the former mother country or elsewhere in a broad and affluent Europe made wide open by agreements designed to end frontiers. Alternatively, former imperial dependencies can export to the former

mother countries either economic scarcities with a manipulation of the price and supply of vital commodities, or they can export sheer violence with terrorism and the like—either export being, of course, the source of serious political instabilities.

In either of these conditions, the question of Islam in Europe—a question distinct from, but admittedly related to, the question of Europe and Islam—is real and may raise a significant, possibly decisive, challenge to European security. Relations with Islam have been experienced in Europe differently than in the United States, and they are still lived differently not only from one side of the Atlantic to the other but also from one European state to another. After 1999, this challenge to Europe's security could quickly become internal, even more than it might be external, as the threats raised by the radicalization of an Islamic diaspora within many European states would be all the more genuine as they could rely on potential ties with the radical Islamic states abroad. More broadly, Europe's relations with Islam, and Islam's relations with Europe, impact on political trade-offs and bargains within the EU: such important issues as Schengen or the allocation of structural funds, and by implication of EU enlargement to the East, fall into the new North-South divide that characterizes the EU at 15. Finally, in a growing number of cases—including the Gulf (over "dual containment"), the Middle East (over the Arab-Israeli peace process), and even North Africa—how to deal with Islamic revolutionary states has a significant impact on Europe's relations with the United States, and even Russia.

The end of the Left-Right cleavages does not mean the end of political divisions and hence, the end of political and even regime instabilities. Already during the Cold War, cleavages within the Left and within the Right were often as significant as the Left-Right cleavage, just as the U.S. opposition to the Left, especially the communist left, was occasionally more significant than the U.S. opposition to the conservative Right, especially the nationalist Right. Now,

however, the collapse of communism has given the socialist Left a new lease on life in the largest European states: in Britain and Italy first, and in France next. Later in 1998, the social democrats' new bid for power in Germany may end 15 years in the opposition. Europe's non-communist Left is all the more at ease in this new political environment as it no longer needs to be revolutionary. Compassion for the unemployed sells well, and claims of competence are especially convincing if and when these claims are made relative to, and against, the insufficiencies of those in power.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the collapse of the Soviet Union restores for the extreme right prospects for a legitimacy denied by its conservative competitors because of the Cold War against totalitarianism. Being an assertive nationalist may no longer be as "bad" as was the case earlier. In countries like Austria and France, the extreme right commands between one-sixth and one-fourth of the electorate. In Italy, a reborn neo-fascist party regains its political legitimacy around a dynamic new leader who contends for national leadership. In this case, too, Germany might be next as it unloads the debilitating burdens of uniqueness and rediscovers a past that Germans had previously learned to master by pretending that there was no past.

Political changes in Europe after NATO enlargement could be quite significant. Renewed clashes within the two sides of the political spectrum and between them risk a fragmentation of the current consensus and public outbursts of anger aimed at the EU or NATO, as well as at the United States. The risk, too, may be over changes in the constitutional frameworks that helped achieve stability during the Cold War. In some cases, the constitutional risk is to do nothing, as in France where political cohabitation between President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin until 2002 would erode the presidential identity of the 1962 constitution, and end the Fifth Republic as it has been known since de Gaulle. In other cases, as in

Italy, the risk is over doing something, like a constitutional reform that would launch a presidential regime that gives precedence to charisma *à l'italienne* (i.e., that of the neo-fascist Fini) over competence *à l'américaine* (i.e., that of the neo-centrist Prodi).

Whatever may happen, it will happen around "Europe" as the defining political issue. For it is now the intrusion of the European Union into the day-to-day lives of each nation-state that can best motivate political ideologies that will enable the state to claim that it protects the citizens from the market, and the nation's identity from the Union.

In a narrow sense, the EU is the victim of its own agenda: too much Europe may be killing it, and the EU suffers from an agenda overload whose rigid timetable carries dangers of derailment with every delay or setback. The main issues of the agenda are known: the euro of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999 when the EU states will begin a long farewell to their currencies; another Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in or around the year 2001, to address the issues of institutional governance that were not settled in 1996; and enlargement by 2003, when the EU will begin its expansion to 21 states. The scope, complexity, and significance of this agenda are truly unprecedented: deepen in order to widen, widen in order to deepen, and reform in order to do both. In every instance and for all 15 members, the EU will cost a lot of money, will take away a lot of sovereignty, and will impose a lot of austerity—in short, the EU now promises to impose a lot of pain that will cause a lot of public resentment.

In a broader sense, the EU is victimized by its own successes. Nonmembers view it as a short cut for economic prosperity and democratic stability. Members continue to view it as a recipe for affluence at home and influence abroad. The latter's growing awareness of the costs of integration, and the former's future discovery of the costs of membership are what gives the process unprecedented fragility. For the past 40 years, whenever community

building in Europe carried a cost (meaning, economic dislocations or erosion of sovereignty) that cost could be contained with vocal national leaders (whether General de Gaulle in the 1960s or Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s) or with new institutions (like the European Council in the 1970s). Now, in the 1990s neither can be found. Although Helmut Kohl remains a forceful and committed "European" leader, he is not an identifiable "national" leader for Europe. Similarly, the Euro-Council envisioned to protect each EU state from the European Central Bank is not likely to be effective if the euro is going to work: no institutional gimmick is going to hide the further erosion of sovereignty under conditions of economic hardship in the continent.

The mixture of economic and cultural crisis—meaning, questions over affluence and identity—has never had good consequences on Europe. Now, however, the countries of Europe lack the means and the will to fight together as a union of states, let alone fight alone or, least of all, with each other. Plans for a Western European Union (WEU) should be encouraged, but they remain an aspiration more than a reality. The war in Bosnia could have been the catalyst for the further development of WEU, but the issue proved to be too demanding militarily under conditions that were too distracting politically. As elsewhere and nearly everywhere, the mood in Europe is inward and the interests are self-centered. Now, the focus of EU attention is on EMU. After 1999, only a derailment of monetary union could create enough national urgency, and release enough institutional energy, for a relaunch of Europe along the lines of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)—as proved to be the case in the mid-1950s, when the collapse of the European Defense Community became the catalyst for the decision to launch an economic community. To be sure, even a CFSP launch in 1999, whatever form that decision might take, would still leave any credible common *security* policy postponed for many more years, pending the resolution of numerous and complex institutional issues. Yet, in the intervening years, a CFSP could display a

common *foreign* policy centered on enlargement to the East before or after 2003, depending on how well EMU proceeds.

Finally, the future of the Cold War legacies in Western Europe is related to the future of U.S. involvement in Europe. Some still view the fact of even the perception of an American withdrawal, whatever form it might take, as a catalyst for action. Rather, it should be feared as a trigger for a generalized *sauve qui peut* whereby the nationalisms of Europe would be unleashed with a variety of bilateral deals within Europe, including Germany looking to the East, with France initially but alone next. A Franco-German *ménage à trois* with Moscow might thus balance an Anglo-Saxon *pas de deux* choreographed by the United States. Depending on the goals which these bilateral deals might seek for Europe, not to mention other deals struck between European states and non-European rogue states like Iraq, vital U.S. economic and strategic interests might be progressively at risk.

With the end of the Cold War transition, U.S. leadership is questioned more openly in much of Europe, and by many of the European states, as unreliable, hazardous, deceptive, intrusive, and unpredictable: unreliable because it tends to come late and remains tentative even after it has come; hazardous because the risks of failure are often assumed by the protected parties; deceptive because of a tendency to not do what is said and not say what is done; intrusive because of an overbearing hegemonial posture that is all the more cumbersome as, precisely, it is viewed as unreliable, hazardous, and deceptive; and, last but not least, unpredictable because the quality of U.S. leadership and the sustainability of U.S. policies seem to depend on internal factors which many in Europe view as incomprehensible or irrelevant. Still, even as American power and leadership are questioned, neither is truly in question, whether in Europe or in the United States. That such would be the case matters. On both sides of the Atlantic, the case for American involvement is a case based on interests: nowhere else can there be found a relationship

that is as *complete* as the relationship between North America (the United States but also Canada) and Europe, a relationship that relies on decisive security ties, as well as on inescapable economic, political, and even cultural ties.

There are many remaining points of strategic, economic, and political derailment, however. Thus, in coming months and years causes for concern might include a defeat in the Balkans, meaning an unlikely decision to withdraw U.S. forces before the Dayton agreements would have been convincingly fulfilled or without preserving minimal order in Kosovo; unmanaged conflict in the Gulf or in the Middle East, meaning a European perception of U.S. policies implemented for national goals at the expense of the allies' needs, combined with a U.S. perception of the allies as good-weather friends; or even a military conflict in Asia, including the like of Korea or Taiwan, which the European allies would choose to ignore. No less significantly, points of transatlantic derailment might also include an economic crisis reminiscent of the interwar years that bridged the gap between the two world wars: for example, a monetary storm in Europe after the hypothetical collapse of EMU—with, without, or because of an economic meltdown in Asia—could trigger an agonizing reappraisal of the post-Cold War transatlantic economic ties notwithstanding the interests that justify these ties. Finally, a political crisis that would result from an open discord over security issues in the Gulf or elsewhere, or from an open confrontation over competing corporate interests, and lead the U.S. Congress to force unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. president and counteraction on the part of the EU Commission prompted by some of its members, would be a great concern.

Thus, the main security challenges in Europe are mostly of its own making. An enlarged NATO does not truly address many or most of these instabilities, except for the fact that it represents the conduit for a U.S. commitment which, as argued, Europe continues to need because of its own insufficiencies, and continues to expect in spite of itself. That NATO might stand at the margin of the most direct

challenges to Europe's stability during the coming years is not troubling. In 1949, too, the North Atlantic Treaty signed by the United States and 10 European states plus Canada did not attend to many of the most immediate security issues faced by the European allies, including imperial wars in the South and political wars at home that came dangerously close in some cases to outright civil wars. After the Cold War, the commitment to NATO enlargement was made without explaining the interests that would justify it. Needless to say, it should have been the other way around: interests define commitments, and the will for a commitment emerges out of a shared awareness of the interests that justify that commitment.

After 1999, the case for enlarging NATO beyond its then-19 members will have to be made on strategic grounds as well as on institutional grounds. In other words, it will no longer be enough to suggest that this is Romania's turn—or that of Slovenia or that of the Baltic states. Instead, it will be necessary to define the Alliance's needs for the missions and objectives sought by its 19 members, and it will be necessary, too, to determine which new members either Western institution should welcome in order to fill the new gaps open by the ongoing rearticulation of Europe's civil and stable space.

The full institutional logic of NATO and EU enlargement has not been articulated yet. Even as NATO enlargement proceeds, it remains a policy without a rationale, notwithstanding the body of scholarly literature that helped promote it during the early post-Cold War years. In 1998, the decisive argument for enlargement was that the predictable cost of not enforcing the commitment to enlarge would far outweigh the unpredictable costs of going ahead with a fairly prudent decision—prudent *vis-à-vis* the new members (limited in number and carefully selected as to their location) but also, therefore, *vis-à-vis* Russia. After enlargement has been voted in the U.S. Senate, the decision to enlarge beyond 19 should be based more explicitly on a strategic rationale. An exclusively institutional case can be

made for the EU, which has an identity of its own as, literally, the 16th member of the European Union: affluence, and hence stability, without the EU is difficult to imagine. The same case cannot be made for NATO, whose members would not necessarily lose their security without the guarantees offered by the treaty and its organization. Now, instead, the rationale for NATO enlargement ought to be realistic, meaning that it should be threat-conscious in addition to being institution-conscious. It must be made differently—either more or less convincingly—about Romania than about the Baltic states or the Ukraine, on the basis of security needs and pending the evolution of Russian policies and objectives in the affected regions.

In 1949 as now, NATO and its subsequent enlargements (in 1952 and 1955) provided a security context within which Europe's internal questions of political stability and economic growth could be addressed, and community-building could be launched. In other words, while it may be argued that NATO alone did not produce peace within the North Atlantic area, the fact that it deterred war from without that area helped buy the time needed for the good Cold War legacies to build up. This carries two implications. First, the European economic community was a by-product of, and a prerequisite for, the transatlantic security community. In other words, the idea of Europe and the Atlantic idea were not only compatible, they were also complementary. It was understood that they would follow parallel tracks—each with its own locomotive, its own ambitions, its own capabilities; but it was also anticipated that at some point these parallel tracks would converge, with a Europe so self-sufficient as to make the Atlantic idea redundant, or with an Atlantic idea so well-rooted into reality as to make the idea of Europe secondary.

Accordingly, the evolution of NATO and the EU, including their enlargement as well as their institutional reforms, must be made not only compatible but also complementary. Both respond to a comprehensive institutional logic that shapes the patterns of space

redistribution. Questions of membership and interests, but also questions of timing and procedures—who and why, when and how?—are raised on behalf of a common Euro-Atlantic space whose articulation began more or less consciously after the two world wars, and proceeded more or less effectively during the Cold War. Each institution must remain aware of what the other does and cannot do: NATO and the EU should be aware of states that cannot enter the EU and NATO soon, whatever the reasons, and of any state that belongs to only one of these institutions. Within such a common space, the two processes of NATO and EU enlargement cannot be separated even as they remain separable because that space would achieve its coherence when a finite number of European states achieve converging membership in both institutions and with the United States. Such convergence can be anticipated in three successive phases.

First, after 1999, a NATO at 19 members would expand toward EU countries that are not yet NATO members, including Austria and (possibly) Sweden and Finland. With Romania, too, a strong candidate for NATO membership on grounds of security in the Balkans (but an unlikely candidate for EU membership for many more years), a post-1999 NATO expansion would respond to military needs in southeastern Europe and political realities in the EU and WEU without raising new risks in, for, or from Russia and other nonmembers. Simultaneously, an EU at 15 members would expand to 21 members by 2003, even though early admission for the smallest of the five Eastern contenders, namely, Slovenia and Estonia, would help confirm the seriousness of the EU process and the firmness of its members' commitment to achieve enlargement at the earliest possible time.

After 2003, a NATO at 21+ (NATO at 19 + Austria + ... + Romania) could consider additional enlargement to remaining EU neutral states (including, by that time, Ireland), the newly admitted EU states (including Estonia and Slovenia), and even the other two Baltic states

(depending on conditions in Russia). This next phase would also carry a 4-year timetable during which the EU, too, would expand to new NATO members not yet members of the EU (including Romania) and to states that complete the regional clusters in the Baltics (Latvia and Lithuania) and Central Europe (Slovakia). By that time, too, Norway might reconsider its long-delayed interest in EU membership. Finally, late during that period, too, access talks with Turkey could finally be launched lest Turkey be "lost" by the end of the decade as the only European member of NATO that would not be a member of the EU as well.

After that, past the year 2007 and nearing 2010, the convergence would be completed with decisions as to how much farther, if at all, the process might continue. By that time, too—for the 50th anniversary of the Rome Treaties—a new relationship between the United States and the EU would engineer explicit ties between NATO and the EU. These ties might take the form of a U.S.-EU treaty, a TAFTA (Transatlantic Free Trade Area), and new institutional arrangements for binding consultation between the United States and whatever type of institutional governance might have then emerged within the EU.

The integrated economic space of the EU, in close association with the United States, and a common Euro-Atlantic security community explicitly based on U.S. power are both futures that have already happened. That space will be all the more cohesive and safe as it continues to respond to some of the features that helped define it over the past 50 years.

- First, the United States may not be a European Power, but it is a Great Power in Europe. To pretend the former is misleading: the very history of the United States makes the closeness of its relations with Europe still look somewhat unnatural. But the tangible components of the U.S. presence in Europe can no longer be ignored: unlike the U.S. relationship with Asia, the U.S. relationship with Europe is complete.

- Second, the Atlantic Idea and the Idea of Europe are complementary. To pretend otherwise is self-defeating. After World War II, each was a precondition for the other; during the Cold War, each helped strengthen the other. After the Cold War, the future of each will condition that of the other, as well as of all others.

- Third, NATO and its enlargement is only one institutional venue for a return of the East into the West as part of the rearticulation of space in Europe and across the Atlantic. To pretend otherwise is not only to reduce the totality of the Cold War legacies to one dimension, but also to distort that dimension.

- Fourth, the enlargement of the Western institutions is only beginning, but it must be and remain finite. In other words, membership for all is not desirable for the good performance of either or both NATO and the EU, and membership in either the EU or NATO may not be desirable for all states in Europe.

Integrating these features in the formulation of the questions and answers raised by the new security challenges faced by Europe after the enlargement of NATO will help pursue the vision that was articulated 50 years ago as the Cold War was about to provide the rationale for a North Atlantic Treaty designed to extend America's stay in Europe. As these 50 years are remembered, they provide much room for satisfaction over what has been accomplished and leave much room for apprehension over what remains to be done.

CHAPTER 6
THE MIDDLE ZONE
AND POST-ENLARGEMENT EUROPE

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The three countries of the middle zone between Russia and NATO—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine—represent a new and important forward edge of the Atlantic Alliance and a crucial borderland in the new Europe. Barring any surprises in the current ratification process of NATO members, Belarus and Ukraine will soon share a border with the expanded Alliance. If, as some predict, a second round of enlargement in 1999 includes Romania for membership, Moldova will also become a border state. The proximity of these states to an enlarged NATO, their relationship to Russia and the other states of the former USSR, and the still unfinished work of political and economic reform in the region make them simultaneously states of great importance and great uncertainty.

By enlarging to the edge of this region, NATO encounters a qualitatively new boundary, different from both the current German-Polish border or the former inner German border. This boundary is neither a zone of near-term transition nor a clear division between allies and enemies. The character of this boundary will be crucial in determining the relationship between the Europe of the West's great institutions and the larger Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Belarus has made plain its opposition to enlargement and has dramatically turned its back on Europe as a whole; however, it presents no serious military threat to the Alliance. Both Moldova and Ukraine look westward for assistance and long-term opportunities to participate in Europe, yet these two states are plainly unprepared for membership in any of its great institutions.

The West must plainly turn to a set of policies that reflect both the character and importance of this middle zone.

However, the boundary between this region and the rest of Europe will not simply be determined by Western policies. These states themselves have a great deal to say about whether that boundary is hard or soft, relatively permanent, or liable to shift eastward. These countries are in the midst of transformations and will themselves determine what kind of states they will become, and ultimately, what kind of neighbors they will be. Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are not simply slower developing versions of the Visegrad states. They have a history of statelessness. In particular, they were in recent decades members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The tasks of forming state institutions and launching a sustainable economies are more daunting than those faced by Poland or the Czech Republic. These states not only must undertake political and economic reforms but carry out the fundamental work of building up the state itself. These complex tasks are still unfinished in all three states, making their future internal architecture and even stability less certain than that in Poland or Hungary.

Finally, Russia will also have an important influence on this region. Given long-standing Russian interests and constraints on its power, it is here that Russia's relationship to the West may well be determined. Geographically and historically, the three states of the middle zone have been more intimately tied to Russia or the Soviet Union than Poland and the other states of Central Europe. They have been the target of Russian integration policy in a way that the states of Central Europe have not and cannot be. All remain dependent on the Russian market and Russian energy supplies. Simply by their independence, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova challenge Russia's notions of itself, its boundaries, its identity, and interests. Ukraine and Belarus are important tests of Russia's attempts to create more closely integrated structures on the territory of the former USSR, yet they have responded in diametrically

opposite ways. NATO and eventual European Union enlargement mean that this middle zone will also be a region where Western and Russian interests crisscross, overlap, and potentially conflict.

The set of challenges likely to arise for the West from this middle zone is illustrated by the examples below. These include Ukraine's political and economic stagnation, the danger of violence in Transdnistr and possibly Crimea, Russian-Belarusian integration, the long-term stability of Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the constraints on Russia itself. These examples are by no means exhaustive, but they indicate the range of problems that are likely to emerge from the region. Ukrainian internal stagnation illustrates the continued problem of weakly established political and economic reforms. Transdnistr and Crimea recall the continued possibility of ethnic conflict. Russian-Belarusian integration, Russian-Ukrainian relations, and the systemic consequences of the constraints on Russian power offer the various options reshaping the region's international relations.

Ukraine Flirts with Stagnation.

Despite real progress, particularly after the election of Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Ukraine's political and economic reforms have slowed to a crawl.¹ Economic reforms have ground to a halt as key political and economic interests divide up the spoils that are emerging from privatization. A host of officials at the central and regional level who derive their power and wealth from the current system are attempting to preserve the Byzantine bureaucratic structure that gives them their say.

Corruption is pervasive, while foreign investment is rare. The general population has been worn down by 6 years of economic hardship, energy shortages, and collapsing social services. The government owes over \$2 billion in back wages and pensions. The Economist Intelligence Unit predicts modest real growth for 1998. These official

statistics still do not capture the yet unmeasured dynamism of the "informal sector" of the economy. The state remains the majority or largest shareholder in many cases. The lack of a clear legal base, weak courts, and bureaucratic corruption scares off most foreigners. Opposition to privatization, particularly in the communist and socialist-dominated eastern part of the country, remains strong.

To compound problems, Ukraine has entered a prolonged political season, framed by parliamentary elections in March 1998 and presidential elections in October 1999. What is at stake in the upcoming elections is not, as many observers feared in the early days of Ukrainian independence, the very existence of the state itself. Rather, the question is now what kind of state Ukraine will become. The broad alternatives can be stated starkly as a choice between Ukraine being part of Europe, even if imperfectly, or being relegated to Europe's periphery. A European Ukraine requires bold choices and actions. A peripheral Ukraine comes by default: the leadership need only follow the political rules of the game already deeply ingrained in the country.

The real prize in Ukrainian politics is not a seat in parliament but rather the presidency, and the events leading up to the 1999 elections will determine how much deeper the current stagnation becomes. Five of the six leading political parties in the country now define themselves in opposition to the president. The political infighting is already bitter. Kuchma has, in fact, had several of his rival's newspapers closed for violation of election laws. They are in turn accusing him of "authoritarianism" and threatening impeachment. It is quite likely that Ukrainian politics after the March 1998 elections will focus on weakening Kuchma still further.

As crippling as these conflicts of policy and personality are, they are only half the story. The most intense struggles in Ukrainian politics take place, not between parties, ideologies, or branches of government, but among the

political and economic leadership in Kiev and the regions. Various coalitions of leading politicians, bankers, and new- and old-style business leaders struggle for control over the state's wealth and for positions of power that will control its divestiture into private hands. As long as these elites are distracted by the still unfinished competition for power and property, there will be little energy left over for sound policy.

Despite the corruption and disenchantment which has come to characterize Ukrainian politics, elections have become a fact of Ukrainian political life. In time, elections, a stronger civil society, and the growth of independent media and non-governmental organizations might even force the candidates to differentiate themselves on the basis of policy and performance. Both former Prime Ministers, Yevhen Marchuk and Pavlo Lazarenko, are leading challengers to Kuchma. Marchuk has embraced the weak Ukrainian variant of European social democracy. Lazarenko has set his sights on the emerging business class, which he himself represents with all its virtues and vices. Kuchma has at times shown himself adept at cultivating both business and moderate Ukrainian ethnic constituencies. As of yet, however, there are no deeply rooted party organizations, no real labor unions or business organizations of the kind we in the West understand, and certainly no deep popular support that would ensure a grass roots base. In this election season, favorable long-term trends are likely to give way to opting instead for business as usual.

If this is the state of Ukrainian politics, why should the West care? Ukraine's problems are man made. They can and must be addressed by Ukrainians themselves. If the Ukrainian leadership is able to avoid the hard choices, then let them enjoy their spoils on Europe's periphery. After all, Ukraine is a stable enough place. Does the West really have much of a stake in Ukraine, especially a Ukraine that appears to have no real intention to take the steps necessary to show it wants to belong to Europe? As tempting as such a conclusion is, Ukraine's choice between Europe and Europe's periphery matters to the continent as a whole.

A choice in favor of the *status quo* in Ukraine does not merely perpetuate the country as it is today. It undermines the foundations that have made the current situation bearable inside the country and less dangerous for Ukraine's neighbors. It would certainly put in danger the policies that have dramatically lowered inflation and brought Ukraine a stable currency. It would exacerbate economic deprivation in the country as a whole, particularly along crucial ethnic and regional fault lines, such as Crimea.

A stagnant Ukraine will grow weaker and less coherent as a government, depriving it of the ability to handle future crises, whether inside the country or with its neighbors. Finally, it would convince the many skeptics in the West that they were right all along about Ukraine. It does not belong in Europe. The current momentum in Ukraine's ties with the West would erode in a way that would undermine the most important external supports for the political and economic reforms that are underway in the country. A western disengagement from Ukraine would adversely influence the course of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which have stabilized, in no small measure, because of the current strategic context provided by U.S. and Western interest in their normalization. A peripheral Ukraine would increase the danger that enlarging European institutions like NATO and the EU would find themselves on a much more unpredictable and unstable frontier.

The West, of course, cannot force the Ukrainian leadership to act against its immediate political interests. It cannot impose sound economic reforms or more open politics. It can, however, remain a strong stimulus for these reforms by reminding Ukraine of the choice it faces and the basic requirements for participation in Europe. The West can also make plain that its long-term support will be there for whichever leader, President Kuchma or one of his opponents, understands the choices and acts in a serious way to get the country moving in the right direction.

The Continued Dangers of Regional Conflict.

Both Ukraine and Moldova host potential sources of conflict inside their borders, which, if ignited, could have regional and even continental implications. The self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Republic (PMR), in the eastern portion of Moldova, made a forceful break in 1992 when armed militia occupied Moldovan administrative buildings on the right side of the Dniestr River, the crucial boundary between the sparring regions. The decision to launch armed attacks was prompted by the initial rhetoric which dominated Moldovan politics in the first years of transition. The Popular Front of Moldova, the primary political force at the time, tended to see independence as a transitional stage to reunification with Romania. Latin script for the Moldovan language replaced Cyrillic in 1989, and the Romanian flag was adopted in 1991. The prospect of what the Transdniestrians called "Romanization" alienated critical portions of the country, and in 1990 the Transdniestrian capital of Tiraspol voted to make the region autonomous territory. In 1991, Transdniestria seceded from Moldova just days after Moldova made its break with the Soviet Union.

Transdniestria is both ethnically and politically at odds with mainstream Moldova. In Transdniestria, fully 25 percent of the population is Russian, 28 percent Ukrainian, and only 40 percent Moldovan.² The ethnic difference is exacerbated by the region's overtly anti-democratic, nationalist, proto-Soviet political style. Igor Smirnov, self-appointed leader of the PMR, plays on nostalgia for the USSR and the desire for order and peace to maintain his "dictatorship" and advocate incorporation into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The presence of the Russian 14th Army in Transdniestria further complicates the situation. The Soviet 14th Army was a rather modest force by the standards of the Cold War, a second echelon mobilization base which could support operations in the Balkans and against Turkey. It has

declined in the past 6 years but still represents the greatest concentration of military power in the region and a source of supply for the PMR itself. It is not just the arms cache and materiel of the 14th Army to which the Transdnistrians are attached. A large segment of the population is retired 14th Army soldiers who identify not only with their former brigade but also with an empire which no longer exists.

Fighting in Transdnistr ensued in 1992 and continued until a cease-fire was imposed by Russia in July. Various and irregular Russian attempts to carve out a peaceful resolution failed. The Russians were more interested in wooing Moldova into the CIS than they were in brokering a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At times, Russia seemed to be using Transdnistr mostly as leverage to secure Moldovan entrance into the CIS. Russia, in fact, failed to transfer its dominant position within Moldova after the 1992 cease-fire into any real sustainable advantage.

In 1997, Russia, the Moldovan government, and representatives of Transdnistr and Ukraine made another attempt, concluding a Memorandum of Agreement in May 1997 that lays down the basic principles for resolving the conflict. Moldovan President Lucinschi and self-appointed Transdnistriean leader, Igor Smirnov, have held a number of face-to-face meetings attempting to translate the Memorandum's principles into a specific agreement that balances autonomy for Transdnistr with the unity and territorial integrity of Moldova itself. This process has produced agreements on military confidence-building measures in October and economic cooperation in November 1997. Yet the two sides remain far apart on basic political questions, with the Transdnistrians still seeking a measure of autonomy that is barely distinguishable from full sovereignty itself, including demarcated borders and membership in the CIS.

The May Memorandum, although it has not yet been implemented, does hold promise for a near-term resolution. The reason for this is that Russia is no longer the sole

outside power engaged in active mediation of the conflict. Ukraine signed the May Memorandum as a co-guarantor and has been active in direct mediation with the Moldovan government and the Transdnistrians. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has even offered to deploy Ukrainian peacekeeping forces to supplement Russian forces already on the ground. At Ukraine's insistence, the May Memorandum strengthens the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the expense of the CIS.³ Although multilateral mediation has been tried before, what separates the current effort from past failures is the level of Ukrainian activity, Russia's apparent willingness to tolerate it, and an increased role for the OSCE.

In Crimea, Ukraine has managed to avoid the eruption of deep ethnic and regional divisions into bloody conflict.⁴ A strong nationalist challenge arose in Crimea in 1994-95. A coalition of Russian parties emerged dominant in the parliamentary elections and elected one of their own presidents in 1994. Long-standing demands for a special status for the peninsula and wide-ranging autonomy appeared to be on the verge of escalating into full blown secession or unification with Russia. The Crimean leadership threatened a referendum to this end. Three factors defused the challenge. The Ukrainian leadership succeeded in making the dispute one of laws, not of force. The Russian government, especially after the invasion of Chechnya, stayed out of this dispute and did not support the Russian nationalist parties. Finally, economic and nomenklatura interest groups on the peninsula itself believed they had more to gain by dealing with Ukraine—especially as privatization began to take place in 1994-95.

Still, Ukraine's Crimea problem is not gone forever. Economic malaise or difficulties in implementing the Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the Black Sea Fleet could well restart dormant conflicts among Russian nationalists and partisans of an accommodation with Kiev on the

peninsula. The aggrieved Crimean Tatars could also become a source of political conflict as they seek a greater voice over political and economic life on the peninsula, a development that would clearly be opposed by the Russian nationalist parties and others on the peninsula who benefited from the forced exile of the Tatars and do not want to see old property issues reopened. Any flare-ups in Crimea could have deleterious effects on Ukraine's Russian and highly russified eastern regions.

These two potential sources of conflict, the still festering Transdnestr and the now quiescent Crimea, are daunting challenges to regimes still being tested by political and economic challenges of the first order. Any outbreak of violence in these areas would directly influence not only the forward edge of NATO itself, but bilateral and multilateral ties in the region that are crucial for the stability of Europe as a whole.

Russian-Belarusian Integration.

The Russian-Belarusian relationship comes the closest to "special" relations of any two countries in the former Soviet Union. Sharing common ethnic, religious, and cultural identities, Belarus has from the beginning sought close relations with Russia whom it historically sees as its chief protector and benefactor. The height of this relationship came on May 23, 1997, when they signed the Union Charter, bringing their two states into one theoretical body. Of course, the elaboration of this charter revealed deep sources of opposition in both countries to the practical development of this concept, leaving the two countries somewhere between allies and integrated partners.

In one aspect, the security relationship, integration has proceeded, albeit with fits and starts and with important limitations. The two sides have signed a series of military agreements which commit them to regular staff talks on key defense issues. The air defense systems of the two countries

have exercised together and are becoming more integrated. Russia is training key elements of Belarus' future officer corps. Russia also appears to have real influence over the personnel policies and the Belarusian Ministry of Defense. Belarusian air defense assets, early warning radar, and other military infrastructure are already a part of long-term Russian planning and joint use. However, Belarus still insists on restrictions that prevent the deployment of Belarusian forces outside the country and Russian forces inside Belarus.⁵ The staffing levels of Russian personnel at early warning and submarine communications facilities within Belarus is strictly capped and regulated. Cooperation among the border guards of the two countries has deepened, but Belarus continues to deploy only its own forces along its borders.

Thus even in the security sphere, this relationship falls far short of the union which its central document's title suggests. First, Belarusian President Lukashenko and the elite which supports him are not interested in opening up their own power base to unrestricted competition from Russian political and economic elites. Indeed, some of the Belarusian opposition to integration has arisen precisely because some of the Union's most vocal supporters in Russia, as well as key opponents, argue that in the long run, the union will not be that of two equal partners, but of a larger and smaller state. When Yeltsin welcomed Belarus into a "unified state" on national television on the eve of signing the Union Charter, Lukashenko responded that Belarus preferred a confederation. Speaking to his parliament in February 1997, Lukashenko vowed never to become part of a merged state with Russia, as a proposal from Russia had evidently outlined.

Second, part of the ruling elite in Russia considers Belarus to be dead weight obstructing Russia's own development. Due to last minute efforts by Russia's chief economic reformers, particularly Anatoly Chubais, the final charter did not allow for Belarus to have an equal voice in economic matters, something which Russian reformers felt

would doom their economy. In other words, the momentum of state-building has swept both Russia and Belarus up in a desire to pursue their own interests. At every point along the path to integration, these national interests have trumped alternative desires for a union.

Finally, Russia and Belarus have chosen different political and economic fates. The crisis during the summer of 1997 and its follow-up have borne out the comparatively enlightened character of Russian political influence. Pavel Sheremet, director of the Russian bureau of the Moscow-based ORT television network, was detained at the Belarusian-Lithuanian border on July 30, 1997, and charged with "premeditated crossing of the state border in a group."⁶ Over 2 months of heated negotiations took place at the highest levels before Lukashenko released Sheremet, and not without provocative comments from Russia. In fact, Russia would not dismiss, even at Lukashenko's insistence, Russian presidential spokesman Sergey Yastrzhembskiy's statement that "when the protection of the honor, dignity, and health of Russian citizens is at stake, the geopolitical interests of the country must become of secondary importance."⁷ In such an environment, Russia's relatively pluralistic political system and open media represent a subversive force in Belarus, and the regime has regularly complained of biased Russian television coverage.

Given the still uncertain nature of the Russian-Belarusian union and the West's obvious interest in ensuring that any future bilateral relationship takes a course conducive to stability in the region, a policy of isolating Belarus is counterproductive. Of course, no one is urging Western leaders to embrace Lukashenko, but the isolation of the Belarusian military at a time when they are formulating the terms of a long-term security relationship with Russia amounts to forfeiting Western interest in this crucial question. The range of bilateral and NATO-sponsored military-to-military programs, coupled with NATO's announced posture of military restraint in Poland, provides the perfect basis for a modest yet sustained

security dialogue with Belarus. Belarusian diplomats discovered rather late that they too would like a special agreement with NATO. Pursuing such an agreement is in Western interests, though celebrating its completion by a summit is not (as long as the politics of Belarus remains repressive).

Russian-Ukrainian Relations.

Russia's relations with Ukraine constitute one of the most significant bilateral relationships in Europe, and one of the most complex. Russia hopes that, over time, the two countries will return to what one former Yeltsin advisor called "a fraternal Slavic compromise," that is, an integrated relationship far closer than normal state-to-state ties. Ukraine wants an unambiguous state-to-state relationship with Russia—a view which is widely supported in the West. Both Ukrainian Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma have worked hard to produce such an outcome. In the past, these differences brought prolonged disagreement on key issues of the bilateral agenda, from the basic foundations of the bilateral relationship to the division and basing of the Black Sea Fleet. In the past 2 years, both sides have taken steps to move toward a new legal foundation for their relationship. In May 1997, Russia and Ukraine concluded an agreement on the status of the Black Sea Fleet and the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship treaty.

The Black Sea Fleet agreement ends 5 years of negotiations on the disputed Soviet fleet. In it, the two sides agreed to grant Russia a 20-year lease to key port facilities in Crimea. In return, the treaty is a clear Russian acknowledgment that Crimea and its chief port city, Sevastopol, are Ukrainian. The treaty also provides Ukraine with rent for the facilities in the form of debt relief and access to port facilities in Sevastopol, a provision the Russian side long resisted. The Friendship Treaty provides the basic outlines of the normal state-to-state foundation sought by Ukraine. In it, Russia provides the first legally

binding recognition of Ukraine's existing borders without conditions. While the Ukrainian parliament ratified the treaty in January 1998, Russia has yet to ratify it.

These recent breakthroughs in bilateral relations, however, come after several years of cautious crisis management by both sides. They have continually been at odds over the importance of the CIS and integration in general, NATO enlargement, economic issues, such as Ukraine's debt and the provisions for Russian-Ukrainian trade. While Russia has made integration of the former Soviet space a centerpiece of its foreign policy, Ukraine has relegated it to a necessary mechanism for achieving a "civilized divorce." Ukraine has, in fact, argued that integration has to be voluntary, primarily economic, and open to the broad integrative processes underway in Europe and the global economy. On NATO enlargement, once the question of nuclear weapons deployment in the new member states was resolved, Ukraine came out in favor of enlargement for Poland. Kuchma explicitly denied that NATO's new boundaries posed any military threat. Russia, on the other hand, saw nothing positive in NATO enlargement. On the economic front, Ukraine's nearly \$5 billion in debt to Russia, largely from unpaid energy bills, had to be renegotiated in 1995 and may come up again this year. In 1996, Russia slapped a 20 percent VAT on the importation of Ukrainian sugar and other goods, a matter settled only in late 1997.

In both countries, foes of normal state relations remain. Some in Russia still resent Ukrainian independence and Kiev's reluctance to support integration. Many in Kiev fear long-term Russian ambitions. The two countries are out of step economically, with each fearing that the other is using economic issues to its advantage. The long time frame for the Black Sea Fleet agreement—20 years—raises the prospect of a two-decade-long disagreement over implementation of what is a controversial agreement in at least some of its provisions for both sides.

The Russian role in Ukrainian foreign policy is still important, however. Kuchma and Yeltsin signed a 10-year economic cooperation agreement during his visit in early March 1998. Whether this economic agreement will actually be implemented remains an issue of debate. With upcoming Ukrainian parliamentary and eventually presidential elections, observers in Moscow fear the warming trend from Kiev is simply an election scheme. That Ukrainian politicians believe they must tilt toward Moscow demonstrates Russia's importance for the domestic Ukrainian political scene, especially in times of elections.

Despite the priority of Russia in Ukrainian foreign policy, Ukraine has fixed a firm gaze on the West and continues to seek its support. Ukraine recently decided not to supply Iran with two turbines it had promised in connection with building a nuclear power plant in Busheri, Iran. Ukraine's turbines were supposed to complement Russia's addition to the power plant. Although Russia will now simply contract out the turbines to a Russian company, the Ukrainian involvement was Russia's way of keeping Ukraine concentrated on the Russian vector of its foreign policy.

The West can and has already been involved in normalizing Russian-Ukrainian relations. The successful denuclearization of Ukraine, moreover, required U.S. political and financial support. Without the trilateral process and U.S. leadership, it is likely that the weapons would still be the subject of difficult bilateral talks. The IMF played a similar role in Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on bilateral debt relief. Arguably, the Ukrainian-Russian Friendship Treaty and Black Sea Agreement are by-products of NATO's intention to expand eastward and Ukraine's deepening ties with the West. The Russian leadership did not want to compound the problems of NATO enlargement by alienating Ukraine. This pattern of indirect Western involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship is vital and all too little understood in the West. With many issues still dividing Kiev and Moscow, as well as

continued mutual suspicions and differences over the future of bilateral relations, there is still a need for the West to encourage the normalization of this relationship.

The Role of a Constrained Russia and the Diversification of Regional Ties.

Russia continues to labor under the enormous strain of its internal political and economic transformation. In this sense, Russia faces the same problems that its neighbors to the west are facing, although its sheer size often precludes the comparison. Russia's foreign policy resources have been severely limited by its internal crisis. The Russian economy is barely half that of the former USSR. Even a period of sustained economic growth will not alter Russia's place far from the world's largest and most powerful economies. Russia's military remains in deep crisis, with most experts predicting further cuts in both conventional and nuclear forces and further declines in readiness. The basic mechanism for making and implementing foreign policy remains fragmented. Serious strategic guidance is provided by President Yeltsin, who is himself often absent from day-to-day policy control. Yeltsin and key advisors provide needed stability on the most serious issues, but there is often little follow-through even on these. Other issues appear not to receive high-level attention at all. Ministries, financial and industrial groups, and regions often pull Russian policy in different directions.

This fragmented mechanism also faces a wide array of challenges outside the middle zone. Festering problems to the south and east distract Russian attention from its western border region. The conflagration in Chechnya has taken a large toll on Russian forces and on the Russian public at large. Russia has also contended with conflict in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. Russian forces are deployed in the frozen conflict zones of Abkhazia and Tajikistan. The problem of stabilizing its Far Eastern and Siberia regions in the face of a rising China, moreover, is also a drain on foreign policy attention.

It is not surprising, given the above, that Russian foreign policy has not been able to concentrate fully on the challenges of the middle zone. It has not been able to turn its dominant position in Moldova since the cease-fire of 1992 into any sustained advantage. Indeed, the greatest leverage over Moldovan policy has come from Gazprom, not the Russian government. Russia has maintained a more pragmatic relationship with Ukraine, though only recently and with much controversy, has it begun to settle outstanding issues that have kept the bilateral relationship from developing normally. Moreover, the expected progress with Belarus on integration has not materialized. It is more likely that the opportunity for such an arrangement has passed. In the near term, Russian foreign policy toward the region is likely to remain an awkward mix of state and private interests.

Yet Russia has important and long-standing interests in this middle zone, even as the area is itself changing in ways Russia has not yet understood. The rise of three new states here has created a more diverse pattern of international relations. This diversity is, in fact, a direct result of the immense changes that have given rise to new states in combination with the weakening of Russian power. The formerly closed space of the former USSR, therefore, has gained increased access to the outside world.

Both Russia and the West must cope with a pronounced trend in the region toward the diversification of ties. Each of the states is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), though Belarus's participation has, in fact, dwindled to near inactivity. Ukraine signed a special charter with NATO during NATO's July 1997 summit in Madrid. Moldova has also expanded its interaction with NATO. Both Ukraine and Moldova seek long-term membership in the EU.

Ukraine and Moldova have also radically expanded their interaction with their Central European neighbors and with each other. Ukraine in particular has formed strong

ties with Poland and, in 1997, transformed a prickly relationship with Romania into a potentially productive one. Ukrainian-Polish relations include bi-national commissions at the highest levels, identifying broad areas of economic, political, and security cooperation. Warsaw played an important role in Ukraine's admission to both the Central European Initiative and the Council of Europe. The two countries also agreed in February 1996 to form a joint peacekeeping battalion. Ukraine and Romania concluded a ground-breaking treaty on cooperation on June 2, 1997, settling key territorial questions as well as agreeing on a framework for approaching future problems over the development of energy resources around Ukraine's Serpent Island. Ukrainian-Romanian rapprochement has given renewed impetus to Romanian-Moldovan ties, as the presidents of all three states met to discuss common issues and concerns in 1997. Indeed, the three countries signed a cooperation agreement in February 1998 to protect ethnic minorities and to set aside territorial disputes.

Within the former Soviet Union, Ukraine has also been at the center of a new sub-group. Building on the informal cooperation among so-called flank states during the late 1996-early 1997 debate over revisions to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan issued a formal declaration at the October 1997 OSCE meeting in Strasbourg aimed at sustaining and extending their cooperation. The group, known as GUAM, is far from an alliance or integrated community, but does well illustrate the trends at work breaking down the formerly unified Soviet space.

Neither Russia nor the West are fully adjusted to the reality of this diversification of international relations. Neither the opportunities nor the pitfalls of this new set of relations are well understood. Meanwhile, both Russia and the West face the problem of untangling their overlapping and intersecting interests in this zone, both now when Russian power is constrained and later after Russia has recovered its economic and political coherence. The work of

fashioning stable regimes and rules for managing this diversified system of international relations has barely begun, yet it must be accelerated in the years ahead to ensure the stable international environment these states need to survive and reform.

The Need For Sound Policy.

These examples suggest a policy horizon in the middle zone that differs sharply from that which the West has encountered to date in Central Europe. The United States in particular finds itself on unfamiliar ground. The requirements for U.S. engagement in this region at this time are not what they were in Europe during the Cold War. Yet U.S. and Western engagement remains crucial for helping to stabilize this zone and prevent it from becoming a challenge to the new forward edges of both NATO and the EU.

NATO remains the leading security institution in Europe and one crucial to the overall stability of the continent, but NATO will simply not play the role in the middle zone that it has played in Central Europe. The states of this region are not candidates for membership any time soon. Their greatest problems are internal. NATO can be a leading force for encouraging genuine military reform, transparency, and military-to-military contacts, not only between the region and the West but within the region itself.

What is vitally important for NATO now is to carry out a successful and transparent enlargement, sustain its cooperative programs to all willing non-members and work to make the NATO-Russian and NATO-Ukrainian partnerships real. Russia, the states of the middle zone, and Europe as a whole also must live for a while with the new and transformed NATO. The voluntary restraints on nuclear weapons and large-scale conventional deployments in Poland are an important show of NATO's long-term intention, but Russia in particular needs to see that Polish

membership in NATO is not the beginning of a new military competition. Poland also must decide whether the realization of its goal of NATO membership frees it for a creative eastern policy. Such a policy would be an important and positive force in the middle zone.

The Joint NATO-Russia Council provided for in the Founding Act must be given time. Russia's internal distractions and external frustrations make it an awkward partner. Many Russians look upon the new institution more as a sop than an opportunity. There are also voices in the West who argue that the council gives Russia too much power over the Alliance. In fact, the real problem in the near term will be making this new institution function in a meaningful way, creating the basis for genuine cooperation on future security challenges. Giving the new arrangements time and effort does not guarantee Russia's reconciliation to the new status quo, but it will establish a secure baseline for military power in Europe, create opportunities for cooperation and test the creativity and the motives of all concerned.

Given the weakness of the western CIS states themselves and the simultaneous strengthening and broadening of NATO to the region's edge, this middle zone could be a crucial testing ground. The interaction of diminished Russian power and an increased Western presence in the middle zone could make for a potentially unstable combination. For this reason, the enlargement of NATO to Central Europe must be accompanied by the construction of sound patterns of cooperation which will produce soft landings. Precedents are already at hand. These include the mechanisms created to manage the Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltic states, Ukrainian denuclearization, and, to a still untested degree, the enlargement of NATO itself. Each of these efforts brought together Russia, leading Western institutions, and states and regional actors to negotiate an acceptable resolution. More of such efforts will be needed in the region in the future.

These efforts are needed first and foremost in the area of political and economic reform. Moldova has quietly sustained genuine progress in both areas, despite the ulcer of Transdnistr, but cannot be expected to sustain these trends without the prospect of acceptance in Europe. Belarus's defiance of Western and Russian norms places an unpredictable regime in the center of the region. Ukraine's stagnation could well become the central destabilizing trend in the region. Leading Western nations, the EU, and key international financial institutions must expand their reach in this zone, setting up incentives to sustain progress and encourage new momentum where reforms have been halted. None of these states have a near-term claim on EU membership, but all need the prospect that economic and political progress will be met by enlightened engagement from Europe and the global economy as a whole.

Given that Europe has two great core institutions, NATO and the EU, Western management of the middle zone will require a truly integrated policy between them. It will also require mutually supportive efforts involving international financial institutions and leading industrial states, working in tandem with the EU and NATO. The role for the United States in this region of Europe is far less demanding than the one played during the Cold War, but nearly as crucial. U.S. engagement directly in the region—and encouragement of parallel efforts by its Western allies—could provide the difference between stability and instability there. It also offers the exciting prospect of fashioning a new post-Cold war consensus among old allies, one in which the various burdens and responsibilities are more equitably divided and the Transatlantic partnership is given new life.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. A version of this section appeared in *The Wall Street Journal Europe's Central European Economic Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, March 1998, p. 8.

2. The figures are taken from the 1996 *CIA World Factbook* on the World Wide Web [<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/md.htm>]. For a broad overview of Moldovan politics, see William Crowther, "Moldova: Caught Between Nation and Empire," *New States, New Politics*, Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 316-349.

3. The OSCE has been a part of the Transdnistr crisis since 1992, dispatching a full-fledged mission there in February 1993 and proposing important compromises and a settlement plan of its own in 1994. However, it has always had to take a back seat to Russia.

4. On the background of the Crimean problem, see Tor Bukkvoll, *Ukraine and European Security*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, pp. 45-60.

5. In a speech to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, Lukashenko said: "Not a single Belarusian citizen will ever be engaged in warfare outside our territory." Found in "Lukashenka Speech on Union With Russia," from *Minsk Radio*, March 27, 1996 (*FBIS Daily Reports*).

6. "Russian Journalists Face 5 Years in Belarusian Prison," from *Moscow Interfax*, July 30, 1997 (*FBIS Daily Reports*).

7. "Senior Russian Diplomat Criticizes Belarus Over ORT Case," in *Moscow Interfax*, August 21, 1997 (*FBIS Daily Reports*).

CHAPTER 7

BEYOND THE FOUNDING ACT: THE NEXT STAGE OF NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Stephen J. Blank

The Soviet Union and the United States sleep in the same bed
but they do not share the same dreams.

Zhou en-Lai

Zhou En-Lai's observation captures the new relationship between NATO and Russia enshrined in the Founding Act of May 1997. The Founding Act will now govern their relationship. But while it satisfied some of Russia's unmerited and insatiable craving for equality with the United States and the West by creating a regular mechanism for bilateral and multilateral discussions on topics of mutual interest, it is by no means clear that Russia's relationships with NATO and the United States will therefore improve. If anything, recent signs point to the opposite conclusion, partly due to the deliberate intent of elements in Russia to make these relations worse, and partly due to American illusions.¹ Russia may prove to be NATO's greatest security challenge because of the immense range of issues where Russian and U.S. or NATO interests now diverge. The Permanent Joint Council created in the Founding Act could easily become as much a vehicle for stalemate as a force for true mutual understanding. Therefore we must examine the diverging dreams that both the United States and Russia have dreamt.

With enlargement underway, many U.S. officials, especially in the State Department, now invoke new missions for NATO. These statements represent *ex post facto* attempts to justify enlargement and find some great central idea for NATO when no threat is currently discernible. These prescriptions also entail a much greater geographic scope and new missions for NATO. And, to

realize this new vision, NATO must change its *raison d'être* and *modus operandi*. It now must adapt to face, not a Russian threat, but internal wars that could, if left unattended, escalate to interstate wars. Therefore, as a matter of U.S. high policy, NATO must be open to all qualifying comers so that it embraces all potential members. Speaking at the British Embassy, in April 1998, Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that President Clinton has emphasized in public and in private to Russian President Boris Yeltsin that no emerging democracy, including Russia and the Baltic states, should be excluded from potential future membership in NATO because of its size, history, or geographical location. Talbott also stated that he saw Russia as a democratic state undergoing a most arduous transition to democracy, which makes it eligible for future membership in NATO. This high-level U.S. policy divides NATO governments and was not presented to the Senate for debate during the Senate's debate on NATO enlargement.² With regard to issues of conflict prevention in Europe or "out-of-area," the emerging official U.S. position is no less expansive and unilateral.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently stated in Brussels that NATO would evolve into "a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa." This statement immediately triggered European foreign ministers' opposition to so radical an expansion of NATO's geographical scope.³ But this is not the sole transformation of NATO's approach to conflict resolution.

Since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and/or the United Nations now provide the authorization for such pan-European operations, NATO must obtain their blessing in order to participate in these conflicts.⁴ Furthermore, before acting, we must do so in partnership with Russia through a "special" NATO-Russian consultative mechanism wherever possible. Ideally, to attain this blessed state, the OSCE would have to replace its principle of unanimous consent with majority rule and all NATO members must become perfect democracies. They

must guarantee to NATO, on pain of exclusion, that they assure equal treatment for their minorities. Then, through a series of building blocks, we can begin building collective security from the bottom up and extend it beyond Europe. Even though NATO will remain an institution for the collective defense of its members, in practice its main missions will increasingly be peace operations "out of area" and NATO will become a primarily peace-making, keeping, or enforcing organization. Thus it will become mainly a political, not a military, organization devoted to the mechanisms of crisis management and preventive diplomacy. NATO's main function would then be to become the vehicle for the integration of ever more areas into the Western economic-security-political-cultural "ecumene."⁵ And this presupposes the fundamental harmony of interests and wills among NATO members and Russia to share present and future burdens and perceptions of crisis. This vision of an emerging priority for collective security is very strong now that no external threat is visible.⁶

This view is not confined to academics or Americans. Secretary-General Javier Solana, speaking of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, stated that all the allies must be collectively involved here because geographic proximity or distance cannot be the basis for calculating the allies' security interest. Collective security overcomes geopolitics' founding principles. NATO must participate in the Mediterranean through a series of military and political dialogues to ensure security throughout that basin, i.e., beyond Europe. These initiatives are primarily political and respond to the fact that most Mediterranean security challenges are socio-economic and/or political in nature. Since Solana outlined primarily political challenges to security, the response to them must also be political ones that enhance stability and expand partnership. NATO's interest reflects its belief that European security is indivisible.⁷

Solana also advocates an international police force to fulfill peace missions in areas where governance has broken

down or is in danger of doing so, and when the troops who intervened previously can "hardly act." These forces should be like France's Gendarmerie or Spain's Guardia Civil, and he requested that the U.N. Security Council determine whether or not NATO's forces should remain in Bosnia next year. The U.N. or the OSCE must be the agencies which provide a mandate for NATO's forces to conduct these peace missions, either solely with NATO or jointly with the Russians, on the basis of decisions achieved in the Permanent Joint Council.⁸

Ambassador Matthew Nimetz likewise postulates the growing importance of the Mediterranean region as a whole. Therefore a clear U.S. commitment to remaining a local military power will markedly enhance regional security. This is also true for the other major NATO powers: France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Greece, and Turkey.⁹ To maintain regional security, NATO must not only integrate the entire region into the Western economy and foster the development of "pluralistic institutions," it must also grasp the military nettle.

The Pax NATO is the only logical regime to maintain security in the traditional sense. As NATO maintains its dominant role in the Mediterranean, it must recognize a need for the expansion of its stabilizing influence in adjacent areas, particularly in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea region (in concert, of course, with the regional powers, primarily Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey) and in the Arabian/Persian Gulf. The United States must continue to play the major role in this security system. The Sixth Fleet will be the vehicle to implement this commitment for years to come, although this is something that might be reviewed some time down the road.¹⁰

Supposedly Russia's views either do not count or Russia will blithely accept this outcome.

The emphasis on the Near East and Southern Mediterranean area is increasingly loud as officials echo Nimetz' call for NATO to emphasize a new southern strategy. While ensuring the integration of Central Europe

into NATO, NATO must also look to the Near East as the seat of instability and should conduct negotiations among its members on threats like Iraq or Algeria. While this new strategy may require modifications of the current NATO process of allied consultations, and leave to the Europeans the lead on operations relating to peacekeeping, failing states, evacuation, and refugee management, the United States would retain primacy over high-intensity military operations.¹¹ On the other hand, it is quite likely that Europe would see the adoption of such a strategy as a harbinger of an increasing U.S. disengagement from the burdens of providing for European security and would not welcome it.

Former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who undoubtedly argued for such a line when they were in office, likewise recently wrote that,

The Alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory. Shifting the Alliance's emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such threats Alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory.¹²

Finally, Secretary Albright told the December 1997 Permanent Joint Council and the North Atlantic Council Foreign Ministers meetings that it is essential for NATO allies and Russia to collaborate against new threats, the gravest of these being proliferation beyond Europe's borders (i.e., Iraq and Iran), but also including terrorism, environmental clean-up, counters to drug smuggling, etc.¹³ She thus confirmed that, "What the allies must guard

against, the administration believes, are terrorism, illegal drugs, nationalist extremism and regional conflicts fueled by ethnic, racial, and religious hatreds.”¹⁴

In short, NATO should become an “intercontinental policeman” to deal with all manner of socio-political and military threats from abroad based on the premise of an existing or emerging European collective security system. This system presumes the pervasiveness of shared interests and common views among states and European security institutions on the nature of the threats to security and the appropriate responses to them. Likewise, NATO does or should follow the U.S. definition of its objectives, missions, and threats to members’ security. In defense of security, stability, and democracy, Europe and the United States must become more nearly equal in their burdens, although we are reluctant to yield our political-military primacy. Russia, as a status quo, democratic partner, should have a real voice in issues. And the principal vehicle for arranging this cooperation to include Russia, especially in the joint conduct of peace operations, will be the Permanent Joint Council, or the OSCE, or the U.N. Security Council. Similarly, the main mission is a multilateral one comprising the various kinds of peace operations, or countering the new threats enumerated above. Furthermore, there is a generalized right of intervention by NATO out-of-area, provided that the OSCE lets NATO do what it wants by approving its operations, and that the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), the embodiment of collective security, gives NATO a mandate for doing so. On the other hand, if Europe refuses to collaborate with us and share the burden of defending vital interests and appropriating the needed resources, Washington should seriously consider reorienting its resources away from defense of ungrateful, recalcitrant Western Europe towards those other crisis zones.¹⁵

These principles and axioms of international politics rest upon an updated version of Wilsonian liberalism’s hopes and postulates—the end of major power competition

in Europe where states' fear of other governments' "relative gains" at their expense, the presumed benevolence of American power, and the endless stabilization of today's *status quo* under the dream of liberal democracy. This outlook of global redemption also embraces the corollary notions that the foregoing ideas and the doctrine of the harmony of interests, i.e., a democratic peace that precludes political and military conflict among democracies, an end to old notions of politics, and instead stresses their shared interests in perpetuating, if not extending, democracy, are the foundation of the new order. And these axioms are included to a large degree in notions of cooperative and collective security.¹⁶

However, only one thing is wrong with this vision. Namely, it is not grounded in the realities of European, U.S., or Russian politics. Certainly this vision of a new peace order fails to answer the first question of strategy, i.e., what is the threat and how do we meet it? Washington has not spelled out the ways in which NATO or the United States would meet the threats cited above. As R.W. Apple wrote in the *New York Times*, "Warplanes are of little use against terrorism and drug smuggling, and naval power is of little help in fighting racism."¹⁷

It also seems odd that we need NATO to discuss with Europe and Russia environmental, immigration, counternarcotics, out-of-area, and proliferation issues. Are there no other fora for dealing with these issues on their own considerable merits without burdening NATO with them? Second, having failed in the U.N. to obtain support for forceful ripostes to Iraq, why should we try again publicly to raise the issue in NATO to no avail and merely reveal again the lack of an allied consensus? As it is, in early 1998 the U.N. Secretary-General had to rescue the United States from its isolation *vis-à-vis* Iraq in one of our more ignominious moments. The same may be said of our Iran policy, which clearly reached a dead end by the end of 1997 and could easily lead us into trade wars with our allies and difficult political contests with Russia. Whatever merits

dual containment may or may not have, NATO is not the venue for discussing it.

We can discern three reasons why the U.S. vision of NATO remains unrealistic. One is our own unwillingness to confront the realities of our own policy and behavior abroad. A second is our exaggerated expectations *vis-à-vis* our European allies. And the third is our failure to grasp the driving forces of Russian policy and ambitions, i.e., Russia's opposing dream.

The American Vision and its Illusions.

Many of our elites take their rhetoric about allied unity, progress towards global democratization, and the end of the "old politics in international affairs" too seriously. As suggested above, this vision of the world evokes much apprehension abroad among our allies who cannot see either the goals or strategy of U.S. policy abroad. Instead they see muddle, incoherence, lack of will, and/or an attempt to obtain cheaply a hegemonic or neo-colonialist position through NATO.¹⁸ While the administration's most consistent success has been in implementing advances in free trade, this traditionally Wilsonian agenda has little or nothing to do directly with the concrete security issues that must be on NATO's agenda.¹⁹ And indeed, even now it is difficult to locate a compelling strategic rationale, other than the political ones of democratization, stability, integration, and free trade, for NATO's enlargement.²⁰ Indeed, one State Department paper stated in April 1997 that we are not doing this for any geopolitical reasons.²¹ If so, then why bother with enlarging our security commitments? Indeed, Secretary Albright in Brussels committed us to a second, if not third, round of enlargement based on the procedures and principles that governed the first round.²² And the Baltic Charter of 1998 committed the United States at some future unspecified date to support Baltic membership in NATO.²³

Given the power and pervasiveness of U.S. illusions, it is hardly surprising that many analysts believe that NATO either was, or is becoming, or should become a collective security institution. President Clinton's former National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, in his major 1993 speech laying out the agenda of democratic enlargement as the administration's strategic global objective, stated that, "at the NATO summit that the president has called for this January (1994-SJB) we will seek to update NATO, so that there continues behind the enlargement of market democracies an essential collective security."²⁴ Stephen Flanagan of the Clinton State Department in 1993, and a strong advocate of NATO's expansion, in 1992 explicitly labeled any new agreement to expand NATO as a "new collective security pact."²⁵ Likewise, many civilian analysts now assume, in flagrant disregard of the facts, that, since its inception, NATO has formally acknowledged the importance of being able to act only through the U.N. and its charter. Or else they prefer this subordination to the U.N. for NATO to retain its effectiveness even though such an outcome, as in Yugoslavia, was most ineffective.²⁶ This argument flies in the face of the fact that NATO has always rejected the idea that it would base its actions exclusively or even primarily on Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter dealing with regional arrangements, precisely to avoid the need for Security Council or General Assembly authorization. Accepting the authority of U.N. mandates as the exclusive principle of action would, as in Bosnia, severely limit NATO's ability to perform collective defense and many conceivable peace operations, e.g., in the CIS.²⁷ Not surprisingly, it is Moscow that most strongly urges just this subordination upon NATO.²⁸ Clearly the aspiration to transform NATO into an intercontinental security system based on a supposed break with the entire past history of international relations coexists with a substantial misrepresentation or ignorance of NATO's history and purposes.

Unquestionably this approach emanates from our unreflective instinct to conflate the notions of collective security and U.S. interests and thereby deprecate, if not de-legitimize, other states' interests. Since this conceptual operation takes place almost unconsciously, it reflects our own unwillingness to admit the truth about our interests and employ the appropriate language for such discussions. As Martin Walker, the Washington Bureau Chief of the *London and Manchester Guardian*, observes, "It would be difficult to exaggerate the ambition of the current foreign policy thinking of the Clinton administration."²⁹ President Clinton, whom Walker interviewed, believes that his strategy of engagement and democratic enlargement, and in particular the agreement with Russia that facilitated NATO's enlargement,

Is a fundamental departure from the way geopolitics has been practiced by nation-states. We are trying to write a future for Europe that will be different from its past. What we have done is to create a balance of power that restrains and empowers all those who come within the framework of the agreement.³⁰

Clinton also maintains that we can create a new reality and "define our greatness in ways that do not entail the necessity of dominating our neighbors." And further, he said, "All of us are trying to change not only the facts on the ground, but the whole pattern of thought that has dominated the international politics of Europe for 50 years."³¹ Of course, not everyone sees the legitimacy of the self-appointed U.S. role as "pathfinder" of a new world order which shapes history and helps construct "a global network of purpose and law," in Secretary Albright's words.³² Clinton also inadvertently conceded here that, as the creators and primary power of the system, we did all this in our interest. The notion that we have created a unique equilibrium and are writing a new page in European history unconsciously admits that as the authors of this play we would resent challenges to our authority by the characters, like France and Russia, should they rebel against their assigned parts. Furthermore, the stated aspiration of U.S.

policymakers to remove Central and Eastern Europe from history signifies the grandly revisionist aspirations of American policy. Just as Russia is a revisionist power (see below), we too refuse to accept the status quo and seek to move beyond or overcome the whole history of Europe and do away with the balance of power as fact, not just as idea.³³ Truly Walker was right in portraying American ambitions as large for they are truly revolutionary in scope.

Essentially this outlook rejects and dismisses the fact that power in all its many forms continues to play a key role in world politics and that we are, even now, defending our vital interests by using one or more forms of that power. We flinch from confronting the reality of our impact abroad. For example, one of the newest areas of interest in Europe's security agenda is the Caucasus and beyond that the Transcaspian where the states of Transcaucasia and Central Asia have joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and, like the Baltic states, now participate in exercises under PfP's auspices. Administration officials regularly deny that they seek anything other than a "win-win solution" for the Caucasus and Central Asia where enormous energy holdings that apparently have a skyrocketing strategic significance are concentrated. These areas are allegedly not zones of bilateral contention with Russia but regions where, if Moscow only understood our benevolence, we could jointly and profitably cooperate.³⁴ U.S. officials regularly deny that these exercises have any kind of sinister intent, an accusation made by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev.³⁵

But these denials and NATO's approach to these areas do not comport with the program of military exercises through the PfP program. Indeed, the actual avowed U.S. aim is to integrate these regions' economies and security firmly with the West and "break Russia's monopoly."³⁶ U.S. military officers and analysts frankly describe how these activities, not only in Europe or Central Asia, are essential

aspects of the U.S. strategy of “extraordinary power projection.”

It is often the action and activities of these forces that provide the dominant battlespace knowledge necessary to shape regional security environments. Multinational exercises, port visits, staff-to-staff coordination—all designed to increase force interoperability and access to regional military facilities—along with intelligence and surveillance operations, are but a few examples of how naval forces [and the same undoubtedly applies to other services-author] engage actively in an effort to set terms of engagement favorable to the United States and its allies. These activities are conducted at low political and economic costs, considering the tangible evidence they provide of U.S. commitment to a region. And they are designed to contribute to deterrence.

Deterrence is the product of both capability and will to deter a nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or others to whom it has provided security assurances, . . . Deterrence of other undesirable actions by adversaries or potential adversaries is part and parcel of everything naval forces do in the course of their operations—before, during, and after the actual application of combat force. . . .

That the United States has invested in keeping these ready forces forward and engaged delivers a signal that cannot be transmitted as clearly and unequivocally in any other way. Forward deployed forces are backed by those which can surge for rapid reinforcement and can be in place in seven to thirty days. These, in turn, are backed by formidable, but slower deployed, forces which can respond to a conflict over a period of months.³⁷

Such operations permit the United States and NATO to prepare for peace, or short, or protracted military operations in crucial security zones. And our recent actions point to these regions' rising strategic profile as such zones.³⁸ In this light, assurances of a benevolent win-win policy ring hollow, not just to Russia, but also to oilmen who are prospecting in the region, and to the local governments who rightly feel threatened by Russia's neo-imperialist policies. And Russia has good reasons for its suspicion.

Russian authorities, perhaps to our discomfiture, correctly view these activities, not necessarily as rehearsals for invasion, but at least as preparation of the theater and the extension of a security umbrella and influence to regions that Moscow deems as vital to Russia's interests.³⁹

These U.S. assertions ring hollow, not because we are either evilly inclined or lacking in intelligence, but rather because we hide from ourselves the true significance and risks of our policy. This self-deception continues at our own, our allies', and our partners' risk even though we can justify NATO enlargement on its own strategic merits in Europe without invoking the kind of moralizing that now justifies enlargement and the search for new missions.⁴⁰ These risks are not only the ones inherent in any military operation. They are also the domestic risks of failed foreign policies because our real policies and goals and their likely economic, military, and political costs are concealed from congressional or public debate like our support for future Russian membership in NATO. Thus, when Senators Roth and Lugar led the defense of enlargement in the Senate, they maintained that the "open-door" policy whereby entry is open to democracies who qualify on strategic grounds, the harmonization of their democracies with NATO's standards, and the Alliance's perception of threats to security and stability, is not the open-ended policy that Talbott said was U.S. policy.⁴¹ The potential for substantial discord between the executive and the legislative branches that might arise on this basis could undermine much of our foreign and defense policy and return us to the past.

The U.S. foreign policy consensus died in Vietnam. Since then, in virtually all crises abroad, we have experienced what former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke calls the Vietmalia (i.e., Vietnam plus Somalia) syndrome. One may also call it the quest for a zero defects security policy. Key elites view any extended foreign involvement with the utmost trepidation and want extensive assurances of success beforehand. Otherwise they may use their formidable power to prevent the deployment

of U.S. resources or forces, obstruct any real action, or restrict the scope of presidential decision-making.⁴² In the aftermath of Vietnam, in 1975 Earl Ravenal observed that all future challenges will be seen as resembling Vietnam regardless of the realities of the case. And this perception will inhibit or constrain effective U.S. responses to these challenges.⁴³ Since Vietnam, and in part thanks to it, there has been an enormous proliferation of reporting, bureaucratic, investigative, and legislative requirements that constitute efforts to micromanage foreign policy. These obligations have frustrated administrations and contributed to major crises like the Iran-Contra affair which only intensify the demand for more controls over policy-making.

As Congress is swayed more by short-term, and partisan political calculation than by any long-term vision of the national interest, few members will support policies to deal with protracted and complex crises. As former Senator David Boren observed,

With each new breakdown of bipartisan consensus and trust comes a new list of congressional restrictions on the executive branch. With new restrictions come new initiatives by the White House aimed at evading what are viewed as unwise limitations upon the prerogatives of the commander in chief. Executive evasions breed more congressional distrust and the cycle continues, paralleling the arms race in its destructive and irrational escalation.⁴⁴

This process occurred regarding Bosnia policy where the administration had to covertly allow the Croats to receive foreign arms and training, then commit U.S. troops to get Congress to take responsible action. It ultimately had to accept, as the price of the budgetary authorization, arming the Bosnian Muslims against the wishes of our allies and perhaps enhancing the risks to our forces there. Moreover, the administration either wishfully believed, or deceived itself into thinking that troops could come out after 18 or 30 months of political inaction on NATO's part and that somehow magically peace would prevail in defiance of

all the local political strife. But what is worse is that Congress' desire to posture nationalistically and act timorously undermines the support for NATO expansion or intervention in Europe that it is simultaneously urging. Observers worried that if Congress is so unable to resolve itself on sending troops to a peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, what will it do to defend NATO members in a real crisis and will it pay the price of doing so?⁴⁵ Thus, in future crises, we cannot take for granted Congress' informed understanding of and agreement with an administration's goals, strategy, and policy rationale.

These structural constraints, in the absence of a post-Cold War consensus on national interests and strategy, compel presidents to engage in foreign policy adhocery and make periodic understandings with ever shifting congressional coalitions (as in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement) on each issue. This process inherently diminishes presidential authority, power, and the consistency of policy.⁴⁶ This process erodes a president's authority and the credibility of U.S. commitments since broad coalitions are a prerequisite of success in the United States and policies that take time to mature are penalized. That psychology and political culture are inimical to successful diplomatic strategies for international security.⁴⁷

Today these factors make it harder for presidents to articulate and implement policies with a broad strategic sweep that respond to novel conditions like the end of the Cold War. One allied ambassador with considerable experience of dealing with the 104th Congress of 1995-97 said, "These people don't seem to have a formed opinion of the outside world at all. It simply does not feature on their agenda."⁴⁸ This disinterest in foreign policy certainly has not changed much since then.

A further cause for concern is the growing saliency of two related outlooks of American constituencies and elites. The first stems from the traditional cognitive effort to separate

war from politics and regard the military instrument as suitable only for operations, e.g., MacArthur's "no substitute for victory." "For many Americans, U.S. foreign military involvement is designed not to project national power or to buy influence—but only to deal with threats and to oppose aggression, especially from non-democratic states."⁴⁹ This outlook is probably more true of elites than of the American people, for elites are uniquely sensitive to the pressure emanating from CNN and other telecommunications media for a zero defects security policy, i.e., instant, clean success, or withdrawal. Indeed, one major reason for the adoption of our high-tech military strategy is precisely because it supposedly offers quick victory at low cost and an ability to prevent CNN and other networks from reporting the war as it really is over time.⁵⁰ In a post-Cold War world, troops should logically come home and not be engaged in faraway indecisive peace operations where clear national interests or overwhelming threat are not readily discernible. When this precept is coupled with the second belief that important constituencies and the politicians share, that the United States is somehow being economically victimized by its allies in Europe and Asia, the prognosis for coherent policy worsens because its coalitional base is further fractured. Patrick Buchanan's campaign for the Republican Party's presidential nomination in 1996 publicly exposed this fault line. But it is not restricted to the most conservative segment of the Republican Party. Indeed, a recent Rand Corporation study, many of whose contributors either are now in key government offices or were, maintains that Europe somehow is refusing to live up to its fair burdens and must be cajoled and even threatened with the withdrawal of our support to redress this balance.⁵¹

This feeling sharpens burden-sharing disputes because it devalues the benefits Americans might receive from any new arrangement. It may not change since it reflects a deep-seated inclination to see international relations in terms of domestic values.⁵²

Debilitating debates along these lines have characterized U.S. policies since the Reagan administration. One can even trace today's inter-branch conflicts and lack of strategic consensus back to the fights over Iran-Contra, foreign and military aid, and SDI in the Reagan years.⁵³ Since the executive branch is not a place where long-range strategy can be formulated easily or effectively given its present structure and responsibilities, it becomes almost impossible for a president to do much more than deal with short-term solutions. The upshot of this structural conundrum is that on every major issue of European security (or foreign policy) where Congress has a major voice, a new coalition must laboriously be formed. Forming these coalitions entails great delay, equivocation, large amounts of "side payments" on issues that can and do come back to haunt us later, and high risks of failure. Interested observers watching this spectacle must be concerned at the durability of the U.S. contribution to a new order in Bosnia and more broadly the Balkans. The absence of a reliable consensus for long-term, steady, U.S. policies in Europe when only the United States can lead Europe has to unnerve European politicians.

Indeed, it is not only the French argument that the United States will ultimately leave Europe. British analyst of Europe William Wallace observed that there no longer is a solid congressional or institutional basis for the U.S. commitment to European security, and that U.S. leadership rests far too dangerously on the mutual suspicion of European states for each other, not on the vision coming out of Washington.⁵⁴ Hence it is not surprising that both France and Germany are working together to reform NATO so it can act without the United States, a trend that can only lessen our ability to lead while not visibly augmenting Europe's capacity to act.⁵⁵

Furthermore, in both the Bush and Clinton administrations, policy choices and personal idiosyncrasies have made it harder for the United States to exploit in strategic terms the victory of 1989-91. These policy decisions apply

both to process as well as to content. George Bush's administration was singularly adept at making policy with a minimum of friction and at consolidating opportunities presented to it by the end of the Cold War, namely German reunification, restructuring of NATO, and the CFE Treaty.⁵⁶ The Bush administration opted to sustain Mikhail Gorbachev's power because it feared that no other Soviet regime would be so compliant on those issues and we would then lose the chance to "lock in" those concessions. Similarly Soviet officials, virtually to a man, claimed that it was the Bush administration's proposals to recast NATO's military-political functions, doctrine, and nuclear policy in 1990 that allowed them ultimately to accept the terms of German reunification.⁵⁷

Nonetheless this approach, though superbly managed, inevitably entailed serious costs. It was essentially a strategy for ending the Cold War on U.S. terms, not recasting a new order that included the former Warsaw Pact members and/or their successors in a viable new architecture. As two executants of American policy wrote,

The United States intended to consolidate the democratic revolution in Europe, reduce Soviet military power in Eastern Europe, and eliminate the Soviet armed presence in Germany. American forces—though fewer in number—would remain. The harsh truth was that the American goal could be achieved only if the Soviet Union suffered a reversal of fortunes not unlike a catastrophic defeat in a war. The United States had decided to try to achieve the unification of Germany absolutely and unequivocally on Western terms. Yet American officials wanted the Soviets to accept this result and believe that they retained an appropriate, albeit diminished role in European affairs. They did not want Moscow to nurture a lasting bitterness that would lead them someday to try and overthrow the European settlement.⁵⁸

Yet while this self-interested approach to the problem gave the Soviets, and now the Russians, implicit hostages against the future, nobody had any interest or expectation in redeeming those pledges. At the same time, the policy

goal was to preserve a U.S. dominated security structure for a fundamentally new Europe. Although Moscow was implicitly guaranteed a place in a more peaceful Europe, nothing was made definite. Now, due to NATO's expansion, policymakers in Moscow loudly, and to some degree rightly, complain of betrayal. As then German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said during the negotiations over Germany's unification, "the Alliances will increasingly become elements of cooperative security structures in which they can ultimately be absorbed."⁵⁹ Furthermore, the fundamental conservatism of the U.S. Government in 1989-92 meant that it was afraid up to the last moment to embrace or help manage the revolutionary change within Russia and the other Soviet republics even into 1992-93 when our policy was aptly summed up as "Russia plus branch offices."⁶⁰ This policy lasted well into 1994 and the Clinton administration.⁶¹

Russia's stagnating political and economic systems also show that despite talk of promoting democracy, the Clinton administration's real efforts have not been particularly innovative or of sufficient scale to affect Russia's internal evolution. If anything, U.S. policies on democratization have corrupted both our own and Russian political figures.⁶² The administration's vacillation on Bosnia until 1995, its unwillingness to admit that its strategy seeks to limit Russia's coercive diplomacy of reintegration in the CIS, and its "continental drift" on NATO enlargement all suggest a policy or policies that are ad hoc, reactive, and anything but strategic.⁶³ In short, both the Bush and Clinton administrations, having won the Cold War, lost focus on what ought to be done in Europe afterwards to create a durable new order.⁶⁴ So, absent grand strategy, we have drift, not mastery.

Even though we have now moved back to a policy of selective, rather than total universal engagement abroad, our policy aspires to the latter and ultimately appears disingenuous. When the chips are down on vital interests, as in Asia's current financial crisis, we act brutally in

support of our great power interests. Nor did we intervene in Bosnia until NATO's solidarity, not Sarajevo's survival, was endangered. Otherwise we avoid doing anything much and try only to contain the crisis at the starting point, a laudable first step, but something that, in the absence of strategy, invariably entails protracted conflict and pressure to get involved when the risks and costs are much higher. We would do better to acknowledge Charles De Gaulle's observation that the state is a cold monster and act accordingly from the outset, for, shorn of rhetoric, our policies have been and remain calculated in classical terms of great power politics.

Our behavior and that of our partners and interlocutors has not suddenly become more angelic. The United States, since 1990, despite its rhetoric, has not followed the demands of collective security or the new doctrines of international relations theory that deprecate realism and the anarchical "self-help" nature of the international state system. Instead,

And how has the United States responded? Just about the way that realism would predict. Great powers need not go to war against weakened foes in order to seize opportunities to enhance their positions, and U.S. leaders from Reagan to Clinton have clearly seen the Soviet collapse as a golden opportunity to shape the world to their liking. Our leaders may cloak our action in the selfless rhetoric of "world order," but narrow self-interest lies behind them. The United States has imposed one-sided arms control agreements on the Russians, [this may be debatable but certainly many Russians believe it-SJB], pressured the post-Soviet republics to give up their own nuclear arsenals, fought a war in the Persian Gulf in order to disarm Iraq, sent troops to Haiti to impose a democratic system, bombed the Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table, and proceeded with plans to expand NATO into Russia's backyard, generating a predictably negative response from Moscow.⁶⁵

Hence many prominent Americans see nothing to be gained, and much to be lost from NATO expansion which they believe is a truly bad, mischievous, and potentially

catastrophic idea. At the same time few of those in power have been willing or able to give a satisfying and/or realistic portrayal of how enlargement serves real U.S. interests. Indeed, talk of real, strategic U.S. interests is frowned upon, and we hear instead arguments about democratization and international liberalism. By relying on a Wilsonian rhetoric of values and these principles to justify NATO's enlargement, the administration defends a noble, even radical goal with bad or weak arguments deriving from unproven theories of international relations or Wilsonian pieties, not the language of U.S. interests. This risks serious dangers, e.g., domestic or foreign opposition to U.S. and NATO policies.

Worse yet, Wilsonianism's language of moral crusade invariably fosters an American triumphalism and unilateralism that leads us astray with non-allies and injures ties to our allies. Officials in the administration now call for double enlargement of European security institutions to encompass areas beyond Europe and a global security partnership. But they also threaten Europe that if it does not cooperate with American programs for security beyond NATO's frontiers, the United States, when faced with challenges "out-of-area," will have to cut its forces and commitment to Europe to face those challenges.⁶⁶ Either Europe conforms to U.S. policy or else. Here collective security rhetoric visibly slides into the language of coercive diplomacy.⁶⁷ A policy that shuns talk of real interests other than free trade and democracy runs a serious risk of repeating Wilson's experiences of utter failure. Or, we run the risk of making grandiose and foolish threats that we cannot fulfill.

Misreading Our Allies.

In this connection, one of the most serious illusions with which we console ourselves is that somehow our allies can be persuaded or browbeaten into supporting our redefinition of NATO as an intercontinental force for doing

good. This illusion misreads the extent to which our allies have also renounced traditional international relations, share our interests "out-of-area," or aspire to play a serious role in defense of peace in Europe or elsewhere during peacetime. German ambivalence will cause great hesitation before embarking on any such operations and France is shrinking its military forces and will not spend more on NATO, a program that rules out such international crusades. And France also has several sharp points of difference with the United States about the nature of NATO's future evolution.⁶⁸ The 1997-98 discord on policy towards Iraq and Iran where France and Germany publicly snubbed what the United States deemed to be vital interests *vis-à-vis* these two so-called rogue states should dispel any illusions about NATO allies' shared viewpoint about the Near East. Nor does the EU's blackballing of Turkey or the decidedly more pro-Palestinian stance it has taken in the peace process suggest that this situation will change anytime soon. Bosnian type crises are a more likely future scenario than is Saddam Hussein's outright invasion of Kuwait, and we saw in Bosnia and in Chechnya how unwilling Europe is to intervene. Indeed, Germany, which resorts to multilateralism on principle, ostensibly because it has so many neighbors that it has to reassure them, has long since made it clear that it will never challenge Yeltsin or Russia's position even when doing so may be warranted.⁶⁹ Nor is Germany alone in this habit of seeking refuge in inactivity masquerading under the guise of multilateralism. If anything, that has become the general European line of action.

Nowhere has the West's failure to rise to the occasion been more striking than in Europe. As the late Colonel S. Nelson Drew observed in 1994,

Indeed, while many of NATO's new "partners" have expressed concern that the "Partnership" has not evolved far enough or fast enough, a convincing case can be made that the events of the past five years may have outstripped the capabilities of

Trans-Atlantic and European security institutions—and the political will of their members—to adapt to them.⁷⁰

Drew's concern was hardly his alone. Many Western observers express increasingly dyspeptic views of European institutions' capability for constructive action *vis-à-vis* the Balkan, Central European, and Russian challenges. Vojtech Mastny of Johns Hopkins University calls the OSCE hapless. A leading U.S. analyst of Eastern Europe, James Brown, in 1995 called the OSCE moribund, useless, irrelevant, and unwieldy. Brown also wrote that one good thing to come out of its 1994 Budapest meeting, that generated an international code of conduct and confirmed its work in mediating and preventing ethnic conflicts, was that the OSCE "will generate no more false hopes."⁷¹ Catherine McArdle Kelleher darkly opined that the OSCE might be growing in scope only because it actually does little or nothing.⁷²

The same bleak view applies to the EU/WEU and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agreed upon at Maastricht by the EU in 1991 and that would take place through the WEU. At the WEU's 1995 Madrid summit, leaders congratulated themselves in the official communiqué about the CFSP's progress.⁷³ However, a WEU committee led by Lord Finsberg referred so scathingly to the WEU's failure to make progress on its agenda as to call its very utility into question.⁷⁴ In February 1996 the WEU's Assembly concluded that NATO remains the sole effective provider of European security. The WEU, absent any real resolve on the part of states to create a pan-European collective security system, "is not at present able to establish a basis for a European defense policy."⁷⁵ Talks since then about combined joint task forces (CJTF) operating as a European pillar dissolved into the reality that only if the United States provides these CJTFs with air and sea lift, intelligence, and other capabilities can they function. European talk of a security and defense identity through the WEU remains just that, talk. And many American and European analysts worry that the gap

between American and European military capabilities is already so wide as to call true coalition partnership in the future into question.⁷⁶ Similarly, observers of the EU's expansion or widening process agree that the EU has made little effort to overcome its agricultural or industrial barriers to European integration and dare not do so lest domestic interest groups take umbrage. Thus economic outreach to the East lags.⁷⁷ Helmut Kohl has confirmed the EU's basic unwillingness to expand even now after it has invited five new states to accession. And even though NATO's and Germany's pressure for enlargement forced the EU to begin discussions with 11 new states and 5 potential new members, it does so unwillingly and imposes niggardly and tough conditions upon potential members.⁷⁸

Nor has the EU overcome its apparent somnolence, if not paralysis, regarding security issues. In the Greco-Turkish crisis of 1996 neither NATO nor the EU was anywhere to be found. Certainly those organizations did not act when those two states almost went to war for a rock in the Aegean, even though both states are NATO members. France blamed the lack of a response on the fact that Italy, the EU's current president, was undergoing a cabinet crisis and had no effective head of government.⁷⁹ This cheap shot only confirms the EU's bankruptcy. A U.S. report of the EU's role in this crisis noted,

Meetings of European foreign ministers to thrash out common policies, participants say, have become hopelessly bogged down in arguments as trivial as the order of the agenda and where to hold the next meeting. The struggle to achieve "foreign policy by committee" has threatened to paralyze the Union when it expands to as many as two dozen members over the coming years.⁸⁰

Moreover Europe still seems reluctant to acknowledge that it must show political will that may include the use of force to build security.⁸¹ The wars in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus since 1992, Russia's trampling of Moldovan integrity and sovereignty, the Chechnya war, Russia's

general regression to the language and aspirations of neo-imperial spheres of influence and a wholly 19th century *Machtpolitik* outlook, all demonstrate the failure of the grand hopes of 1989-91 and validate Drew's insights for Europe's agencies, including NATO and the U.N.

Domestically as well there is little basis for reorienting European thinking on international affairs to unlock Europe's resolution. A recent study of European public opinion on security issues concluded that,

In all EU member states, however, it is essential to take account of the cognitive dimension of attitudes on this issue. The evidence suggests that on this very fundamental question of the level of governance at which defense policy is decided, and, indeed, in regard also to the level at which foreign policy is decided, European public opinion encompasses vast areas of ignorance or incomprehension: an accurate view of foreign and defense decision-making is not in fact found in any member of the union.⁸²

In virtually every major Western state since 1989 the domestic economic-political basis of government has collapsed leading to high inflation, long recessions, currency collapses, high unemployment, and protracted political crises. Whether it takes the form of continuing scandals and political gridlock in Italy, the collapse of political parties and the agitation for Quebec's independence in Canada, France's continuous strikes due to its inability to meet current economic challenges at home or abroad, or the annual budgetary gridlock in the United States since 1986, the result is the same. Virtually every Western government of 1989 was overthrown by inward looking political blocs who are either insufficiently aware of or not interested in Europe's needs, or who cannot conduct a consistent policy responsive to those needs because they cannot secure a viable domestic consensus. The unresolved struggle in Great Britain over policy towards the Maastricht Treaty is another perfect example as it has already claimed at least two conservative prime ministers since 1990. Therefore,

since domestic politics are increasingly narrowly focused, international cooperation weakens.

Not only is the structure of international organizations set up to cope with the problems of the Cold War ill-suited to deal with post-communism, but Western Europe has found itself in a twofold dilemma. The end of the Cold War has placed the question of the distribution of power and the nature of democratic institutions on the domestic agenda of most if not all of these states, the fate of Italy being the most vivid illustration, while at the same time the security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe has posed a question of strategy to which they have no answer precisely because their domestic politics are in a state of turmoil. The economic recession has simply made this situation worse, because investment capital that might have gone to central and Eastern Europe is not available, even while domestic pressure groups impose restrictions from the post-Communist world.⁸³

At the same time, the Western governments since 1989 were far too conservative and muscle-bound to respond to the fast-moving challenges of the period. France has still not devised any positive response on European security other than to try and weaken U.S. influence in NATO and Europe while also tying Germany down to Paris. This policy only tied France more to Germany and impeded both states' ability to deal with European issues.⁸⁴ Hence France's foreign policy failures were very much due to France's inability to define positive French interests, or ways to realize them.⁸⁵

And when the successors of the regimes of 1989-91 came in they were even less able or inclined to make the case for Europe. For example, Canada's defense policy, stated in its recent White Paper, stresses tailoring its armed forces to what domestic tolerances will allow, diminishes the formerly central role of NATO, and endorses a new multilateral orientation. This multilateralism should not be seen as a genuine commitment to truly multilateral or collective security but paradoxically as an assertion of a strategy dictated by the national interest. It is a step

towards a renationalized and minimal defense strategy.⁸⁶ While this strategy probably accords with domestic and fiscal constraints, it also fosters a self-centered and even potentially schizophrenic outlook. A penetrating analysis of the White Paper observed that,

Canada views multilateralism as a means of continuing to participate actively in global affairs so as to increase the influence it might otherwise not exercise, including influence over the United States. It does want to see Washington take the lead on many issues but hopes to use multilateralism as a mechanism of restraining unilateral American actions and policies. Above all, Canada does not equate a commitment to multilateralism as requiring that it assume a greater share of the burden for defending Western interests around the globe.⁸⁷

The scant utility of this approach for international or just European security readily emerges when one ponders the nature of multilateralism according to international relations theory. According to one recent analysis,

Multilateralism tends to make security a nonexcludable good. This minimizes the hegemon's coercive power and its ability to extract payment for protection. It makes the sanctioning of free riders difficult (because domestic coalitions then feel exploited-SJB) and threats of abandonment almost impossible. From a choice-theoretic perspective, multilateralism does not seem a convincing bargain or a determinate solution.⁸⁸

In other words, Canada's and other, similarly inclined states' stance makes it harder for anyone to contribute positively to security and encourages other states to complain about their disproportionate burdens. As former British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind said, the EU's foreign policy is failing because it is a policy of the lowest common denominator and hence useless as a means of advancing European security.⁸⁹ The mirage of multilateralism and the quest for it in the belief that the situation is now ripe for it, and that this will bring European security closer, have instead made it harder to create either a

Machtordnung or a *Friedensordnung* (a power-based order or a peace order) as Yugoslavia so tragically shows. Yugoslavia's and Russia's travails show that the current order is inherently unstable and contains too many tendencies towards military resolution of crises. The inability to progress beyond the *status quo* spells either war or regression to new forms of blocs or spheres of influence policies in Europe as a last resort.

As a result the West has had no coherent policy for dealing with the challenges coming from east of the Elbe. As the prominent French analyst Nicole Gnesotto observed,

The truth of the Yugoslav conflict is that our democracies are in such a state of conflict themselves that they are no longer capable of differentiating between the manageable and the unacceptable, even in the case of Serbia. Not that Realpolitik has not been a consideration in matters of war and peace—quite the contrary; but when in the name of strategic stability, some intend to negotiate, for each crisis, our principles in exchange for our interests—stability being more crucial than morals—is it not, *mutatis mutandis*, as a result of a confusion of values of the same order which previously led pacifists to proclaim “better red than dead”? . . . Apart from any moral considerations, should not the Western countries have in particular concluded, with a view to their own strategic interests, that a certain level of barbarity was in the long run incompatible with the security of a democratic Europe? . . . In the end what threatens the European order today is not so much the spectre of ethno-nationalism as the inability of the democracies to define the boundary between the legitimate and the unacceptable.⁹⁰

Europe's inability to act in a coherent unified fashion assumes many forms. In 1997 it assumed the form of an unwillingness to act when Albania collapsed and appeared on the verge of civil war even though the United States and Europe had plenty of advance notice. And it is equally apparent in 1998 that significant inter-allied differences exist with respect to the Kosovo crisis. The refusal to act despite “early warning” was also prevalent in Rwanda's massacres in 1994 and suggests that the answer is political will, not more diplomats arguing about architectures.⁹¹ But

a deeper cause of this malaise is that despite the triumphs of the West, concerns about other states' relative gains, e.g., Germany's power after unification, still drive much of governments' foreign policies and make it difficult, if not impossible to achieve unified European policies. As Helmut Kohl observed, Germany's dominance "would necessarily provoke fear and envy among all our neighbors and move them toward common action against Germany."⁹² A foreign policy based on the postulate of a European harmony of interests on all issues of European security, not to mention "out-of-area" issues, is factually wrong and carries the risk of dangerous outcomes. It belongs to the realm of illusion, not fact.

Europe, rather than rushing off to a united policy, craves the American umbrella, for without it a "security competition" based on a renationalization of foreign and defense policies would necessarily ensue as Kohl and other European elites believe.⁹³ While such a competition may not lead to wars of the nature of 1914 or 1939, it would probably lead to regional blocs, spheres of interests and of influence, and what French analyst Francois Heisbourg called "*la geopolitics du Grand-papa*" (old time power politics).⁹⁴ This observation represents the settled belief of West European and Central European elites themselves. Central European officials, despite their friendship with Germany, desire NATO membership, not only because of their residual fears of Russian policy, but also because they do not want to be left alone in Europe without the Trans-Atlantic connection, with a unified Germany.⁹⁵ And Bonn, as Kohl's observations show, knows it.

Thus Washington cannot and should not take for granted European integration and unity, i.e., unity behind its aims and objectives. Similarly, support for one or another brick in the West European security architecture is generally motivated as much by fears of other states' relative gains as it is by a desire to do something for Europe.⁹⁶ When we hear politicians or analysts tell us that Europe has reached the millennium and has renounced

power politics, Bismarck's acid comment comes to mind that politicians who invoked the name of Europe generally did so because they were afraid to ask for something that was in their selfish interest. We would be wise to observe the realism behind that in analyzing European policies as well as our own. Likewise more realism in our study of Russian policies in Europe would also help us wake up from our "dogmatic slumbers."

NATO and Russia after Madrid.

The Russian problem in this context is twofold. Russia not only has a radically different dream than does the United States, it also refuses to play the role assigned to it by Washington. A most dangerous delusion is the continuing belief that after the Cold War Russia will cooperate with *our* agenda and not follow its own concept of its interests. Thomas Friedman, the International Affairs Correspondent of the *New York Times*, strikingly illustrated the prevalence of this illusion.

Personally, I thought we fought the Cold War not to contain Russia but to change Russia—so Moscow could really work with the U.S. in reducing both countries' nuclear arsenals, stemming weapons proliferation and confronting rogue states. I thought the real fruit of the Cold War would be to have a Russia that cooperates with us on our *post-Cold-War* agenda.⁹⁷ (Italics in the original)

Sadly, such historical revisionism and illusions concerning past history and present realities are all too pervasive. They do not speak well for our elite's understanding of the current international situation. Unfortunately, Russia remains unreconciled not only to NATO enlargement but also to both the European post-Cold War *status quo* and the U.S. vision of the future. Moscow opposes the use of NATO as a political or military instrument for out-of-area operations in the Middle East, as its stout resistance to U.S. policy in Iraq, Iran, and increasingly the Arab-Israeli peace process illustrates. But

it also remains firmly opposed to NATO's enlargement or its role and scope in Europe. And its opposition is based on principle, not just temporary calculation of material advantage. Moscow repeatedly announced that there were no concessions that could get it to change its mind on these issues and that it opposes NATO enlargement (if not NATO itself) on principle. Yet American officials regularly deny this. For instance, Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that his "private conversations" with Russian legislators led him to believe that expansion was not "a serious issue."⁹⁸ It is not Moscow's fault if we refuse to believe its genuine protests against our policy. Therefore it is worth focusing on how Moscow views the post-enlargement process of European security development, and especially its concept of the Permanent Joint Council with NATO.

Clearly Moscow's attitudes on these issues have their roots in the past (even the 1970s and 1980s). Moscow still thinks in terms of the past when it approaches the European security agenda. As James Sherr observes, there has been a regression in Russian thinking to pre-1914 approaches to security, hardly an efficacious way to advance Russia's European position today.⁹⁹ Indeed, the fundamental principles that underlie Moscow's approach to European security today could have been formulated by Peter or Catherine the Great or any of their more intelligent successors or diplomats if they faced today's situation. This historical basis for Russia's position on European security issues appears in what Moscow advocates for European security.

- Russia, to be secure, must have a sphere of influence where it can dominate the security system of its neighbors from the Baltic coast (including Finland) to the Black Sea. This is the motive force behind the priority goals of Russian foreign policy, the integration of the CIS around or under Russian auspices in politics, economics, and defense.

- Central Europe in general and Poland in particular must not be able to defend themselves by means of alignment with other European states. Nor should they be able to resist Russia's superior military, political, and economic pressure by their own power. Therefore, as far as possible, NATO should not be allowed to develop those states' militaries or use their territories for military purposes and development. The basis for this belief is that if these are not "friendly" countries as Russia understands the term, then they are hostile states that can become bases for Western enemies.

- Furthermore, Europe must not be united in a security system that excludes Russia because any such unity is inherently directed against Russia and restricts its free hand. Russia must be part of a system encompassing all of Europe at all times in order to retain a free hand in its self-defined sphere of influence and the means to veto and constrain the rest of Europe from uniting against it here. As Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment observes, the shrewder opponents of NATO enlargement deliberately fought so hard about Central Europe to prevent expansion to "the Niemen and Naretowa," the rivers that demarcate Poland and the former Soviet republics from each other.¹⁰⁰

- Failing an optimal outcome, European states must be divided against each other to prevent a continental bloc from emerging. Historically Russia sought to keep Germany divided and France and England at odds. Once that policy failed in 1870, Russia endeavored to prevent its isolation in Europe *vis-à-vis* Germany or England, its two main rivals. After the Cold War, this policy shifted to entail Soviet efforts to divide the European allies from the United States, a policy that has now been revived.

- Thus two corollaries flow from those principles. Russia cannot be a great power in Europe, which it must be for it to survive, unless it is reintegrated along lines that compromise the sovereignty of its neighbors and make Russia the arbiter of their security. If Russia is not an

empire, it is little or nothing in the great game of states, a vision that has haunted Russian statesmen from time immemorial.

- Hence there is the abiding Russian belief that it must have more security than anyone else along its periphery, otherwise it would be worse off than its neighbors. And if it cannot control their security policy, than it is inevitable that hostile powers, bent on destroying Russia's power, integrity, etc., will take over Russia's neighbors. This belief was common to Tsars and Soviets alike and still reigns in Moscow. Sergei Rogov, head of the USA/Canada Institute and a major advisor to and spokesmen for the Foreign Ministry and government, recently wrote that,

First of all, Moscow should seek to preserve the special character of Russian-American relations. Washington should recognize the exceptional status of the Russian Federation in the formation of a new system of international relations, a role different from that which Germany, Japan, or China or any other center of power plays in the global arena.¹⁰¹

- Elsewhere Rogov wrote that, "The Russian Federation is unwilling to consent to bear the geopolitical burden of the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War or to be reconciled with an unequal position in the new European order."¹⁰² Nor is this an isolated view. Russian elites still assume that Russia is or is entitled to be seen as a superpower or great power that must have equality with the United States throughout the world, and a place at the "presidium table" of any European security system. As Yeltsin's senior foreign policy advisor, Dmitri Ryurikov, observed in 1997, it was "strange, unjust (or unfair) and wrong" for NATO not to grant Russia such a veto and that "refusal to give Russia this right actually deprives it of the possibility of taking part in settling European security problems."¹⁰³ Finally, Primakov's insistence on equality with Washington is well-known and a cornerstone of his standpoint on Russian foreign policy's cardinal tasks. As he stated, the Founding Act had to be a document that would "reflect real

possibilities for us to influence whatever decisions might be taken by the Alliance."¹⁰⁴

- In practice, this demand for a superior status means that Russia assiduously shuns a true security dialogue with the smaller states and pursues it instead with the big powers so that it can reassure itself about its status, as noted above. As Yeltsin wrote to the major European governments and the United States in 1993,

On the whole, we are of the opinion that the relations between our country and NATO should be several degrees warmer than the relations between the Alliance and Eastern Europe. The rapprochement between NATO and Russia, including the direct cooperation in advancing peace, could progress at much quicker pace. It would be possible to include the East Europeans in this process.¹⁰⁵

Russia's obsession with its status as a great power and its demand for a special privileged position at the expense of other states dates from its earliest appearance in international affairs some 500 years ago. This obsession betrays an abiding insecurity regarding its ability to compete in that world. NATO enlargement will hardly supersede so deep-rooted an instinct by proclamations of its benign intent.

Russia is not only obsessed with its great power status and its diminishing relevance to European security. Russia also looks only at military power and does not sufficiently take account of an institution like the EU as a security provider. It views the EU only as a trading bloc from which Russia stands to benefit economically. Moscow remains blind to the security aspects of the EU.¹⁰⁶

Russia's peculiar mentality concerning Europe also means that not only does NATO's advance haunt it. It also is gripped by the fear that unless some new mechanism, specifying its unique greatness, is established, it will be consigned to the periphery of American interests. If Washington will not regard it any longer as its equal

partner, then a kind of nightmare scenario that seems to be unfolding before Russian eyes even now will take place. In effect, it wants what it awkwardly tried for in the 1970s, a superpower condominium, or as Primakov's predecessor as Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, observed, Primakov is not proposing strategic partnership with the United States as much as he is proposing "something akin to peaceful coexistence."¹⁰⁷

Likewise, European security should be organized along such lines that would most effectively leave Moscow's hands free to revise both the territorial and defense arrangements of 1989 to its best advantage. Those revisions could include revising the CFE treaty to minimize NATO enlargement's consequences, or even refusing in practice to accept the post-1989 borders. Even though Moscow signed treaties recognizing the borders with Ukraine and Lithuania after the May 1997 Paris conference, it has brought neither treaty to the Duma for ratification. Neither has it done anything to implement the May 1997 Ukrainian treaty. And Russia continues to refuse to sign the border treaties that are ready for completion with Estonia and Latvia, allegedly on the grounds of maltreatment of their Russians, more accurately because they refuse to accept Russian guidance over their domestic and security policies. Indeed, in 1998 Russia unilaterally instituted sanctions against Latvia in response for police brutality against Russian demonstrators there, and for bomb threats against the Russian embassy.

Nor is this trend accidental. As Primakov told the OSCE in September 1996,

Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War certain countries in Europe—the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—have disintegrated. A number of new states were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new system of security.¹⁰⁸

Accordingly, the advocacy of a pan-European collective security system, which goes back at least to Molotov in 1954 and was taken up by Yeltsin as quoted above in 1993, is essentially an attempt to achieve the following practical results in Europe:

- NATO, while remaining in business, would lose its collective defense aspect and become merely an agency for peace operations in Europe with or without Russian participation. It would only be able to function out-of-area with U.N. or OSCE authorization, and thereby become an auxiliary of either or both of these organizations where Russia would have a veto.

- NATO would then be unable to undertake any peace operations in the CIS, given Russia's veto there, through the superordinate agencies over NATO and/or the NATO-Russia Council where it has a veto as well. Moreover, NATO would not be able to stop any Russian activity inside the CIS, not just what is now recognized as spheres of influence peacemaking.

- Russia and NATO or Russia alone would offer security guarantees to states outside of NATO. This action would place them once again in a situation of compromised independence, sovereignty, and security. Meanwhile Moscow would advance to its long-stated policy of dividing Europe with NATO in a straightforward sphere of influence deal. That *status quo* could then provide the basis for a free hand in reintegrating the CIS. We could also expect to see pressure for territorial revisions as well. Moldova and Belarus represent the prime examples of what we could then expect from Moscow.

Even if the first round of NATO enlargement takes place, Russia's ideal outcome entails demilitarizing Central Europe and further disarmament in the West. Then Russia would remain as the strongest European military power and the only one with real freedom to act in its sphere of vital interests. Russian elites greatly fear that NATO enlargement represents a future preparation of the theater

for potential attacks against Russia itself, or at least to detach the CIS from its orbit. Therefore Russia must have a correlation of forces *vis-à-vis* NATO designed to meet the worst case scenario imaginable. As Russian force models of security and threats in the European theater indicate, the principle of a sufficient defense (PSD) underlying Russian defense planning is one of at least 90 percent. In other words, if the success of defense equates to the failure of offense or aggression, Russia's PSD highlights the belief that NATO will attack (in a conventional war) even if its chances of success were at best 1 in 10 (10 percent). "Obviously NATO and the United States are perceived as being quite reckless." And this formulation leaves out Russia's nuclear deterrent.¹⁰⁹

While such a view seems outlandish given Russia's weakness today, it still animates far too much thinking in Russian security policy and creates a glaring disparity between means and ends in Russian strategy. That disparity is quite possibly the greatest threat to peace in Eurasia. It also makes for a security situation east of Germany where we are dealing with an unpredictable state that does not truly know where its writ stops and which has yet to come to terms with reality.

Just as Russia's dream is wholly at odds with the vision of cooperative security that most of Europe and the United States shares, its internal system of governance also mocks international accords like the OSCE's Code of Conduct. Russia is in violation of over 50 percent of the Code's provisions.¹¹⁰ The return to pre-modern Tsarist forms of rule, which is acknowledged and even glorified by prominent Russian officials like Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov, is not irrelevant in this context to the pursuit of similarly antiquated notions of security.¹¹¹ It was precisely those pre-modern forms of rule that launched Russia repeatedly upon suicidal foreign and military policies that led to the Russo-Japanese war, the Balkan wars of 1912-13, World War I, and more recently, Chechnya.¹¹²

Russia has obstructed to the maximum degree possible OSCE and U.N. peace efforts in the CIS, preferring instead to create an exclusive military sphere of influence, often by forceful means. To this end, Moscow has dismembered Moldova and Georgia, launched coups in Azerbaijan, violated its own collective security treaty (the Tashkent treaty of 1992) with Baku and Erevan, and sent massive amounts of illegal arms to Armenia. Moscow has also intermittently threatened Baltic and Ukrainian boundaries, waged economic warfare against CIS and Baltic states, demanded extra-territorial rights for Russians in the CIS and the right to influence Baltic citizenship legislation, imposed unilateral sanctions on Latvia to this end, and attempted to unify the CIS under its own auspices.¹¹³

In Chechnya, Russia sowed the whirlwind and reaped it, violating binding political agreements with the OSCE signed only a week before the invasion. But the ultimate result of its folly has been to force the general retreat of Russian power in the Caucasus and Central Asia as Russia's military debility became too obvious to ignore.¹¹⁴ Yet these forced retreats have not yet forced an adequate reassessment of Russia's well-known strategic goals or overall policies.

These same goals and outlooks still animate Russia's approach to European security. They invalidate the U.S. dream of a democratic partner who is reconciled, albeit unhappily, to the *status quo* and the vision of intercontinental security based on democratization, NATO as international policeman, etc. Today Russia cannot be persuaded, or bought off, to go along with that view in return for essentially symbolic, meaningless concessions. It insists on playing a lone, free, and unpredictable hand in Europe. This is unacceptable to Europe, not just Washington. As German analyst Heinrich Vogel writes,

The critical variable for assessing European security in this perspective is the calculability of political structures and

decision-making processes in Russia and the other CIS states which are still based on precarious political, economic, and social conditions. Since the rhetorics of brinkmanship can become addictive, the cooperation of the Russian governments to come is not assured. Therefore promoting the consolidation of political systems in this region in the direction of democracy—i.e., rule of law, balance of constitutional powers, and civilian control over the military—is the only option of an enlightened Western policy.¹¹⁵

The Struggle over the Founding Act and within the Council.

Since the Founding Act between NATO and Russia was signed, a “battle of interpretations” has broken out between them. When we look at the Founding Act’s text, it becomes clear that this Act constitutes not only the creation of a mechanism for Russo-NATO relations but also an invitation to an ongoing political struggle to define the future scope of those relations.

NATO diplomats acknowledge that some powers will have to be delegated to the new councils with Russia, Ukraine, and other European and Central Asian partners or their functional roles will wither and die. Though the United States insists the North Atlantic Council will remain the Alliance’s premier policy-making forum, senior NATO officials acknowledged that Russia’s concerns will be taken into account by many allies. They said the psychological need to keep Russia involved in sustaining NATO’s new role as a pan-European organization will mean that the West must be much more responsive to Moscow.¹¹⁶

Thus the core of this struggle is defining just what powers Russia will have in the Council. This struggle has already begun since Russia’s concept of the Council remains fundamentally at odds with NATO’s.

Russian spokesmen from Yeltsin down insist that the Paris agreement on the Council gives Russia a veto over its activities.¹¹⁷ This view contradicts the official statements of the United States that Russia has a voice, not a veto in

NATO. Ambassador Robert Hunter states flatly that issues that could affect third countries are fenced off from the Council and Russia will have no influence or authority over "anything that NATO does with Central European or other countries."¹¹⁸ Not surprisingly and as could have been foretold, the result has been a stalemated council and great Russian bitterness, if not claims of being deceived. It is noteworthy, in this context, that Russian analysts, despite the Paris accord, still talked of worst-case scenarios of trying to overturn the European settlement if it cannot prevent NATO's further enlargement.¹¹⁹ And they also maintain that the Founding Act neither gives NATO the rights to veto Russia's actions, nor can it effectively prevent a Russian veto.¹²⁰

Accordingly, the Council has become either the forum in which stalemate is made visible or where Russia outlines its countervision for Europe. The most recent account of the Council states that it is deadlocked due to the competing Russo-Western visions of its role and activities. Thus it is bogged down in disputes over procedures, the agenda's items, and other minutiae. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs has said that there is a "clash of cultures at every level of participation between Russia and NATO."¹²¹ Despite the strong U.S. priority to counter proliferation, there has been little serious discussion in the Council with Russia, something consistent with NATO's past record of minimal activity in regard to WMD proliferation.¹²² Moscow wants to use the Council to prevent enlargement, find markets for its conventional arms producers in Europe, insert itself into NATO's military plans for the new members, and enhance defense technological and industrial cooperation with European states.¹²³ Policing the CIS and the Middle East through NATO has no place in Moscow's concept for NATO.

Russia's main objective in the Council is to use it to prevent NATO's expansion, particularly its military arm, into Central Europe. It has pressed to use the Council to discuss issues of infrastructure and insert itself into

discussions on the extension of NATO's infrastructure eastward. And obviously NATO refuses to accept this interpretation of the Council or Russia's efforts to obtain a veto over NATO's internal military decisionmaking.¹²⁴ "The upshot is that the PJC has achieved next to nothing and actually has served to highlight the continuing disconnect between Russian and European security."¹²⁵

Moscow has also already intimated that unless the revised CFE Treaty sets NATO's post-enlargement ceiling at or below NATO's existing levels, it may not sign the new treaty. And, in particular, NATO forces must not advance towards its borders. Thus Moscow is trying to use its long-held goal of demilitarizing Poland as blackmail *vis-à-vis* NATO.¹²⁶ Similarly, inside the Council and at NATO ministerial meetings, Primakov and then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin have insisted on a European security structure where NATO is converted into a peacemaking operation that cannot act without Russian consent and participation, where the OSCE is the coordinating agency of European security.¹²⁷ Primakov has charged that NATO exercises assume a quasi-offensive character, that the European-Atlantic Political Council (EAPC) is in danger of becoming a surrogate for the OSCE where Russia will be excluded, and that Russia must have a mechanism to inspect NATO's military infrastructure as a vital interest in defending its essential military and security concerns.¹²⁸

Similarly, the issue of peace operations is now moot. The Founding Act, though not a legal document, does carry implications of a politically binding document and it can easily be construed as giving the OSCE and the U.N. further authority over NATO (and thus giving Russia a legitimate right as well) to determine the scope of NATO and Russian participation in peace operations.¹²⁹ While U.S. officials cite Bosnia as a positive sign of Russo-American and East-West cooperation in peace operations, Russian opinion is rather different, and Russia still insists on an untrammelled freedom to engage in unilateral peace operations in the CIS,

its "backyard."¹³⁰ Since peace operations are today's prime instrument for the expansion of the great powers' spheres of influence, Russia still seeks a free hand in its sphere, but that is unacceptable to Europe.

We may see the continuing adherence to spheres of influence and attempts to detach regions from an indivisible Europe and place them in a situation of unequal security for them *vis-à-vis* Russia in the Baltic and even Ukraine. Though Russia has signed treaties with Lithuania and Ukraine, it has done nothing to implement those treaties and the new borders; nor has the Duma passed these treaties, making them legally binding.¹³¹

In late 1997, Moscow's collapsing military forces led it to make interesting new proposals for confidence-building measures and disarmament in the Baltic. But it still aims to give the entire littoral, the Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland, security guarantees in order to keep them out of NATO and confer a superior position on Russia. In the meantime, it has stated it will not negotiate borders with Estonia and Latvia unless they meet Moscow's *desiderata* for legislation on their Russian population, a long-standing red herring in regional diplomacy.¹³² Unfortunately this goodwill was destroyed by Russia's unilaterally imposed sanctions against Latvia in 1998.¹³³ Clearly Russia could not resist the temptation to score cheap, short-term points unilaterally against Riga by instituting the sanctions. Such actions betray Moscow's great power chauvinism at its unreconstructed worst and remind everyone why we need NATO. As Henrik Landerholm, a Moderate Party member of Sweden's Parliament, observed in 1997,

In the last analysis, NATO naturally also constitutes a guarantee that small states with insufficient defensive capacity—to which category Sweden as well belongs following the 1996 defense decision—can develop in peace and freedom. This is particularly true if Russia's course should change.¹³⁴

Sadly, too much still suggests that Russia has not yet changed enough from its former course to nullify

Landerholm's warning. And if one looks at the European security agenda today, it becomes clear that there are divisions on issues within NATO and that Russia opposes the U.S. policy on virtually every aspect of that agenda. Consequently, the Permanent Joint Council will continue to be stalemated and ineffectual.¹³⁵

Conclusions.

It is now clear that renewed East-West tension in Europe will be the order of the day for quite a while. It need not have been this way. But the incompatibility of Washington's and Moscow's dreams makes it all but certain that this will remain the case. Neither side will admit that both are revisionist powers, with Washington seeking to democratize all of Europe and creating an international posse that it leads, while Moscow still wants to undo at least some of Eurasia's 1989-91 territorial settlement.

This double revisionism all but guarantees a substantial degree of East-West political tension in Europe and elsewhere. But it is not the case that NATO enlargement caused this discord, although it surely aggravated it. Russia and the United States entered into this period with diverging illusions. Russia thought it could dominate the CIS with U.S. blessing and thereby supersede Europe's smaller states, and the United States believed that it could make the world safe for democracy through a strategy of democratic enlargement and collective security.

While Zhou En-Lai's metaphor above is apt, it should be remembered that the bed the superpowers slept in was not the conjugal bed but rather Procrustes' mythological bed that altered to fit his shape. Unfortunately, they could not restructure it as he did to accommodate their differing dreams. And the dream of lasting partnership that led them into the post-1991 relationship was based on ultimately incompatible understandings of the mutual passion for partnership that drove them together. The future appears to be one of a realistic divorce, hopefully without undue

acrimony. But, today at best, we can now only hope for what the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov (1814-41) meant when he wrote, "The love was without joy, the parting will be without sorrow."

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. For an example of the Russian elite's continuing determination to play a lone hand in Europe. see Igor Maslov, "Russia and NATO: A Critical Period," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 1-15; and for the continuing suspicion and distrust of NATO, see Pavel Felgenhauer, "Defense Dossier: Inside Vulnerable Bastion," *Moscow Times*, April 9, 1998.

2. Jim Hoagland, "Foreign Policy by Impulse," *Washington Post*, March 19, 1998, p. 21, and *Idem.*; "The Gatsby Syndrome," *Washington Post Weekly edition*, July 14, 1997, p. 5.

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CHAPTER 8

NATO AND THE CAUCASUS: THE CASPIAN AXIS

Glen E. Howard

Few regions of the former Soviet Union have been at the center stage of world attention more than the Caucasus. From the battlefields of Chechnya to the oil fields of Baku, the Caucasus is once again becoming a pivotal arena of world geopolitics as the rush to develop one of the world's largest untapped oil basins is transforming this region into a major energy crossroads between Europe and Asia. The eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the rush to gain a strategic foothold in the oil-rich Caspian is dramatically altering the strategic landscape between Eurasia's petroleum heartland and the world's most powerful alliance. With NATO's expansion east a new Eurasian borderland is emerging along NATO's volatile eastern flank that is rapidly narrowing the distance between the Atlantic Alliance and the newly independent states of the Caucasus. No event symbolized this development more than the 1997 visit to the region by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. His mission to the newly independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia proved to be a major milestone in NATO's ties to the Caucasus as Solana became the highest ranking representative of NATO to ever travel to the region.¹

Solana's historic visit to the Caucasus officially acknowledged the emergence of the Caucasus as a key component in American and European security planning in a pivotal energy crossroads of Eurasia. Since World War I, oil in the Caucasus has been a major strategic objective of European powers. Twice in this century strategic planners in the German General Staff have plotted the capture of Baku's oilfields. In 1918, Germany and its ally, Ottoman

Turkey, coordinated an attack that led to the successful capture of Baku's oilfields at the end of the First World War. Twenty-five years later German strategic planners at the request of Hitler plotted the seizure of Caspian oil in a bid to gain control over the Soviet Union's "petroleum heartland."² Eyeing Baku, which produced over 80 percent of the Soviet Union's total oil production, Hitler directed two panzer divisions south toward the Caucasus in 1942 to capture the oil prize of the Caspian. This unsuccessful gambit proved to be a devastating setback for Hitler's war machine as oil shortages plagued German military operations throughout the remainder of the war and ultimately proved to be the Achilles' heel of the *Wehrmacht*.³

With the end of the Cold War, the Caucasus is once again at the forefront of world geopolitics as Caspian oil transforms NATO's eastern flank. Throughout the Cold War, NATO's eastern flank received little attention from NATO policymakers who frequently treated Eurasia as an afterthought in strategic planning.⁴ Nearly a decade after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the new geopolitics of Caspian oil is dramatically reshaping the strategic importance of the Caucasus in Western energy security. Today the struggle over pipelines and transportation of Caspian oil to Western markets is a key security concern of the United States and its NATO allies in the post-Cold War era. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana is keenly aware of the strategic significance of the Caucasus to Western energy security and underscored this point when he traveled to Baku in February 1997. During that visit Solana emphasized that:

The Caucasus is an important region for Europe which has enormous social and economic potential. Europe will not be completely secure if the countries of the Caucasus remain outside European security.⁵

For over 2 centuries, the Caucasus has served as a major linchpin in Imperial Russia's zone of forward defense. Acting as a strategic buffer, the Caucasus insulated the

Russian Empire from threats to the south posed by the encroaching Ottoman and Persian Empires.⁶ It served as a strategic outpost for the Near East allowing Russia to project its influence along several strategic axes: Turkey, Iran, the Black Sea, and Central Asia. The strategic importance of the Caucasus was significantly augmented by the region's enormous economic importance to Tsarist Russia, which provided Moscow with two-thirds of its oil, three-fourths of its manganese, one-fourth of its copper, and much of its lead.⁷

At the turn of the century the discovery of oil in Baku by the Nobel Brothers transformed the strategic importance of the region as the Caucasus became a major source of oil for the rapidly industrializing economies of the European powers. Baku itself became the center of the world petroleum industry as the Caucasus entered a key stage of economic development. Nearly a century later a second oil boom is in the making as the Caucasus once again becomes a major center of world petroleum development. To date, nearly a dozen NATO and NATO-aligned states are racing ahead with plans to gain a strategic foothold in the Caspian. The flags of numerous state-owned oil companies of many NATO-member states now fly in Baku. This list includes Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United States, and even Japan.⁸

Two key members of NATO, the United States and Turkey, attach deep strategic significance to the Caspian. Their common interests in developing the oil resources of the region and in safeguarding its transport across the Caucasian Isthmus is rapidly escalating the geopolitical importance of the region to NATO and its allies. The focus of American interests in the Caspian is the 40 percent American-owned Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).⁹ Along with the United States, several key NATO allies have developed vast economic stakes in the flagship consortium. Moreover, U.S. concern over the various obstacles arising from the transportation of

Caspian oil from the region is playing a major role in reshaping Western strategic interests in the region. The cornerstone of Western energy security concerns in the Caucasus is the strategic 1,650-kilometer Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This pipeline will play a key role in ending Russia's monopoly over energy routes from the Caspian and offer the West an alternative means for transporting Caspian oil outside of Russian control.

NATO's interest in an alternative pipeline outside Russian control has additional strategic significance to the NATO-aligned states of Eastern Europe. Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, each attach a certain degree of strategic significance to Caspian oil that enhances their overall energy security. Each of these NATO-aligned states share a commonality of interests in their desire to break the Russian energy umbilical cord that has tied their economies to Russia since their subjugation into the former Warsaw Pact. The two anchors of NATO's eastern flank, Ukraine and Turkey, assign a high strategic priority in breaking this connection that makes their economies almost 100 percent dependent on Russian gas imports. By creating an alternative energy transportation grid free of Russian monopoly, these states can tremendously bolster their energy security without relying on Moscow for most of their energy needs.

The challenge of meeting these new strategic realities is presenting NATO policymakers with a much different set of concerns along its Eurasian borderland than was ever faced during the days of the Cold War. For NATO, the Caucasus is becoming a key geographic nexus between the newly expanded NATO Alliance and the Eurasian petroleum heartland. In turn the Caspian is rapidly becoming an integral part of the calculus for Western energy security on a scale approaching that of the Persian Gulf. What worsens matters for Western policymakers is that the struggle for Caspian oil is shifting beyond the competing interests of European powers and now includes the competing interests of regional powers in South Asia and even the Pacific. As a

former policymaker on Caspian issues in the National Security Council observed:

Increasingly, the Caspian region is emerging not only as a critical component of Western energy security, but also as a linchpin in the evolving balance of power in Eurasia, Asia and the Middle East.¹⁰

While the United States and its NATO allies share a profound interest in maintaining the balance of power in the Caspian, the premier challenge awaiting NATO in the Caucasus will be the delicate task of counterbalancing Western energy security concerns with those of Russia. To date, NATO's blueprint for engagement in the Caucasus has been the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. Through the PfP program, NATO planners hope to enhance regional stability by offering military assistance and training in a variety of areas that can bolster regional security. While NATO successfully has filled the "gray zone of insecurity" around the periphery of the former USSR by offering special NATO charters with Ukraine and the Baltic states, no line of security has been drawn by NATO in the Caucasus. The Caucasus remains perhaps the most volatile region of the former Soviet empire where a gray zone of insecurity remains blanketed by a sea of oil. The regional security environment in the Caucasus has grown more complicated due to Moscow's inability to relinquish its imperial interests in the region and as other neighboring regional powers slowly encroach upon Russia's shrinking perimeter of forward defense.

American policymakers insist that Washington's major aim is to avoid resurrecting imperial 19th century rivalries in the Caucasus and neighboring Central Asia, a period which historians record as the "Great Game."¹¹ For whatever reasons Washington refuses to acknowledge, NATO has embarked upon its own version of the "Great Game" by launching the PfP Program, which is creating unprecedented military contacts between the Alliance and the newly independent states of the Caucasus. Without a

clear strategy of engagement in the Caucasus, the PfP initiative is becoming one of the primary channels for building closer military and security ties between the newly independent states of the Caucasus and the West. With over 27 nations participating in NATO's PfP Program, the collective future of three of these countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, will have a tremendous impact on the future of Western energy security.

NATO and Caspian Oil.

As NATO enters its post-expansion phase the need to safeguard access to world energy supplies will continue to play a key role in NATO contingency planning and strategy. Virtually all of the NATO-member states remain overly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East. In coming years Europe's oil import dependence is projected to rise from the current level of 55 percent dependence to over 60 percent by 2010, and 75 percent by 2015, the majority of which will be coming directly from the volatile Middle East.¹²

Energy diversification away from the Middle East has extreme importance for the energy security needs of NATO allies due to its ability to insulate Europe, as well as the United States, from future oil shocks caused by instability in the Persian Gulf region. The continued tension between the West and Saddam Hussein over Iraq, which has resulted in Iraqi oil remaining largely offline to Western consumers since the 1991 Gulf War, has had a significant impact on how NATO's allies in Eastern Europe view the Caspian. These states have begun to reexamine their dependence on Middle Eastern oil and look to oil supplies from Central Asia and the Caucasus as an alternative to Arab crude.¹³ The European Union, for example, is conceptualizing a cohesive integrated approach to Europe's energy needs and is reportedly adopting a policy plan towards the Caspian that incorporates this region into European energy strategy.¹⁴

For the United States and its NATO allies in Europe, the interplay of oil and national security in the wake of the Arab oil embargo and the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran remain fresh in recent memory. Equally as important, many of NATO's newest alliance members in Eastern Europe share similar strategic goals in their common aim of severing their energy umbilical cords with Moscow, which together has greatly fueled Europe's embrace of the Caspian as an alternative supply of oil and gas. Oil has and will continue to play an important role in NATO's national security planning as both the United States and its NATO-aligned allies seek to insulate themselves from supply disruptions caused by over-dependence on one single regional source of oil.¹⁵ Winston Churchill aptly noted the dire implications that this causes for national security over a century ago when he foresaw the problem that this issue created for Great Britain and the Royal Navy. Churchill noted that:

On no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety, and variety alone.¹⁶

Indeed, in many ways the struggle for the Caspian basin is strongly reminiscent of Great Britain's rivalry with Russia over Persian oil concessions at the turn of the century. At that time the Royal Navy sought to develop oilfields in south Persia as an alternative supply source for oil. A similar fate awaits the Caspian as the United States and its NATO allies struggle to create an alternative energy supply that lies outside of the regional pipeline monopoly that Russia maintains over the Caspian basin. To date, nearly a dozen NATO-member countries are represented in five major consortia involved in developing the oil wealth of the Caspian basin. (See Table 6.) Western oil contracts with Azerbaijan alone are worth \$28 billion. Major European companies, such as Italy's Agip, Belgium's Petrofina, France's Elf Aquitaine, and Britain's British Petroleum have strong governmental support for their activities in the Caspian and these NATO allies are developing a greater

Countries	Companies	Fields
United Kingdom	British Petroleum	Chirag, Shah Deniz
Norway	Statoil	Shah Deniz
Germany	Deminex	Karabakh
Belgium	Petrofina	Shah Deniz
France	Elf Aquitaine, Total	Shah Deniz
Turkey	Turkish Petroleum	Azeri, Chirag (AIOC); Shah Deniz
United States	Amoco, Exxon, UNOCAL, Conoco, Mobil, Pennzoil, Chevron	Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli
Italy	Agip	Karabakh

Table 6. NATO Member Countries Developing Oil in the Caspian (Azerbaijan).

strategic stake in the region's future. Italy's ENI has become the largest operator in the Caspian region and even German oil companies have gained a foothold in the Caspian as the quasi-state owned Deminex has won a major oil concession from Azerbaijan.¹⁷

U.S. Interests in the Caucasus.

The United States has been at the forefront of NATO allies in pronouncing its strategic ties to the Caucasus and neighboring Caspian region. U.S. policymakers have been instrumental in advocating greater NATO involvement in the region through the PfP program. The United States has also been active in conflict resolution efforts in the Caucasus involving the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and has played a pivotal role in the OSCE's Minsk group, which has been attempting to broker a resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh since mid-1994.

Mindful of Russian sensitivities in the Caucasus, U.S. policymakers have articulated a program of engagement in

the region that espouses multiple solutions to the geopolitical dilemma posed by transporting oil from the Caspian. The core U.S. policy concerning the transit of oil from the region revolves around the concern that no one nation should monopolize the pipeline routes for exporting Caspian oil. One of the chief problems confronting U.S. policymakers has been the challenge of trying to arrange an equal distribution of Caspian oil between two competing spheres of influence in the Caucasus—that of Turkey and that of Russia.¹⁸

Without question, the struggle for Caspian oil is becoming one of the biggest strategic challenges to emerge out of the former USSR for American policymakers. Devising a strategy of engagement in this complicated region slowly has evolved due to the absence of any U.S. historical experience in dealing with Eurasia. Nevertheless, the wisdom of the elder statesman of America's policy of containment during the Cold War, George Kennan, remains as valid now as it did over 40 years ago. When asked to devise a strategy for Eurasia in 1947, he reminded those formulating America's foreign policy that "any world balance of power means first and foremost a balance on the Eurasian land mass."¹⁹

Creating a strategy to follow this objective remains one of the most difficult challenges for American policymakers in the post-Cold War era. The need to maintain the balance of power on the Eurasia land mass has become a tremendous challenge for the United States as the balance of power shifts from the pursuit of the nuclear balance of power in Eurasia to pipelines and energy security. The cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Caucasus are multiple pipelines and the export of early oil from the Caspian. American strategic interests in the Caspian were formed shortly after Azerbaijan signed the "contract of the century" with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) in September 1995. America's predominance in the AIOC is clearly evident due to the fact that the flagship consortium is 40 percent American-owned. As a result of

American stakes in the AIOC, U.S. policymakers in the Clinton administration soon initiated a strategy of engagement focusing on a multiple pipeline policy for the export of "early oil" from Azerbaijan.

The multiple pipeline policy consists of U.S. support for creating two major pipeline routes for exporting AIOC's "early oil" from the Caspian. The 1,346 kilometer Baku-Novorossisk pipeline is the first of the two routes and runs northward from Baku through war-torn Chechnya to Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossisk. The second route is the 926-kilometer Baku-Supsa pipeline that runs through Georgia. Known as the "Western route," this pipeline is extremely costly to rebuild (over \$2 billion) but remains the only non-Russian route for transporting "early oil" from Azerbaijan. The Western pipeline route ends at Georgia's Black Sea port of Supsa where a 1.6 million-barrel oil terminal is being constructed. By early 1999 it will be capable of handling the AIOC's "early oil."²⁰

As the size of U.S. oil companies has grown in the Caspian, so has the level of commitment and concern shared by U.S. policymakers over the need for stability in the region. The principal architect of U.S. policy toward the Caspian region is Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. In early 1997, Talbott outlined the strategic importance of the region to U.S. interests by noting that:

If economic and political reform in the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia does not succeed—if internal and cross-border conflicts simmer and flare—the region could become a breeding ground of terrorism, a hotbed of religious and political extremism, and a battleground for outright war. It would matter profoundly to the United States if that were to happen in an area that sits on as much as 200 billion barrels of oil.²¹

The Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline.

Central to U.S. objectives in the Caucasus is the promotion of the 1,650 kilometer Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as the Main Export Pipeline (MEP). Known as "later oil," this

pipeline is the real strategic prize in the struggle for Caspian oil. With a projected peak volume of more than one million barrels per day (bpd), the pipeline will stretch from Baku in Azerbaijan to Turkey's deepwater Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. The major strategic value of Ceyhan is its ability to handle 300,000-ton supertankers, which would alleviate oil traffic running through the congested Bosphorus.²² While no final decision over the selection of an MEP route will be announced by the AIOC until sometime in early 1999, the ultimate decision on the selection of the MEP and the key question over its financing will be played by the U.S. Government. The United States retains significant leverage over the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey in the MEP decisionmaking process.

Due to Russian concerns, the United States has sought to delay announcing the selection of an MEP route, although officials in the Clinton administration repeatedly emphasize that the Baku-Ceyhan route is preferred. (See Table 7.) In early 1998, U.S. Secretary of Energy Frederico Pena traveled to Turkey where he stated publicly that the Baku-Ceyhan is the most suitable route for the MEP.

Option	Length (km)	Diameter (in.)	Capacity (bpd)	Cost (\$ billion)
Baku-Ceyhan	2,170	40	800,000	2.5
Baku-Poti	1,040	40	800,000	2.1
Samsun-Ceyhan	890	40	800,000	2.0
Baku-Novorossisk	1,346	28/32/40	800,000	2.3
Source: Robert E. Ebel, <i>Energy Choices in the Near Abroad</i> , Washington: CSIS, 1997.				

Table 7. Pipeline Options for Later Oil.

The strategic dimensions of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, however, go beyond oil. Currently there are plans underway in the U.S. Government to ease the \$2.5 billion cost of the pipeline by building a gas pipeline next to it which would significantly lessen construction costs. If such a proposal materializes, then the strategic stakes of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project would double, thus augmenting the strategic importance of the pipeline project for both Turkish and U.S. national security interests. Nevertheless, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline itself will in all likelihood become the centerpiece of U.S. energy security policy in the Caucasus for the next century.

U.S. national security policymakers devote considerable attention to all the complicated security elements associated with the transportation of Caspian oil. At the request of Congress, the U.S. Department of State has prepared a detailed study on the Caspian in order to familiarize U.S. policymakers with the region. The report highlights every strategic aspect of the Caspian oil basin to U.S. national interests and is intended to serve as a major reference document for policymakers. To maintain even closer watch over the energy security developments in the region, the U.S. Government has established an inter-agency working group for Caspian energy that is chaired by the National Security Council (NSC). This group meets monthly, and sometimes weekly, to discuss U.S. policy toward the Caspian Basin. In recent years no other oil-producing region in the world has warranted such high-level attention.²³

Support for U.S. interests in the Caucasus has received widespread support from within the U.S. Congress. Major bipartisan legislation has been passed by the Congress that calls for greater U.S. strategic commitment to the region. As Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, U.S. Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) has introduced "The Silk Road Strategy Act," aimed at stabilizing the Caspian basin and "helping fortify the area against future conflict."

Brownback's Act calls for the United States to support its strategic and commercial interests by providing urgently needed economic, technical, and financial assistance for the region, including assistance in the development of telecommunications and transportation infrastructure in Azerbaijan and other nations in the region.²⁴

The Silk Road Strategy Act also calls for providing security-related assistance in the form of military education, counter-proliferation training and supplies of surplus U.S. military equipment for the newly independent states in the Caspian basin. This legislation also encourages the development of democratic and free-market institutions in the region. The core component of the strategy is to halt Russian and Iranian efforts to destabilize the region through a broad array of activities which are inimical to U.S. and Western interests.²⁵ Facing an erosion of international support to isolate Iran, the Clinton administration has begun to embrace Brownback's strategy by supporting the creation of an East-West corridor that would involve a system of pipelines from Central Asia across the Caucasus to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. U.S. policymakers unveiled the proposal behind the "Eurasian Transportation Corridor" at a series of conferences and meetings in Caspian capitals in late 1997.²⁶

Proliferation Concerns.

Aside from national security concerns over Caspian pipelines, another important area for the United States and its NATO allies in the Caucasus is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A substantial portion of the former Soviet Union's nuclear infrastructure is situated throughout the Caspian region as an entire range of nuclear research reactors, power reactors, nuclear fuel fabrication plants and uranium mine processing plants extend from the Caucasus to the steppes of Central Asia. Significant quantities of enriched uranium have been identified in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. Facilities

in these regions accounted for no less than 600 kilograms of enriched uranium.²⁷ Central to Western security concerns is the close proximity of these facilities to the nuclear aspirant states of Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Allegations of shopping sprees by such states were frequently reported in the Western media after the breakup of the former Soviet Union. Since then, the Caucasus has played a pivotal role in Western counter-proliferation efforts as the United States and its Western allies have successfully thwarted these states obtaining nuclear materiel from the region. The smuggling of ballistic missile parts and low-grade nuclear fuel has been frequently reported in the Western media. In April 1998, for example, the government of Azerbaijan halted a shipment of Russian nuclear-capable ballistic parts bound for Iran. Twenty-two tons of stainless plates used to build ballistic missiles were seized by Azeri customs officials near the Iranian border in a major operation to prevent the seizure of weapons of mass destruction bound for Iran.²⁸

The growing importance of Eurasia in NATO's counter-proliferation strategy was a key component of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels in December 1997. Albright told an audience of NATO policymakers that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East and Eurasia are dangerous threats to Europe and place the continent at considerable risk. The Secretary of State strongly urged NATO policymakers to adopt a wider strategy to deal with future challenges from these two regions.²⁹ The degree of concern shown by Albright highlights NATO's growing interest in combating the proliferation of these weapons. This issue was first added to the Alliance's agenda at the NATO Summit in January 1994. Shortly after this decision, the United States launched a major counter-proliferation operation in Eurasia in 1994 known as Operation SAPPHIRE. The covert operation resulted in the highly successful transfer of

half a ton of highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan to the United States.³⁰

Since then the United States has intensified its counter-proliferation watch in Eurasia by devoting greater attention to the Caucasus where the Republic of Georgia has become the centerpiece of U.S. efforts in the Caucasus. In mid-1998 American military personnel conducted a highly secret operation to remove over 9 pounds of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium from a facility near the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. In cooperation with NATO ally Great Britain, American experts loaded the nuclear materiel on U.S. military aircraft for transport to the United Kingdom.³¹ The Tbilisi institute caused considerable concern among American policymakers because it is the only facility in the entire former USSR that is not monitored by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency.³² The United States has sought to bolster its counter-proliferation efforts in Georgia by increasing the level of assistance it extends to the Georgian government to tighten security. In early 1998 the U.S. Department of Defense signed an agreement with Georgia to provide more than \$1.3 million in materiel and equipment to combat proliferation. The agreement calls for the United States to assist Georgia in creating an export control system to prevent the movement of weapons of mass destruction, equip border forces, and train Georgian personnel in counter-proliferation efforts.³³

Aside from the facility in Georgia, other dangerous sites are situated throughout the Caucasus; for example, one unfinished nuclear power plant exists in Armenia, while another nuclear facility similar to the institute in Tbilisi is located in Georgia's breakaway province of Abkhazia. The Institute of Physics and Technology in Sukhumi may be one of the most dangerous nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union. Located in Abkhazia, the institute previously housed 2 kilograms of enriched uranium in 1992 and has been impossible to inspect due to the unresolved conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia.³⁴

The Caucasus in NATO Strategy.

The proximity of the Caucasus to Europe strongly concerns NATO members due to the potential challenges that this region might pose to European stability. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, for example, highlighted the importance of the Caucasus to European security when he placed the Caspian region within the U.S. sphere of interest as part of the larger Euro-Atlantic community.³⁵ Talbott noted that while new threats arising from the south or from the east might seem remote, "They are not unthinkable," adding that in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh alone, "more Europeans have died violently in the last 5 years than the previous 45."³⁶

The strategic necessity for determining where to place the volatile Caucasus in NATO's post-expansion grand strategy is far from being resolved. With the first phase of NATO expansion now complete, a new NATO borderland has emerged to the east that forms a gray zone of insecurity. Outside of NATO's direct interests, NATO's Eurasian borderlands remain important enough to warrant high level interest by NATO strategic planners. Solana's 1997 visit to the Caucasus certainly underscored this point. New post-expansion missions are currently being examined by NATO officials, which may result in more out of region deployments to potential hot spots outside continental Europe. To cope with this likelihood NATO is weighing the adoption of a new strategic concept that may profoundly affect NATO's security interests in Eurasia. Since 1991 the basis of NATO's post-Cold War strategy has been the Alliance Strategic Concept which viewed territorial defense as the primary mission of the Atlantic Alliance. Now that strategy is being reviewed as a result of the July 1997 NATO Expansion Summit in Madrid. During that meeting, NATO officials agreed to update the old 1991 NATO strategic concept which has guided NATO since the end of the Cold War. In its place a new NATO strategic concept will be adopted at a conference honoring the 50th anniversary of

NATO in Washington, DC, in April 1999. Once adopted, this strategy will direct NATO into the 21st century and prepare the Alliance for new threats to European security.³⁷

Any new NATO strategy will have to incorporate many of the new geographic realities introduced by NATO expansion. While many NATO planners believe that the Alliance should maintain its core function of collective defense, others argue that NATO needs to adapt its political and military structures to improve its ability to meet new regional challenges. Former policymakers in the Clinton administration argue that NATO must prepare for new missions and revise its plans. These officials argue that the Atlantic Alliance should take into consideration new potential threats emerging outside the borders of Europe. Both former Secretary of State Warren Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William Perry argued that:

The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective security, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory.³⁸

Faced with the new strategic realities fostered by the end of the Cold War and NATO expansion, NATO officials realize that the days are past when the Alliance will consider collective defense as a primary focus of strategy. NATO will increasingly be called upon to perform peacekeeping missions, such as the U.S.-led NATO mission in Bosnia. A growing number of NATO officials claim that the notion that NATO is restricted to defending its own members' territory was interred for good in 1992 when NATO officials agreed to make Alliance resources available to peacekeeping missions under CSCE or U.N. authority. Many NATO members agree that the Alliance should retain the option, when considering *jus ad bellum* to act autonomously when the U.N. or the OSCE fail to act—in cooperation with any interested non-member state. These members foresee an eventual geostrategic fusion between

collective defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and OSCE commitments.³⁹

Until this occurs, NATO's experience in Bosnia will most likely serve as the basis for preparing NATO forces to meet future threats to European stability. Echoing this view, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana has observed that "new challenges, exemplified by Bosnia, have arisen—challenges which require NATO to respond effectively and rapidly."⁴⁰ In anticipation of these new regional threats, NATO is developing a new military command structure that is better adapted to the challenges for managing regional crises and conflicts. Mobile forces and rapidly deployable command and control structures are being developed which would enable NATO to respond robustly and quickly to any new mission of peace enforcement in and around the periphery of Europe.⁴¹ In preparation for potential deployments to the Caucasus and Central Asia, U.S. defense planners finally overcame bureaucratic infighting among regional command authorities and divided the region among U.S. regional commands in early 1998. The decision marked a prolonged period of confusion in U.S. strategic planning in Eurasia that left the region outside any type of U.S. regional command authority. U.S. European Command, which had overseen the PfP program, assumed military responsibility for the Caucasus, while U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle East, received responsibility for Central Asia.⁴²

Backed by the United States, two innovations in the NATO command structure are being introduced that will allow NATO to insert its units into hostile regions where NATO can operate together with PfP trained forces. The first is a streamlining of the command structure that will allow NATO to have a smaller command structure. The second is the introduction of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. This will provide the Alliance for the first time with an expressly organized capability to deploy a peacekeeping force into a crisis area. Most significantly, from the outset, CJTFs are designed to operate with the

participation of non-NATO countries. The first full-scale demonstration of this new concept occurred in September 1997 when the United States dispatched eight C-17s from the United States to Central Asia for joint peacekeeping exercises in Kazakhstan that were the longest non-stop military deployment ever conducted by the U.S. military.

The U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping exercise involved over 1400 paratroopers, including a 540-member Central Asia Battalion, or CENTRAZBAT. The CENTRAZBAT departed from the continental United States along with members of the U.S. 82d Airborne, and the units conducted an airborne drop over Central Asia. The peacekeeping operations were carried out by the U.S. Atlantic Command, which is responsible for the American-led elements of NATO's PfP program with the newly independent states. Marine General John Sheehan, the commander of U.S. Atlantic Command, participated in the airborne jump and pronounced the exercises a success. Moreover, upon finishing the exercise, General Sheehan told *The Washington Post* that "that there is no nation on the face of the earth that we cannot get to."⁴³

A major aim of the peacekeeping exercises was to bolster the level of military cooperation between NATO and the newly independent states of Central Asia. A wide range of PfP countries and NATO personnel participated in the peacekeeping operations. Military personnel from Georgia, Russia, the United States, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan all participated in the airborne jump. Officially, the Central Asian peacekeeping exercises failed to receive the distinction of being a NATO-led PfP exercise. Instead, Pentagon analysts preferred to characterize the U.S.-led operations as being "in the spirit of PfP." Regardless of this portrayal, the CENTRAZBAT deployment had all the hallmarks of a NATO PfP exercise, as many of the Central Asian participants were equipped with U.S.-made equipment. More importantly, it was the first full-scale demonstration of the CJTF concept in Eurasia and forebodes even greater military interaction

between NATO and Eurasia. It is extremely likely that the CENTRAZBAT will serve as a model for future NATO-sponsored exercises in the Caucasus.⁴⁴

Turkey's Strategic Interests in the Caucasus.

The one member of NATO that stands to have the largest inroads into the Caucasus is Turkey. No other member of the Atlantic Alliance has the depth of strategic interest, nor the historical attachment to the region. As the only NATO member that shares a common border with all three of the newly independent states in the Caucasus, Turkey shares a profound interest in how NATO's relations with the region evolve. With the second largest army in NATO, Turkey can carry considerable influence in helping NATO shape its relations with the region.

The core of Turkish strategic interests in the Caucasus is the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which will play a major role in fueling Turkey's strategic interests in the Caucasus. From NATO's perspective, the Baku-Ceyhan will have an ancillary benefit for NATO in Turkey where the Alliance runs and operates its own network of pipelines. Since the end of the Cold War many of the existing NATO-run pipelines in Turkey have become underutilized and Caspian oil could solve some of the problems NATO planners have experienced in keeping these pipelines operational. With soaring energy needs that will rise by 400-500 percent over the next decade, NATO planners could maximize the use of these pipelines with Caspian oil that would in turn help alleviate Turkey's soaring energy needs.

Despite the end of the Cold War, Turkey remains as important to the Atlantic Alliance as it ever has. One NATO observer even noted that Turkey may very well be "potentially the most important NATO ally for the next half century."⁴⁵ Due to its unique geographical location Turkey remains a valuable NATO ally capable of maintaining stability along a variety of regional axes. Throughout the Cold War, Turkey served as the eastern anchor of the

Atlantic Alliance where it guarded the southeastern flank of NATO. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, Turkey has assumed an even more critical role for the Alliance. It is a major frontline NATO state facing three important strategic axes: the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The need to maintain stability along these axes remains pivotally important to NATO, especially since the influx of Caspian oil along the eastern flank creates another dimension of security that affects NATO planning.

Safeguarding the flow of Caspian oil is already strengthening Turkey's importance to NATO due to American and European energy security concerns in Eurasia. For Turkey, the oil resources of the Caspian are pivotally important to the country's future energy needs as its energy demand stands to rise by 400 percent by 2010. Turkish oil companies have a major stake in the Caspian, and Turkish Petroleum has a significant share of the flagship Western consortium operating in the Caspian—the AIOC. State-owned Turkish Petroleum continues to expand its presence in the Caspian region in a bid to gain a greater share of the oil resources. Currently, Turkish Petroleum maintains a 6.75 percent stake in an \$8-billion Caspian oilfield development project led by British Petroleum (BP) and Statoil. It also holds a 9 percent share in the nearby Shah Deniz project, also led by BP and Statoil.⁴⁶ The Caspian axis has assumed even greater strategic importance for Turkey due to the loss of Iraqi oil. Oil sanctions imposed by the United Nations have taken a damaging toll on the Turkish economy due to the closure of the main Iraqi pipeline that carried Iraqi oil to Ceyhan. The loss of transit fees from this pipeline has cost the economy over \$33 billion in revenue. The need to offset the loss of these fees has significantly elevated the importance of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Consequently, the Baku-Ceyhan is critically important to Turkey's future energy security needs.⁴⁷ Once operational, the million barrels per day

pipeline will go a long way toward meeting Turkey's soaring energy needs.⁴⁸

Turkey's Military Relations with the Caucasus.

Turkey's proximity to the Caucasus and cultural and linguistic ties to the region naturally have resulted in Ankara's special interest in forging closer military ties with the Caspian region. Turkey has invested heavily in the creation of bilateral military cooperation agreements with all the newly independent Turkic states. With U.S. backing, Turkey has taken a leading role in promoting NATO's PfP program in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Shortly after the introduction of the program in mid-1994, many of the responsibilities for carrying it out were delegated by NATO to Turkey. Due to its already established military attaché network in the Caspian region, Ankara has been well-suited to set up and run the PfP exchange programs. Over time, however, the United States increasingly has assumed a much larger role in running the regional PfP program as the number of American military attachés assigned to regional posts have increased. Turkey's role in the PfP program, however, still remains significant and the bonds developed between Turkish officers and regional military officers from the Turkic states undoubtedly form the basis for long-term defense cooperation with the region.⁴⁹

By seizing the initiative early in the Caspian, Turkey's military ties to the Turkish-speaking states have yielded positive results for Ankara. According to Turkey's Deputy Chief of the General Staff, significant numbers of mid to high-level officials from the Caucasus and Central Asian states are being educated in Turkey as a result of the PfP program. Since the introduction of the program, over 4,000 military officers from the Caspian region have attended Turkish military academies. Officers from Georgia and Azerbaijan have joined hundreds of officers from the Central Asian republics who are studying in Turkish military schools, and the number promises to increase. In

1998 the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff told an American audience at National Defense University that approximately 2,300 students from the region have graduated from Turkey's military colleges, while another 1,700 students are continuing their training there.⁵⁰

Turkey's military initiatives in the Caucasus have given Ankara an enormously impressive defense and security relationship with the newly independent states of the region. Nearly one-third of the officers studying in Turkish military schools are from Azerbaijan, while Turkmenistan reportedly has dispatched over a thousand military personnel to Turkey to study in Turkish defense schools. Georgia's military ties are evolving as well. In 1997-98 Georgia continued to strengthen its defense ties with Ankara. Several bilateral agreements between the two countries have been signed. In 1997 Tbilisi sent the first group of Georgian military officers to Turkish military schools. NATO's PfP program has proven to be a perfect conduit for permitting Turkey to solicit the training of Turkish-speaking military officers from the Caspian region. Turkey, in turn, has sought an even larger regional role in the PfP program by requesting that NATO institutionalize Ankara's defense links to the Caspian region by establishing a NATO-sponsored regional PfP training center in Turkey for training military officers from the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵¹

The depth of military ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan is perhaps the most impressive of all the newly independent states. Deep cultural and linguistic ties already exist and serve as a logical basis for military and security cooperation. In fact, military relations are so close that Azerbaijan has even adopted the same national military holiday as that of Turkey (October 9) in a sign of military solidarity with its Turkish ally. Since Baku gained its independence in 1991, Turkish military relations with Azerbaijan have deeply evolved and certainly rank as one of the most developed that Ankara has with any of the newly independent states in the former Soviet Union. Several

military cooperation and exchange agreements have been signed between the two nations since Azerbaijan gained independence. According to President Aliyev, these agreements are "creating a strong foundation for Azerbaijan's Armed Forces."⁵²

President Aliyev routinely holds closed-door consultations with the Turkish General Staff when he visits the Turkish capital. For Azerbaijan, the Turkish military remains the best regional deterrent for Azerbaijan. The fear of renewed fighting with the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Russian support for further territorial acquisitions, strongly concerns the Azeri government. With the second largest armed forces in NATO, Turkey is the only regional power, perhaps with the exception of Ukraine, to which Azerbaijan could turn to counter Russian support in the event of renewed fighting in the Caucasus.

During President Aliyev's April 1997 visit to Turkey, the Azeri leader delivered a speech to several hundred Azeri military students studying at the Turkish Land Forces Military Academy. In mid-1997 the first batch of over 500 field-grade officers graduated from Turkish military schools. These officers will likely serve as the nucleus for a new generation of Azeri officers upon which Azerbaijan can build its military, thus reducing the number of Russian officers already serving in the Azeri army.⁵³ In addition, Turkey has provided Azerbaijan with valuable combat experience by permitting Azeri special forces units to participate in Turkish-led military operations against the Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) in southeastern Turkey.⁵⁴

Turkey's strategic interests in Caspian oil have elevated Azerbaijan to a key position in Turkey's regional interests in the Caucasus. With its massive oil resources, regional experts in Turkey anticipate that Ankara will one day reap enormous profits in weapons sales to Azerbaijan and the rest of the Turkish-speaking states in the Caspian. They

argue that Central Asia is one of several major arms markets in the world where Turkey could one day sell arms.⁵⁵ The Turkish military, in turn, has not hidden the strategic importance that it places on Caspian oil. In 1996 Azerbaijan Defense Minister Sefer Abiyev traveled to Ankara and met with Turkey Chief of the General Staff General Ismail Hakki Karadayi. This meeting yielded a military agreement on technical, scientific, and educational cooperation between the two militaries. Commenting on the meeting, General Karadayi stated "that in recent years Azerbaijan has emerged as an important country due to its strategic location, oil reserves and pipelines."⁵⁶

Other high-ranking members of the Turkish General Staff have echoed those views as well. In early 1998 Deputy Chief of Turkey General Staff General Cevik Bir outlined the strategic importance that Caspian oil and gas play for Turkey. Before an audience at National Defense University in Washington, DC, General Bir stated that:

Its vast resources render the Caucasus even more important. Taken together with those in the Middle East, oil reserves in the region are calculated to be 200 billion barrels . . . this represents 71 percent of the world's oil reserves. One third of the world's total natural gas reserves are in the Caucasus-Caspian basin alone. When rich natural resources such as water and gold are also taken into account, in addition to oil and gas, the region becomes a focal point where the vital interests are expected to increase 35 to 40 percent by the year 2010, [and] the probability is that the region will eventually become an oil and natural gas center.⁵⁷

The need to forge a greater strategic military and security commitment to this new epic center of the world oil and gas trade is one of the new emerging challenges for Turkey in the new world order. Concerns over the emergence of a regional arms race in the Caucasus has heightened Turkey's regional sensitivities, and regional states like Azerbaijan are turning to Ankara for support and military assistance to counter what Baku perceives as Russian efforts to tilt the military balance of power further

against Azerbaijan. Ankara and Baku reached an even higher level of defense cooperation in May 1997, shortly after the revelation that Moscow had furnished Armenia with over \$1 billion in Russian arms from 1994-96. Moreover, renewed fighting along the border with Armenia near a key strategic crossroads of the Baku-Supsa pipeline energized President Aliyev to develop an even deeper defense dialogue with Turkey.⁵⁸

Concerned by these events, President Aliyev traveled to Ankara in May 1997 to hold consultations with the Turkish civilian and military leadership to assess the strategic balance in the Caucasus. Chief among Aliyev's fears are concerns that Russia might inspire an Armenian offensive to sever the Western pipeline route from their mountain positions in the Mughan Steppe. The pipeline is 22 miles from Armenian positions and is within artillery range of the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. Any Armenian effort from this direction would cut Azerbaijan's energy umbilical cord to the West, leaving Baku dependent on Russian pipeline routes for exporting its oil to the West.⁵⁹

Strongly aware of Azerbaijan's pipeline vulnerabilities, President Aliyev held 3 days of intense discussions with members of the Turkish General Staff in May 1997. Those meetings included one-on-one discussions with Turkish Chief of the General Staff General Ismail Karadayi. During President Aliyev's meetings with Karadayi and civilian officials in the Turkish government, the Azeri leader strongly urged the Turkish military to intensify its cooperation with Azerbaijan by extending its defense commitments to pipeline security. The Turkish media further reported that Azerbaijan sought to use the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Turkish military, apparently in an effort secure greater Turkish military commitments against the threat posed by the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. Aliyev's visit proved to be a major success. His meetings yielded a host of agreements on economic and technical cooperation between the two countries.⁶⁰

Aliyev gained a major strategic commitment from Turkey by signing a declaration on "Deepened Strategic Cooperation" with the Turkish government.⁶¹ The secretive agreement appeared to extract a pledge from Turkey for a deeper strategic commitment to Azerbaijan's national security. Both sides vowed that each would help the other in the event that either side's sovereignty and territorial integrity was endangered. Although this agreement is open to interpretation, the extent of Turkey's defense commitment to Azerbaijan's security made by this agreement still remains unclear. According to the *Turkish Daily News*, the Declaration states that "the two sides will help each other within the context of their strategic partnership using methods foreseen by the United Nations in the event that their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of their borders are endangered."⁶²

Azerbaijan and NATO.

Turkey's military relations with Azerbaijan highlight the depth of military ties being formed between a key NATO ally and one of the Caspian region's most pivotal oil states. NATO's PfP program has been instrumental in fostering the climate for building stronger bonds with the region as Turkey utilizes the PfP program as a conduit for building closer military ties with Azerbaijan. With encouragement from Ankara, the pace of Azerbaijan's military ties to NATO has gradually picked up and is rapidly evolving. After a reluctant start in developing connections with NATO through the PfP program, Azerbaijan made significant headway after Solana's 1997 visit to Baku.

Azerbaijan's serious overtures toward NATO began in April 1996 when President Aliyev became the first-ever leader of Azerbaijan to visit NATO headquarters in Brussels. During his visit, Aliyev toured NATO headquarters and promised to forge closer bonds with NATO's planning structure. During that visit Aliyev made a formal request to obtain specific types of military

equipment, particularly NATO communications equipment. Azerbaijan also requested that NATO assist the Azeri government in creating a modern civil defense program, train an Azeri contingent for participation in international peacekeeping operations, and deploy NATO units for peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh upon the conclusion of a political agreement on settling the conflict.⁶³

Azerbaijan, in turn, is aware of Western concerns over regional pipeline security and has carefully sought to nurture NATO's interests in safeguarding the oil resources of the Caspian basin. In January 1997 Vice-President of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) Ilham Aliyev, who is also the son of President Aliyev, traveled to Brussels to talk to NATO officials about sponsoring a NATO pipeline security conference in the Azeri capital. Aware of NATO's underutilized pipelines in Turkey, Ilham Aliyev apparently sought to cultivate NATO interest in Azeri oil by raising the possibility for holding such a conference in Baku. Azeri officials insist that Caspian oil could serve as a useful alternative to NATO stockpiles based along the Atlantic seaboard of the United States.⁶⁴

Public support in Azerbaijan for NATO has been extremely positive since the PfP program began. After President Aliyev visited Brussels in April 1996, articles appeared in the Azeri press that began seriously to examine the implications of Azerbaijan joining NATO. These discussions even debated what aspects of the country's constitution would have to be changed to allow such a move.⁶⁵ The Azeri constitution prohibits the permanent stationing of any foreign troops within the country, with the exception of the minor Russian military presence at the radar facility at Gabala.⁶⁶ The newspaper *Bakinskii rabochii*, for example, even went so far as to assert that Azerbaijan should one-day become NATO's anchor in the Caucasus owing to the fact that it is the only independent nation in the Caucasus that does not have any foreign military bases located on its territory.⁶⁷

Azerbaijan's political opposition movement has been a major motivating force in internal Azeri politics advocating closer military ties with NATO. Azerbaijan's opposition Musavat party, headed by Isa Gambar, has been very vocal in criticizing the cautious pace being undertaken by Azerbaijan in building ties with NATO. To heighten pressure on President Aliyev, the opposition Musavat party created an organization that would promote greater ties between Azerbaijan and NATO on the eve of Solana's visit to Azerbaijan. The Musavat party secretary in charge of political questions, Sulhaddin Akber, established a working group known as the Azerbaijani Association for Atlantic Cooperation (AAAC) in Baku. The founders of the group support the expansion of NATO and the idea of closer ties between Azerbaijan and NATO within the framework of PfP. The other major opposition party, the Popular Front, also formed a "NATO club" which meets regularly to discuss avenues of security cooperation for Azerbaijan with the Atlantic Alliance.⁶⁸

In April 1997 Azerbaijan achieved a major milestone in its modest efforts to participate in PfP. During a 2-day meeting of NATO Chiefs-of-Staff, President Aliyev dispatched Azerbaijan Chief of the General Staff N. Sadikhov to Brussels to participate in the NATO-sponsored discussions which included a joint session of PfP representatives.⁶⁹ Sadikhov's visit proved to be a significant boost for Azeri participation in NATO-sponsored PfP activities. Shortly after Sadikhov's trip to Brussels, Baku deployed its first ever contingent of Azeri soldiers to NATO military exercises in Norway. For nearly 2 weeks during May-June 1997, these Azeri units participated in NATO exercises in Norway. The 13-day exercise known as "Cooperative Banners" involved other PfP units from the former East bloc and the former Soviet Union and seriously signaled Azerbaijan's new found commitment to the PfP program.⁷⁰

Participation in PfP appears to have yielded some tangible benefits for the Azeri military. Not surprisingly, it

permits Azerbaijan to solicit greater assistance from NATO members in training the Azeri military. Baku's efforts to solicit the German *Bundeswehr* were reportedly turned down after the German Foreign Ministry learned of plans to dispatch German military advisers to Azerbaijan to train Azeri air force and infantry officers. Discussions with Britain's Ministry of Defense however, have proven more successful. In late 1996 British military officers were dispatched to Azerbaijan to discuss plans for sending British Ministry of Defense specialists to Azerbaijan to teach English in Azeri military academies.⁷¹

Over the past several years, little or no interaction has occurred between the U.S. military and Azerbaijan due to limitations imposed by section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Despite this congressional handicap, the Clinton administration has struggled to overcome this restriction by dispatching senior policymakers to Azerbaijan to reassure President Aliyev that the United States retains a strong geopolitical interest in his country and the whole region. According to one former high ranking administration official, the United States has begun a regular dialogue with security policymakers in Azerbaijan as part of growing U.S. strategic interest in the region. This official reported that senior officials from the U.S. Department of Defense have traveled to Baku to discuss a full range of security concerns. The talks involved discussions on a wide range of matters and demonstrate "that an open channel of communication now exists between the United States and Azerbaijan on defense and military matters."⁷²

In October 1997 U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter traveled to the Caucasus to map out further NATO cooperation with the Presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan. During his meetings with President Aliyev, Hunter discussed Azerbaijan's participation in PfP and its future relations with NATO. Discussing the outcome of those talks, Azerbaijan's former Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov stated that Azerbaijan welcomed NATO's eastward enlargement and stressed Baku's close relations with

NATO member Turkey.⁷³ According to Hasanov, Aliyev's discussions with Hunter centered on expanding Azerbaijan's participation in PfP. In their joint statement, however, both sides sought to emphasize the fact that despite Baku's improving relations with NATO, the question of Azerbaijan joining the Alliance for the foreseeable future is not on either sides' agenda.⁷⁴

Georgia and NATO.

Of all the newly independent states in the Caucasus, the Republic of Georgia has been the centerpiece of NATO activity in the Caucasus. It is the gateway to the Caucasus and a key transit state in the transport of Caspian oil to Western markets. With one of the most vibrant economies in the Caucasus, Georgia boasts one of the strongest growth rates among all of the former Soviet republics. In the realm of security, Georgia has bolstered its external security by building a wide array of defense and security links with its neighbors. Through the PfP program, Georgia has carefully cultivated close military relations with NATO that are the strongest of any of the states in the Caucasus. Georgia's close ties to NATO are largely attributed to Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, whose position as the former Foreign Minister of the USSR played a pivotal role in ending the Cold War by defusing ties between the USSR and NATO. One of Shevardnadze's biggest accomplishments with NATO occurred on June 23, 1989, when he became the first ever Soviet official to enter the headquarters of NATO in Brussels.

Since the end of the Cold War, Shevardnadze has become a major supporter of NATO expansion and has encouraged the Alliance to develop closer ties to the Caucasus. The Georgian leader has masterfully articulated the stabilizing role that NATO can play in European security. Ironically, according to Shevardnadze, his landmark visit to NATO headquarters largely convinced the former Soviet Foreign Minister that NATO's role should not diminish in the

aftermath of the Cold War. In his position as President of Georgia, Shevardnadze has on several occasions stated in speeches at NATO headquarters in Brussels that the Alliance should become the principal military and political guarantor of stability and security in Europe. Shevardnadze in turn has appealed "to the other newly independent states to maximize to the fullest the opportunities that exist through NATO."⁷⁵

The Georgian President remains firmly convinced that NATO can play a stabilizing role in helping Russia proceed down the path toward democracy. Until that time passes, however, Shevardnadze feels "that Russia's imperial tendencies will remain a potential danger to the world." The Georgian leader believes that the struggle unfolding in Russia is "between those who support the imperial concept and historical Messianism on the one hand," and those who advocate "democratic choice" on the other. Moreover, Shevardnadze believes that "it would be an unpardonable error to think that the democratic forces led by President Yeltsin have finally and conclusively prevailed over the 'party of imperialism'."⁷⁶

Shevardnadze has played a pivotal part in advocating a wider peacekeeping role for NATO in Eastern Europe. Since July 1993 the Georgian leader has been at the forefront of international leaders who have given their public support to the idea of giving NATO peacekeeping functions in Europe. His outlook on NATO is shared by other ranking Georgian officials, who have shown tremendous support for a growing NATO role in the Caucasus. Speaker of the Georgian parliament Zurab Zhvania stated during a meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart that: "NATO is the only security factor in Europe."⁷⁷

Shevardnadze, however, has been careful not to voice his support for NATO too loud lest Moscow fear that he intends to break Georgia's ties to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Georgian leader has emphasized that NATO peacekeeping operations should

only be conducted in cooperation with the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). With an obvious eye toward Abkhazia, Shevardnadze has called for NATO to place greater emphasis on developing more powerful mobile peacekeeping units in NATO. He argued that the need for such units has increased dramatically, but cautioned that such operations should be only under the aegis of the OSCE and the United Nations. Shevardnadze has observed that most states, with rare exceptions, would gladly invite NATO to take part in settling their internal conflicts. Moreover, he argues that if these conflicts go unsettled they can evolve into "conflicts of international and regional dimensions."⁷⁸

Since joining PfP, Georgia has been a favorite regional destination for NATO officials and is the usual starting point for NATO military visits to the Caucasus. The earliest reported visit to Georgia occurred in 1995 when General Jeremiah McKenzie, the Deputy Chief Commander of NATO forces in Europe, visited Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia with a five-member NATO delegation to inspect regional progress in NATO's PfP program.⁷⁹ Shevardnadze has facilitated NATO involvement in the region by placing Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, at the disposal of important NATO conferences and meetings on regional security in the Caucasus. NATO has sponsored several conferences on conflict resolution there since Georgia joined PfP. In October 1996 NATO sponsored a workshop on regional security in Tbilisi that brought together key representatives of the national security bodies from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. High-ranking delegates from NATO, the United States, the European Union, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan convened there to discuss the geopolitical future of the Caucasus, including the impact of PfP.⁸⁰

Shevardnadze's vision of NATO involvement in the Caucasus goes much further than conferences. In late 1997 the Georgian statesman took a bold initiative toward NATO

assuming a greater presence in the region by proposing that his country participate in and host a series of NATO-sponsored PfP exercises. This proposal surfaced in October 1997 when permanent U.S. representative to NATO Ambassador Robert Hunter traveled to Tbilisi to hold talks with the Georgian President.⁸¹

U.S. military assistance to Georgia has played a significant role in getting modern equipment for the Georgian military through the NATO PfP program. In March 1998, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen signed an agreement on military and security cooperation with Georgian Defense Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze. As part of that agreement, the United States also decided to grant Georgia some \$1.35 million to finance the purchase of U.S. military radios for a Georgian infantry company that will regularly participate in maneuvers under PfP. Cohen also noted that the U.S. Department of Defense will provide Georgia with two patrol boats to guard its Black Sea borders.⁸²

In February 1997, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana made Georgia the first stop on his landmark tour of the Caucasus. When Solana landed in Tbilisi, he became the highest-ranking non-Soviet military official to ever tour the Caucasus. Solana visited Georgia on the first leg of the trip, where he held discussions with President Shevardnadze on both European and regional security issues. During his visit Solana met with Defense Minister Nadibaidze and Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili and addressed the Georgian parliament.⁸³ After his meeting with Solana, Shevardnadze appealed to the Secretary General to have NATO play a greater role in the Caucasus when he noted that "small nations must have stronger security guarantees."⁸⁴

Since joining the PfP program, Georgia has developed military ties with many NATO allies, particularly Germany and neighboring NATO-member Turkey. In June 1996 a delegation of Turkish special services led by the service's deputy chairman, Ozden Peksavash, visited Tbilisi to

exchange information and discuss security cooperation with the Georgian Ministry of Security.⁸⁵ In mid-July Turkish General Cetin Dogan, the first deputy commander of Turkey's Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Georgia, where the two sides reportedly reached an agreement on the "training of military cadres" and the holding of joint military exercises. Turkey maintained the tempo of its military dialogue with Georgia in September 1997, when President Sultan Demirel visited Tbilisi and signed an agreement with Georgian officials to train officers and cadets in its military colleges and academies under yet another agreement.⁸⁶

Naval assistance from NATO has been pivotal for Georgia in the formation of its coastal defense forces. Assistance from Turkey, the United States, and Great Britain, has greatly helped Georgia establish a modern naval force. Tbilisi is seriously pursuing the creation of a modern naval defense force that would be capable of protecting Georgia's maritime borders, since Georgia inherited virtually no vessels from Russia that previously belonged to the Soviet Black Sea fleet.⁸⁷ Without a navy, Georgia has had to face the embarrassment of relying upon Russian naval forces for protecting its territorial waters. Russia, in turn, has conveniently used Georgia's naval weakness to reinforce its control over Georgia's maritime borders and maintain tight access over which vessels come and go from Georgian ports.

Russia has sought to capitalize on this advantage by limiting the encroachment of Turkish fishing vessels in Georgian territorial waters. In March 1996 Moscow used its naval capabilities to send a powerful signal to Ankara when Russian warships attacked Turkish fishing vessels in Georgian waters. This incident nearly sparked a major regional conflict with Turkey that greatly embarrassed Georgian officials. To add insult to injury, Russian border forces later seized a Ukrainian vessel and detained its crew without informing the Georgian government. These episodes greatly underscored Georgia's inability to protect

its own maritime border and prompted the United States, Great Britain, Turkey, and Ukraine to accelerate and expand their assistance program to the fledgling Georgian navy.⁸⁸ As a result of these incidents Georgia embarked on a major effort to bolster its naval forces in an effort to ensure its maritime security.⁸⁹

Great Britain responded to Georgia's naval concerns by dispatching a group of naval officers to Georgia in late 1997 where the Royal Navy unveiled a program of naval assistance. This program includes naval training for Georgian officers in the United Kingdom and the transfer of several small-scale naval vessels from the Royal Navy to Georgia. During that visit British Assistant Defense Secretary Roger Jackling announced in Tbilisi that Great Britain would donate two coastal guard cutters to Georgia. Jackling also announced that in early 1998 the Royal Navy would accept the first group of Georgian naval officers for training in the United Kingdom. The United States, Ukraine, and Turkey have also responded to Georgia's naval concerns by donating several old coast guard vessels to its fledgling navy.⁹⁰ Ironically, after Jackling's visit to Tbilisi, Russian officials had a change of heart in their refusal to assist Georgia. Colonel-General Sergei Mayev, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Main Armament Directorate, traveled to Georgia to discuss the possibility of turning over to Tbilisi several naval vessels from the former Soviet Black Sea fleet. Prior to this announcement, Russian Ministry of Defense officials consistently had refused to do this.⁹¹

Georgia's military ties to NATO also have an energy security component as a result of Tbilisi's key strategic role as a major transit state for the export of Caspian oil to Western markets. Georgia's chief strategic role in the geopolitics of Caspian oil is due to three strategic issues, two of which relate to Caspian oil. The first is Georgia's pivotal position along the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline route, which is often referred to as a strong choice for the Main Export Pipeline (MEP) route. Secondly, Georgia is the

strategic hub for the widely discussed Eurasian Transport Corridor, which has received over \$5 billion in support from the European Union via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The third factor is attributed to the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which is another possible option for the MEP.

Georgia is well-positioned to play a central role in any pipeline transporting Caspian oil to Western markets. U.S. officials fully understand Georgia's importance to Caspian oil as a key transit country and former Secretary of State James A. Baker assessed the importance of Georgia in U.S. policy when he wrote in the *New York Times* that it is in "the strategic interests of the United States to build the strongest possible economic, cultural and political ties to Georgia." Baker emphasized that Georgia's importance to the United States is "derived from its location at the nexus of Europe and Asia," with ports on the Black Sea, which will enable it to become the principal outlet for bringing Caspian oil and gas to international markets. Baker added that because of these factors, "Georgia's future security is therefore important to America's security."⁹²

Georgia therefore is a key regional chokepoint for the flow of Caspian oil to Western markets. Rail links between Baku and the Georgian port of Batumi now serve as the economic lifeline for the newly independent states of the Caspian region. Free of Russian monopoly, this route is witnessing a major increase in commercial traffic for everything ranging from Uzbek cotton to Caspian oil. Over a million barrels per month is transported to Western markets along the Georgia route from Chevron's oil fields in Kazakhstan.⁹³ This influx of trade through Georgia is creating what some Western analysts describe as a new Silk Road, the historical trade route that served as a Eurasian highway between China and Central Asia to the rest of Europe. Enders Wimbush, a leading American specialist on the Eurasia Transport Corridor, has called this change "one of the fundamental political shifts of our time, with

important consequences for U.S. strategic interests from Europe to China."⁹⁴

Armenia and NATO.

For over two centuries Armenia has been Russia's chief bulwark of defense in the Caucasus. Wedged between Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, this land-locked nation of 3.5 million has traditionally looked to Russia as its chief guarantor for security. In the post-Soviet era Armenia remains a pivotal Russian ally in the southern Caucasus, just as it did in pre-Revolutionary days when Armenia was the cornerstone of Russia's forward defense in the Caucasus.

Little has changed in how Russian policymakers view Armenia since the Tsarist period. In fact, Boris Yeltsin's strategic perception of Armenia is hardly any different than his Tsarist predecessors. As the Caucasus becomes engulfed by the race for Caspian oil, Moscow remains fixated on Armenia's role as a strategic linchpin in its regional security. Of particular concern is the belief that Christian Armenia will drift away from Russia's sphere of interest and deprive Moscow of a key buffer state guarding the Muslim borderlands of the southern Caucasus. Discussing Russia's dilemma, Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized in a speech in early 1998 that:

Armenia is part of Russia's field of strategic interests. It is an Orthodox country, we must not lose Armenia and we shall not lose her.⁹⁵

Since the end of the Cold War, this basic geopolitical assumption has guided Russian policymakers in their calculus for security in the Caucasus. It is a policy that Moscow will likely adhere to well into the next century regardless of whether Caspian oil finds its way to Western markets. This policy has guided Russia through two centuries of conflict in the Caucasus and throughout the breakup of the USSR when Nagorno-Karabakh's won its bid

for independence from Azerbaijan in 1992-93.⁹⁶ Through a combination of martial traits and strong Russian military support, Armenia managed to win the decisive first round of the post-Soviet wars in the Caucasus. By the time a cease-fire was arranged in mid-1994, the military balance of power in the region had decisively shifted to the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia's victory on the battlefield led to the seizure of more than 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory and resulted in more than a million Azeri refugees fleeing from the region as a result of the Armenian offensives.

Against this backdrop NATO launched its effort to promote Armenian participation in NATO's PfP Program. Unlike Azerbaijan which is eager to distance itself from Russia, Armenian policymakers view security ties to Moscow as a strategic necessity and the key to national survival. To overcome this tremendous disadvantage NATO officials have had to steer clear of the historical animosity shared by Armenia toward neighboring NATO-member Turkey. With the second largest army in NATO, Turkey's geography and historical domination of land-locked Armenia is a tremendous handicap for NATO in building stronger ties to Armenia.

NATO's road to Yerevan began in October 1995 when Deputy Commander of NATO forces in Europe General Jeremiah McKenzie visited Armenia with a five-member NATO delegation. The purpose of his mission was to inspect the progress of Armenia's participation in PfP and encourage Armenia to commit its scarce resources to establishing military ties with NATO.⁹⁷ During his 3-day stay in Yerevan, General McKenzie made a public appeal for the Armenian government to take a more active role in the PfP program. Acting Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazian indicated that Armenia planned to play a more active role in the program, but emphasized that Armenia would proceed at its own cautious pace.⁹⁸

True to Papazian's word, Armenia proceeded cautiously in its efforts to participate in PfP exchanges during the first several years of the program. Unknown to General McKenzie, Armenian policymakers had more important strategic concerns on their minds in 1995 than taking advantage of NATO's PfP program. From 1995-96 Armenia embarked on a major rearmament program aimed at replenishing equipment lost during the war with Azerbaijan. Replenishing those stocks and building a modern national army became a major priority. According to NATO officials, Armenian military representatives registered little official interest in the PfP program or NATO-sponsored regional conferences on regional security during this period. Even when NATO sponsored conferences on regional security in the Caucasus in nearby Tbilisi, Armenian government officials failed to extend any type of federal assistance to private non-governmental groups who were interested in establishing closer ties to NATO.⁹⁹

Raffi K. Hovannisian, a former foreign minister in Armenia, underscored this problem when he retold how an Armenian delegation wanted to travel to Tbilisi in October 1996 to attend a NATO-sponsored conference on "Developing a Regional Security Concept for the Caucasus." The conference drew many high-level NATO officials, including NATO Admiral Michael Gretton. Hovannisian strongly criticized Armenia's failure to provide logistical support for Armenia officials attending the conference. The former foreign minister also stated that the Armenian government failed to provide any substantive or even informational support for the Armenian group that attended the conference.¹⁰⁰

Armenia made a stunning turnaround in its participation in the PfP program in 1997. Ties began to improve after NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited Yerevan in February 1997.¹⁰¹ During Solana's visit Armenian Defense Minister Vazguen Sarkissian announced that Armenian forces would participate in

military training exercises with NATO in order to familiarize themselves with how the Alliance operates. Upon the conclusion of Solana's visit Armenia dramatically boosted the level of its participation in PfP by dispatching Armenian units overseas for PfP exercises.¹⁰²

The dramatic turnaround in Armenia's participation in PfP may be strongly attributed to Russia's participation in the NATO summit in Madrid in mid-1997 where the Alliance created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Russia's decision to participate in the Permanent Joint Council apparently signaled Armenia that it would have greater flexibility in pursuing its ties with NATO. Following Moscow's announcement, Armenia opted to send its foreign minister to the NATO expansion summit in Madrid. Although Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian failed to travel to the NATO summit, the presence of the Armenian Foreign Minister and other high-level officials from the Caucasus, including President Shevardnadze of Georgia and President Heidar Aliyev of Azerbaijan, strongly indicated NATO's growing importance there.¹⁰³

The success of the NATO expansion summit in Madrid provided an additional boost to Armenia's participation in the PfP program as Armenia significantly increased its level of activity in the program shortly after the conclusion of the historic summit. Evidence of a turnaround in support from the Armenian government occurred when the Armenian Foreign Ministry published a survey of the views of senior Armenian policymakers on security issues in the Caucasus. The study, *Armenia's Security Policy: The Vision of Senior Policymakers*, offered a positive assessment of NATO's role in the Caucasus, particularly from the Armenian Minister of Defense.¹⁰⁴ In the survey Armenian officials insisted that their country has a strong European identity and emphasized that the political spectrum of European security has now become broader due to NATO expansion.¹⁰⁵

Armenia's participation in the program reached a major milestone in late 1997 when Yerevan dispatched the Armenian deputy foreign minister to NATO headquarters to discuss expanding Armenia's participation in the PfP program.¹⁰⁶ Shortly after those discussions the government of Armenia participated in its first-ever PfP exercise.¹⁰⁷ In 1998 the Armenian government sent Chief of General Staff of the Armenian Armed Forces Major General Mikayel Arutyunyan to Brussels to attend a meeting of NATO's Military Committee in one of the strongest displays of interest in NATO ever made by the Armenian Ministry of Defense.¹⁰⁸

Armenia's NATO Patron.

Perhaps no other ally in NATO is more ideally suited to promote Armenia's dialogue with NATO than Greece. Greek ties to the Caucasus date back to the time of Alexander the Great when the conqueror brought the region under Greek rule. In fact, one of Alexander's legendary generals, General Atropates, governed a province in the Caucasus that now bears his name—Azerbaijan. Remnants of early Greek civilization remain scattered throughout the Black Sea region, and Greece has actively pursued a policy of reviving its military and security links with the region since the collapse of the USSR. Greek military ties to Armenia date back several centuries when both countries shared a similar suffrage under Ottoman rule. According to one Greek defense official, military ties between the countries are at least 200 years old. These historical links offer Greece a natural basis to facilitate closer links between NATO and Armenia. The first public indication of bilateral military ties between the two countries surfaced in 1996 when Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian visited Athens and signed an agreement on military cooperation with Greece. During that visit, Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkisyan observed that Armenia would become a stable regional ally for Greece in the Caucasus.¹⁰⁹

After signing the 1996 agreement, Armenia and Greece significantly boosted the level of their military and security cooperation. A year later the military cooperation agreement was expanded to include an agreement on the joint sharing of military intelligence as well as another series of cooperation and exchange agreements. Those meetings culminated in the signing of a major intelligence and military-cooperation agreement in June 1997 when Greece's Chief of the General Staff, Athanasios Tzoganis, traveled to Armenia to participate in the signing ceremony. The two countries also agreed to expand the level of their existing bilateral military training programs. The military agreement evoked little concern from Russian officials in Moscow and one Russian commentator simply referred to the visit as "the logical continuation of bilateral relations established by the agreement on friendship and cooperation."¹¹⁰

A month later Greek Defense Minister Akis Tsokhatzopoulos visited Yerevan in one of the highest level military visits ever paid to Armenia by a Greek defense official. The Greek Defense Minister announced that the two sides planned to expand military cooperation between the two countries, which he noted have "existed for over two hundred years."¹¹¹ The visit yielded several defense agreements, including accords on defense cooperation and an Armenian decision to dispatch military units to Greece to participate in NATO PfP exercises.¹¹²

Although Greece's initiatives in the Caucasus have helped facilitate greater Armenian participation in NATO, officials in Turkey share deep reservations over the scale of Greek initiatives in the Caucasus. Turkish officials believe that Greek military overtures are related to a larger regional strategy aimed at the encirclement of Turkey. The agreement on intelligence sharing signed between Greece and Armenia created major concerns in the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In a statement released during the Greek Defense Minister's visit, the Turkish foreign ministry stated that

"Turkey is sensitive to this issue as it concerns the security of Turkey." ¹¹³

Greek initiatives in the Caucasus, however, have not been solely limited to Armenia. Greek defense officials have also visited Georgia and Azerbaijan where they have signed military exchange agreements with the two countries. In 1998, for example, Greek officials visited Baku and signed an exchange agreement with Azerbaijan. During this visit Azerbaijan accepted an offer from the Greek Ministry of Defense to pay for the training of a group of Azeri Air Force pilots at a Greek Military Academy. ¹¹⁴

Continuing to operate under the aegis of NATO's PfP program Greece reached a major milestone in its Caucasian initiatives when it hosted a major PfP exercise that involved elite military units from Armenia. In December 1997 an Armenian Special Forces unit participated in a 10-day NATO PfP exercise in Greece under the code name Prometheus-97. The multinational peacekeeping exercise consisted of Greek, Dutch, Armenian, Bulgarian, and Albanian units that carried out military operations in a zone affected by a natural disaster that required disaster relief operations and convoy protection. In what may forebode greater American military assistance to Yerevan, Armenian units participating in the exercise were equipped with American weaponry to conduct the exercises. ¹¹⁵

Armenia's Ties to Russia.

While NATO's ties to Armenia have shown significant progress over the past 18 months, officials in Yerevan continue to downplay the recent warming of relations with NATO. Armenian officials insist that their military relations with Moscow remain a top priority. Since joining PfP, Armenian officials have insisted that they intend to maintain a delicate balance between East and West. For example, the Armenian Foreign Ministry outlined this approach by observing that Armenia's participation in the PfP program would only be "additional" to Armenia's

existing bilateral military cooperation with Russia and the CIS. Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sarkissian strongly echoed these views by noting that Armenia had limitations in its defense cooperation with Greece and NATO. The defense minister stated that Armenia does not have any immediate plans to import arms from Greece due to differences in armaments. Armenia's military forces, he noted, are equipped mostly with Russian weapons, while the Greek military is primarily equipped with an array of NATO and Western-designed equipment.¹¹⁶

The defense minister's statement strongly underscores the fundamental difference in views about NATO's role in the Caucasus in contrast to Armenia's regional neighbors, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Due to Moscow's historical role as a guarantor of security for Armenia, Yerevan refuses to consider NATO as any sort of regional counterweight to Russia in the Caucasus. One high-ranking Armenian official echoed this view by claiming that NATO's role in Caucasus security "should not be seen as a counterweight to Russia's role . . . particularly since Russia and NATO have signed a cooperation charter." The official noted that "counterpoising Russia and NATO's respective roles is unhealthy for the region," and constitutes a "destructive approach." He also stated that that efforts by Azerbaijan to pursue closer ties to NATO "can be destructive to regional stability."¹¹⁷

Despite the warming of ties with NATO, Armenia veered away from its Western course in mid-1997 when it signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid with Russia in August 1997. The new treaty further strengthened already significant military relations between the two nations by replacing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security signed in 1991. The agreement also offered Moscow an exclusive military basing agreement in Armenia for the next 25 years.¹¹⁸ Officials in Moscow proclaimed the new treaty to be a step higher than the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security signed in 1991 and argued that neither

Russia nor Armenia have signed any similar kind of treaty with any other country in the world in recent years. The Armenian parliament overwhelmingly approved the Russian basing agreement that granted Russian forces exclusive basing rights in Armenia whereby Yerevan would pay for 30 percent of the costs to maintain the bases.¹¹⁹ Commenting on this agreement, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the former Prime Minister of the USSR, stated that the military basing agreement would enable Russia to offset NATO forces based in Turkey. Ryzhkov also referred to Armenia's role as a buffer state for Moscow in the Caucasus.¹²⁰

The dark side of Moscow's efforts to destabilize the regional balance of power in the Caucasus surfaced in mid-1997 when the Duma defense committee revealed that the Russian military had illegally transferred over a billion dollars in arms to Armenia from 1994 to 1996. The scandal, which became known in the West as "Yerevagate," involved the transfer of extensive stocks of Russian weapons from military warehouses all over Russia, including arms caches in Siberia. The massive transfer of arms also included the gift of over 32 Scud ballistic missiles and 8 associated launchers to the Armenian military. Armenian military personnel even received extensive training in the use of the missiles at the Russian testing range of Kapustin Yar in mid-1996. With a 300-kilometer range, Armenian Scuds are more than capable of wreaking havoc on the oil fields in and around Azerbaijan's capital city of Baku. Moreover, the transfer of nearly 100 sophisticated T-72 tanks and 50 armored vehicles greatly augmented the military muscle of the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh.¹²¹

The Demise of the Commonwealth.

At a time when Armenia refuses to abandon its centuries-old relations with Moscow, Azerbaijan and Georgia are increasingly distancing themselves from the faltering CIS, as the Yeltsin government has proven

incapable of forging an equal partnership among its collective members. In contrast, ties between NATO and Georgia and Azerbaijan via the PfP program have created unique inroads for NATO in the Caucasus as a potential guarantor of regional security.

Moscow's disposition toward NATO's growing ties to the region has been unfavorably received in Kremlin policymaking circles. Russian officials insist that the Atlantic Alliance abandon any idea it has of integrating the former Soviet republics into an enlarged NATO. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana's trip to the Caucasus in early 1997 was fiercely criticized by Russian officials who accused the NATO Secretary General of having a hidden agenda aimed at undermining Russian influence in the region.¹²² Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Afanasyevsky echoed these views when he pointed to NATO's growing activity in the Caucasus, particularly its efforts to develop closer military contacts and hold joint military exercises. Afanasyevsky observed that "both the Caucasus countries and NATO itself have been active in initiating such contacts."¹²³

Russian concerns over NATO activity in the region continue to place Azerbaijan and Georgia at odds with Moscow. Azerbaijan has been strongly criticized for its efforts to forge stronger ties to NATO. A major source for Moscow's irritation with Baku stems from the fact that Azerbaijan remains the only independent state in the Caucasus that refuses to allow Russian military bases on its soil. Since joining the CIS, Azerbaijan has become increasingly disillusioned with the organization. Russian sponsored efforts to oust Aliyev from power have resulted in no less than four to five coup attempts since 1993, the most recent coming in February 1997 shortly after Solana's visit to Azerbaijan.¹²⁴

Over the course of 1996 and 1997, President Aliyev has been the most outspoken in his efforts to distance Azerbaijan from the CIS. He has repeatedly resisted

Russian efforts to regain access to former military bases in Azerbaijan and repeatedly asked for Moscow to conclude its investigation of the illegal \$1 billion arms sale to Armenia that transpired from 1994 to 1996. In March 1997 President Aliyev stated that while the time for the funeral of the CIS is not at hand, it is drawing quite near. Since joining the CIS in September 1993, Azerbaijan has increasingly distanced itself from Russian-led collective security efforts within the organization. Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Russia, Ramiz Rizayev, told *Nezavisimaia gazeta* that his country had expressed dissatisfaction with the Tashkent Treaty in Collective Security noting that it is only oriented toward defense against external aggression and demanded that it be altered.¹²⁵

Regional Conflicts.

With the growth in relations between NATO and the Caucasus, there have been increasing calls from Georgia and Azerbaijan for some sort of NATO-sponsored peacekeeping mission under the aegis of the United Nations. Both President Shevardnadze and President Aliyev have suggested publicly that NATO play a wider role in the Caucasus and their attendance at the NATO expansion summit in Madrid marks another milestone for NATO in its ties to the Caucasus. Although the possibility for dispatching a NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force to the Caucasus is quite remote, it is not implausible. The two largest unresolved regional conflicts in the Caucasus, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, remain deadlocked with Europe's top security forum, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), unable to arrange a settlement. Frustrated over the absence of progress by the European-led OSCE talks, both Azerbaijan and Georgia have become increasingly vocal in their calls for some level of NATO involvement in the region.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the largest and most volatile of the unresolved conflicts in the

Caucasus. Entering its fourth year of negotiations, any breakthrough in peace talks is largely tied to Armenian hard-liners in Nagorno-Karabakh, who refuse to give up any of the occupied territory that they seized from Azerbaijan during the war. This refusal, combined with instability in Armenia proper, has greatly dimmed Western expectations for resolving the conflict. With approximately 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory under occupation by the Armenian-backed force of Nagorno-Karabakh, the return of the disputed territory ranks as one of Azerbaijan's key national priorities. Ironically the people of Azerbaijan view the conflict through a European prism and consider it to be analogous to the centuries-old European dispute over Alsace-Lorraine.¹²⁶ So far, efforts to resolve the dispute have fallen on the shoulders of Europeans as the OSCE has proven unable to broker an agreement. Since mid-1994 the OSCE has tried to resolve the conflict acting as a mediator in talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹²⁷

For Azeri officials, NATO has great appeal as a source for resolving the conflict in the Caucasus due to its successful peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Azeri policymakers view NATO's record there to be quite promising for Azerbaijan and remain hopeful that the continued U.S. engagement in the region may eventually result in some sort of NATO-led peacekeeping operation in the disputed enclave. President Aliyev strongly underscored this point when he visited NATO headquarters in April 1996 where he expressed hope that upon the OSCE's resolution of the conflict NATO would be able to assist in the deployment of an international peacekeeping force to Nagorno-Karabakh.¹²⁸

Against the \$2 billion budget of NATO, the \$100 million budget of OSCE nowhere matches the resources of NATO. The OSCE neither possesses the reputation established by NATO in peacekeeping operations such as Bosnia, nor the experience. To date, the OSCE has never fielded a military force for peacekeeping operations. Instead it has primarily limited itself to election monitoring and human rights

missions in several ethnic conflict zones, such as Tajikistan and Bosnia. With close to a million displaced persons living in refugee camps, Azerbaijan has grown weary of the OSCE's inability to broker an agreement with Armenia and the government of Nagorno-Karabakh. NATO's growing relations with the Caucasus have stirred discussion inside Azerbaijan that NATO might become an option if OSCE efforts fail. In 1997 Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry conducted a study on the possible international options that the government might have for a peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. The study approvingly hailed NATO's success in Bosnia, emphasizing that NATO holds significant promise for potential peacekeeping operations in the Caucasus if the OSCE eventually proves unable to bring about a resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.¹²⁹

Any likelihood for an OSCE-sponsored resolution diminished in early 1998 when Armenian President Ter-Petrosian resigned from office. The subsequent election of Robert Kocharian as President of Armenia in April 1998 threatened to prolong the adoption of an OSCE-sponsored formula by Armenia that had been favorably received by outgoing President Ter-Petrosian. Petrosian was believed to be on the verge of accepting an interim agreement in which Nagorno-Karabakh would surrender buffer zones around the enclave in an OSCE-sponsored stage-by-stage agreement where Nagorno-Karabakh would receive the highest autonomy within Azerbaijan. Kocharian, however, has rejected any effort to return any of the territory occupied by the Armenian-backed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh and insisted on complete independence for the enclave, which is not recognized by any other country in the world.¹³⁰

Abkhazia.

The Abkhazian conundrum is the second largest regional conflict in the Caucasus where there has been increased reference to the potential for NATO intervention

by regional leaders. President Eduard Shevardnadze increasingly has advocated that a "Bosnia type" solution is needed to resolve the conflict over Abkhazia. Since mid-1993 Russia has kept 1,500 peacekeepers in a buffer zone between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia.¹³¹ Currently Russian forces operate there under the auspices of the CIS. Kremlin policymakers have been extremely reluctant to take on a more vigorous peacekeeping role in Abkhazia that would include resettling refugees and patrolling a wider area of the region. Peace talks remain deadlocked with the Abkhaz separatists insisting upon greater sovereignty than Georgia will tolerate. In 1997 CIS leaders agreed that the Russian peacekeeping force would assist in resettling refugees, but so far have failed to initiate any decision.¹³²

Distraught over the lack of movement in resolving the conflict, Shevardnadze repeatedly has insisted that the international community take on a bigger role. Georgian officials are extremely dissatisfied with Russia's failure to prod Abkhazia into any kind of dialogue with Tbilisi, particularly as Moscow plays the combined role of both mediator and peacekeeper in Abkhazia. As Shevardnadze has observed, "when we gave Russia a special role in resolving the Abkhaz conflict, we had no other way out. There were the Security Council resolutions, but they (Russia) were really the only ones who could have helped us." Moreover, the Georgian President believes that "the time has come in the world and especially in Europe for the decisions of the high councils of the U.N. to be fulfilled."¹³³ The Georgian leader asserted that Russia has virtually "exhausted its potential as political mediator and military peacekeeper in the Caucasus," and recently called for a "Bosnia option," using forces from outside countries, which could be used to restore his country's control over Abkhazia.¹³⁴

A NATO role in resolving the conflict, however remote, increasingly has become a topic of discussion by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in his discussions on

international peacekeeping options for Abkhazia. At the "NATO Expansion Summit" in Madrid in May 1997, Shevardnadze even broached the idea of introducing Ukrainian peacekeepers in private talks with Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma. Shevardnadze reportedly asked the Ukrainian leader to consider the possibility of dispatching peacekeepers to Abkhazia as part of a NATO-sponsored peacekeeping force.¹³⁵

During his July 1997 visit to the United States, Shevardnadze made the subject of U.N. or NATO intervention a key part of his U.S. agenda. Shevardnadze raised the issue of U.N. intervention in his discussions with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. In his trip to Washington, the Georgian leader raised the notion of NATO intervention during his talks with U.S. policymakers. American officials, however, reacted coldly to his NATO proposal and expressed concern that such a force would jeopardize Russian support for international efforts to resolve the conflict. U.S. officials, in turn, urged Shevardnadze to remain patient and insisted that he pin his hopes on a U.N.-sponsored effort to resolve the conflict through the "Friends of Georgia Group" at the United Nations.¹³⁶ The remarkable patience of the Georgian leader has been rapidly approaching an end as Moscow's intransigence in prolonging the Abkhaz conflict and the February 1998 assassination attempt in which Russia may have had a hand stand to further distance Georgia from the ailing CIS. Georgia is desperately seeking a way to internationalize the conflict and gain greater diplomatic support from the U.S. and Western allies for a Western-backed effort to intervene in mediating an end to the conflict.

Both Azerbaijan and Georgia share a common interest in having NATO play a wider role in the Caucasus, especially in implementing any sort of U.N.- or OSCE-sponsored peacekeeping operation. Although a NATO-led peacekeeping operation in the Caucasus may not be a pressing concern for NATO policymakers, it certainly

occupies a key place in the minds of President Shevardnadze and President Aliyev. In Shevardnadze's 1998 New Year's address to his country, the Georgian leader stated that "failing significant progress soon" toward a political settlement of the Abkhaz conflict, he would call for an international "peace enforcement operation in Abkhazia on the Bosnian model."¹³⁷ The Georgian President then indicated that he would raise this issue at the upcoming summit of NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as well as the "Friends of Georgia" group of Western countries, the OSCE, and the U.N. in 1998. Shevardnadze also outlined a timetable for the full restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity by the year 2000.¹³⁸

Interestingly, NATO's profile in brokering conflict resolution in the Caucasus has risen steadily in popularity among regional leaders since the PfP program began. The frequency of use of NATO as an option by regional leaders in the Caucasus is indeed an interesting phenomenon and undoubtedly deepens as more and more officers embark on military exchanges with key NATO states. NATO's credibility in the Caucasus has risen tremendously among regional states in the Caucasus due to its record of success in Bosnia. Still, NATO intervention in any scenario remains possible only as an option if the United States and its NATO allies decide to resort to it, which undoubtedly remains low on the list of policy options for Western policymakers.¹³⁹

Shifting Alliances in the Caucasus.

NATO's growing ties to the Caucasus underscore one of several regional trends that are emerging where new regional alliances are being formed between the independent states of the Caucasus and neighboring regional powers. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the oil rich Caucasus has continued to operate amid a regional vacuum of security that officials in the Clinton administration now refer to as "a second gray zone of insecurity."¹⁴⁰ In the absence of any major guarantor of

power in the region, the Caucasus is witnessing the creation of a whole new series of loose regional alliances and security alignments that are dramatically altering the strategic complexion of the Caucasus. Neighboring regional powers, such as Ukraine, Turkey, and Iran are leading these efforts as old regional rivalries are resurrected in the absence of any regional guarantor of power.

Ukrainian strategists in Kyiv have been the most active in formulating a new strategic policy for the Caucasus that seeks to create a regional grouping of states that opposes Russian influence in the region. In October 1997 the Presidents of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova formalized their common regional interests into an informal grouping known as GUAM. Founded at the Council of Europe Summit in Strasbourg, Ukraine initiated the formation of GUAM in order to counter Russia's position in the Caucasus. The four countries signed a communique during that meeting establishing an informal alliance of the four countries, whose chief objective appears to be the establishment of a mechanism for coordinating the group's foreign and economic affairs.¹⁴¹

The addition of Moldova signified an expanded version of a regional alignment formed the previous year that had been referred to as the Baku-Kyiv-Tbilisi axis. GUAM appears to be an extension of that axis which stands apart from the Commonwealth of Independent States due to its exclusion of Russia. Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov observed that GUAM should make a major contribution to the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe and would promote political and military consultations with NATO on regional security issues.¹⁴² The Azeri foreign minister stated that GUAM would lead to the strengthening of contacts between the four countries, which would go hand-in-hand with a process of their integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Shortly after the Strasbourg meeting, GUAM members held a consultative meeting at the deputy foreign minister level in Baku to map out a common strategy.¹⁴³

During that meeting the Azeri foreign minister indicated that contacts between NATO and the GUAM could evolve as a sort of "16-plus-four principle, in order to raise political and military cooperation to a qualitatively new level, not only between NATO and its partners, but also among the GUAM countries as well."¹⁴⁴

Members of GUAM have already created a military contingent composed of units provided by regional members. In December 1997 Ukrainian Defense Minister Aleksandr Kuzmuk announced the creation of a joint battalion by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine that would protect the Caucasus transport corridor. Referred to as the "Eurasia battalion," the Western media claimed that a major aim of the military force would be to defend the oil transport corridor that stretches from Baku to Supsa. Kuzmuk and his Georgian counterpart, Vardiko Nadibaidze, agreed to create a unit that would jointly protect the railroad and oil pipelines that encompass the corridor. In late 1997 the President Aliyev of Azerbaijan stunned Western diplomats by fielding the Azeri contingent for the battalion for review by visiting U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter. Moldova, for unknown reasons, has failed to provide a military contingent for the battalion, and appears to be limiting its involvement in GUAM to merely a political and economic role.¹⁴⁵

Armenia has sought to counter this newly emerging alignment by forging closer military and security ties with Greece and Iran as a means of deterring the Baku-Kyiv-Tbilisi-Kishinev axis. Greece's willingness to fill that void has led to discussion of a possible Athens-Yerevan-Moscow-Tehran axis in the Caucasus to counter GUAM. According to Greek Defense Minister Apostolos-Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, a key purpose of his country's efforts in the Caucasus is to counter Turkey's "destabilizing impact" in the region.¹⁴⁶ To counter Turkey's growing influence, Greek officials also have advocated the formation of a Greece-Armenia-Georgia-Iran axis. Armenia represents the cornerstone of both Russian and Greek

strategy in the Caucasus aimed at blocking Turkey's perceived intrusion into the oil corridor of the Caucasus. Armenia, for example, has significantly improved its own external military relations when it concluded an agreement on military cooperation with Greece, Syria, and Bulgaria. Yerevan also has initiated the sharing of military intelligence with Greece in an effort to exert greater pressure on Turkey's eastern flank.¹⁴⁷

Greece's military ties with Armenia and Turkey's military relations with Azerbaijan highlight one of the growing dangers posed by the emerging alliances in the Caucasus as individual NATO-member states implement a regional strategy aimed at creating new regional alliances. PfP in some instances appears to have been the conduit for building these alliances, as Turkey has overwhelmingly been the greatest beneficiary of the PfP program in an effort to pursue its regional aims in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Both Ankara and Athens have successfully used the PfP program as a conduit for forging closer military ties to regional states in the Caspian region in order to build greater strategic depth as well as establish the groundwork for future arms sales to the region.¹⁴⁸ Efforts to pursue these regional agendas, however, may prove to be destabilizing to regional stability if Turkey or Ukraine emerges as a regional guarantor of security to these states. Unaware of these dangers, policymakers in NATO should identify and monitor these trends in order to prevent any outbreak of regional hostilities between rival NATO member states. In the event of tensions erupting between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean, then it is extremely likely that the Caucasus would become a secondary theater of military operations between the two regional rivals.

The Gray Zone of Insecurity.

The expansion of regional alliances in the Caucasus underscores the growing uncertainty that awaits this region as it transitions from a little known hinterland of the

Cold War to a key energy crossroads of Eurasia. The Caucasus is vitally important to Western energy interests. Its strategic location next to one of the largest untapped petroleum basins in the world is unleashing new security alignments oriented toward the defense of the region's oil supplies that may fall outside the ability of the West to influence. In many ways the Caspian region is emerging as a second Persian Gulf as the number of external powers vying for control over the region's oil resources extends along several regional axes.

Regional security in the Caucasus is greatly complicated by the emergence of an immense power vacuum that has blanketed the region since the end of the Cold War. Russia's defeat on the battlefields of the North Caucasus has further altered the regional balance of power as its capability to project power into the southern Caucasus remains limited, although Moscow still retains significant capacity to interfere in the domestic affairs of neighboring states. Meanwhile, Turkey and Greece continue to advance their own regional security agendas in the Caucasus, which may place these neighboring regional powers on a collision course for conflict. The encroaching interests of Turkey, however, raises a serious question for NATO policymakers as they formulate a new regional strategy of engagement in the Caucasus that takes into serious account the whirlwind of competing interests there which is creating what American policymakers refer to "as a second gray zone of insecurity."¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, NATO initiatives in the Caucasus through PfP are a major step forward in alleviating the regional vacuum in security as the PfP program becomes the primary tool available for Western policymakers in their efforts to promote regional stability in Eurasia. NATO efforts to forge closer links to the region have been favorably received by all the regional states, especially as Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia forge stronger ties with NATO through the PfP program. Interest in the Caucasus among senior NATO officials continues to grow as the region

increasingly becomes a permanent part of the Alliance's agenda. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana strongly underscored this point when he told Azerbaijan's parliament in February 1997, "that although it was his first trip to Azerbaijan, it would not be his last."¹⁵⁰

Meanwhile, Western energy security concerns in the Caspian stand to dramatically reshape NATO's interests in Eurasia. The construction of the strategic 1,730 kilometer (1,081 miles) Baku-Ceyhan pipeline over the next decade will play a central role in influencing NATO interests in the region as transportation security becomes the centerpiece of its concerns in the Caucasus. Both the United States and Turkey share a deepening strategic commitment to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as each side seeks to prevent Moscow from developing a regional monopoly over pipeline routes from the Caspian. Western policymakers have a vital interest in safeguarding the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline as they seek to promote the integration of the Caucasus into the larger Euro-Atlantic community.

The receptiveness of regional leaders to NATO initiatives in the Caucasus has undergone dramatic changes since it first launched the PfP program. Unlike in previous years, regional leaders in the Caucasus now openly refer to the need for a wider NATO role in the region as some states view the Alliance as a regional counterweight to a resurgent Russia. Regional leaders in the southern Caucasus recognize NATO's capacity to project stability into ethnically unstable areas of southeastern Europe and the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia remain at the forefront in advocating a wider NATO role for the region. Both leaders seek to internationalize their respective regional conflicts hoping that one-day, NATO can play a role in assisting with a U.N.- or OSCE-sponsored peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia. Armenia, on the other hand, remains wedded to Moscow, but even Yerevan's outlook toward NATO has shown considerable progress since Russia joined the Joint Partnership Council and may

eventually play a larger role in the program through Greece's NATO patronage.

While a NATO peacekeeping deployment in the Caucasus is unlikely for the near future, the notion of a NATO-led peacekeeping exercise in the region is definitely on the horizon. Such an exercise, which would be patterned after the American-led exercise in Kazakhstan in September 1997, would prove to be a tremendous psychological boost to NATO's image in the region. It additionally would demonstrate the American commitment to promoting regional stability in the Caucasus. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has envisioned a similar type exercise in the Caucasus and his aim moved one step closer to reality in early 1998. During the visit of the Georgian defense minister to the United States the two countries reportedly signed an agreement to hold PFP exercises in the Republic of Georgia sometime in the near future.¹⁵¹

Conclusion.

NATO planners are strongly aware of the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus to the Atlantic Alliance. As NATO debates the adoption of a new NATO strategy to guide the Alliance into the 21st century, the entire Caspian is assuming a more prominent role in NATO's thinking about the future. In a round of NATO "crystal ball" discussions in London in late 1997, a group of NATO officials openly debated the strategic challenges that might arise for the Alliance in the 21st century and the Caspian figured prominently in those talks.¹⁵² Meanwhile, regional support for a wider NATO role continues to surface in the thoughts and views of senior officials in the Caucasus. A major regional newspaper there has even gone so far as to allege that U.S. reconnaissance aircraft based at Turkey's NATO air base at Incirlik would regularly monitor the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline once it became operational. Moreover, the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan gave credence

to this view by announcing in early 1998 that the government of Azerbaijan is now holding regular consultations with NATO on pipeline security.¹⁵³ Whether these allegations are true or not remains unclear; however, there is growing evidence that the Caucasus is ascending in importance in the strategic thinking of the Atlantic Alliance as its approaches the 21st century.

Together the Persian Gulf and the Caucasus represent two of the world's most unstable regions, and it remains unthinkable that NATO can ignore the potential impact caused by future instability in a major oil basin such as the Caspian. Russian military officials have begun their own crystal ball discussions on the future of the region and are deeply disturbed over the escalating interests by Western powers in the Caspian. Their chief fear is that the intensity of regional rivalries unfolding along the shores of the Caspian will one day lead to a military deployment there in order to protect Western oil interests just as they have in the Persian Gulf. As one Russian general noted:

There is currently only one threat to Russia. It is not NATO, China or Islam, but the threat of Desert Storm Two appearing on the shores of the Caspian Sea.¹⁵⁴

With over \$28 billion in oil agreements with Azerbaijan alone, it is clearly visible that Western powers share a deepening strategic interest in Caspian energy security. However, great uncertainties await the Caspian region as it transitions from a backwater of the Cold War to one of the most highly contested geopolitical arenas of world energy. As an important energy corridor, the Caucasus deserves close attention from NATO policymakers as the region forms a new NATO borderland that will have extreme importance for the energy security of not only NATO allies in Western Europe, but those in Eastern Europe as well. NATO's PfP program is helping to pave the road to greater regional stability in the Caucasus by fostering desperately needed security cooperation between the West and the independent states of the region. Of the 27 nations

participating in NATO's PfP Program, the collective future of three of these countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, will have a tremendous impact on the future of Western energy security.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8

1. With oil reserves estimated to be several times larger than the North Sea, the Caspian possesses one of the largest untapped oil basins in the world. According to data presented in an energy study released by the U.S. Department of State, the region's oil potential may reach 90 billion barrels, which would place the Caspian region on a scale equivalent to the oil potential of Iran, or possibly Kuwait. Most estimates of the reserve potential of the Caspian presented by journalists and analysts in Western media frequently overestimate the Caspian's oil reserves. Western energy experts calculate that current proven reserves are 27.5 billion barrels of oil and estimated reserves stand between 40 and 50 billion barrels. The U.S. Government, however, has calculated that the region's oil reserves are as high as 200 billion barrels. If true, this calculation would place the oil reserves of the Caspian on a par with the oil potential of Iraq or Saudi Arabia. For the U.S. position on the oil potential of the Caspian, see *Caspian Region Energy Development Report*, U.S. State Department, 1997, p. 2.

2. Wilhelm Tieke, *Der Kaukasus und das Öl: Der Deutsch-sowjetische Krieg in Kaukasien 1942/43*, Munich, 1995, p. 3.

3. Joel Hayward, "Hitler's Quest for Oil: The Impact of Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941-42," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 1995, pp. 94-135.

4. The eastern flank and southern region traditionally were considered a second, and even third strategic priority for NATO. This view even extended to the scholarly literature on NATO where Eurasia received little attention by Western academics. Some scholars attribute this to the extremely diverse and complex nature of the region. For more information on this issue, see Douglas T. Stuart, "Continuity and Change in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance," *NATO at Forty: Change, Continuity, & Prospects*, James R. Golden, Daniel J. Kaufman, Asa A. Clark IV, and David H. Petraeus, eds., Boulder: Westview Press, 1989, pp. 74-75.

5. Sergei Putilov, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, No. 8, 1998, p. 8.

6. Perhaps the best strategic assessment of the 19th century Caucasus in Russian is the work by Georgian military historian: S.V. Megrelidze, *Zakavkaz'e v Russko-Turketskoi Voine, 1877-1878*, [The Transcaucasus in the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878], Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1972. Chapter one is of special interest because it provides a strategic overview of the Caucasus as a *teatr voennoi deistvie* [theater of military action]. This chapter provides excellent insight into Russian military planning by the Russian General Staff and those of the Great Powers, pp. 50-76. For the best history of the wars in the Caucasus in any language, see W.E.D. Allen and P. Muratoff's, *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828-1921*, Cambridge, 1953.

7. Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 217.

8. The more important issue of safeguarding the transport of Caspian oil through the volatile Caucasus will have a significant impact on how NATO strategy evolves toward the region. Ironically, the rush to develop the region's oil supplies is transforming the entire Caucasian Isthmus into a major regional chokepoint comparable to that played by the Straits of Hormuz, or the Straits of Malacca.

9. Hugh Pope, "Oil Companies Rush into the Caucasus to Tap the Caspian," *Wall Street Journal*, April 25, 1997, p. 1.

10. Sheila Heslin, "The New Pipeline Politics," *New York Times*, November 10, 1997, A31.

11. For an outline of U.S. policy and views toward the Caucasus and Central Asia, see the speech by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," Remarks by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, July 21, 1997, at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, Maryland.

12. *International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook, 1996*, p. 32. Due to the demographic and economic growth taking place in Asia, the demand for energy could double between now and 2005.

13. Andrew Borowiec, *Washington Times*, March 5, 1998, A13.

14. For a comprehensive view of European energy policy, see on the worldwide web: www.europe.com/energypolicy.

15. The U.S. dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf region increased during the first 9 months of 1997, reversing a 7-year decline. During the period, Persian Gulf countries supplied 19.2 percent of U.S. net oil imports, up from 18.9 percent in the 1996 January-September period. *The Journal of Commerce*, February 25, 1998, p. 8A.

16. Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 160.

17. *Ibid.* Deminex is a quasi-state owned German oil exploration company that won a 10 percent share to develop the Lenkoran-Deniz and Talysh-Deniz oil deposits in offshore Azerbaijan. The French company Elf Aquitaine is project operator with a 40 percent stake, and Total of France holds another 10 percent. The investment project is valued at approximately \$2 billion, and the two fields' proven oil reserves are approximately 80 million tons.

18. The northern route of the dual pipeline solution backed by the United States is the Baku-Novorossisk pipeline, which became operational in November 1997. A limited quantity of Azeri oil made its way to the Russian port of Novorossisk in the Black Sea, which was transported by Russian tanker to Bulgaria. In October 1998 the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC) will select a main export pipeline route for early oil which will have a dramatic impact on the future geopolitical gravity of the Caucasus as Turkey bids for strategic access to the heart of Caspian oil.

19. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 39.

20. The Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk has the capacity to handle 640,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil. Currently this port is the largest Russian oil terminal and even has surpassed St. Petersburg in terms of the quantity of oil being transported. Novorossisk is also the major terminus for crude shipped via pipelines from Siberia. The quality of Siberian oil is improved when it is mixed with the richer blend of Caspian oil at Novorossisk, thus significantly improving the quality of the Siberian blend. Russia's geopolitical affinity for Caspian oil has perhaps more to do with this nuance of petroleum geology than the battle over pipelines.

21. *Ibid.*

22. Robert E. Ebel, *Energy Choices in the Near Abroad: The Haves and Have-Nots Face the Future*, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 1997, p. 60.

23. *Ibid.*

24. The TRACECA project sponsored by the European Union plans to transport goods to Europe from Central Asia and the Caucasus without transiting Russian territory.

25. *Ibid.*

26. David Ottaway and Dan Morgan, *The Washington Post*, November 20, 1997, p. A37.

27. Chrystia Freeland, "Scientists Warn of More Nuclear Perils," *Financial Times*, April 23, 1998, p. 4.

28. "Baku Stops Missiles Bound for Iran," *Washington Times*, April 25, 1998, A9.

29. Craig R. Whitney, "Albright, at NATO Meeting, Tells of Peril From Eurasia," *New York Times*, December 17, 1997, p. A12.

30. According to Solana, the principal non-proliferation goal of NATO is to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, reverse it through multilateral diplomacy. See Javier Solana, "NATO and the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, March 1997.

31. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. and Britain Relocate A Cache of Nuclear Fuel," *New York Times*, April 21, 1998, p. 1.

32. Michael Evans, "Troubled States Cast Long Nuclear Shadow," *The Times*, April 23, 1998. Nuclear facilities in Eurasia are monitored under the nuclear safeguard inspection regimes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Georgia remains the sole exception despite signing the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The safeguard regime has yet to be ratified by the Georgian parliament, which has prevented the International Atomic Energy Agency from carrying out inspections. This was one of the major reasons accounting for the removal of the enriched uranium from the university institute near Tbilisi.

33. "Accord Signed with U.S. on Training Border Guards," *New Europe*, February 22-28, 1998, p. 36.

34. "Scientists Warn of More Nuclear Perils," p. 4.

35. "A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia," Remarks by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, July 21, 1997, at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Baltimore, Maryland.

36. Remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, The Atlantic Council of the United States, May 20, 1997.

37. NATO has intervened in Bosnia at the request of the U.N. Security Council.

38. Warren Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times*, October 21, 1997.

39. Gwyn Prins, "Security Challenges for the 21st Century," *NATO Review*, January 1997, pp. 27-30.

40. Javier Solana, "NATO and the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, March 1997.

41. Part of NATO's increasing out-of-area focus emerged during the Strong Resolve 98 exercises, which tested the full range of NATO missions by handling simultaneous conflicts in widely separated geographic areas. In early 1998, NATO conducted its largest field exercise since the end of the Cold War. The 11-day NATO operation involved 90 ships and 50,000 servicemen. It focused on fictitious regional crises in Spain, Portugal, and Norway. *Washington Times*, March 10, 1998, p. A13.

42. *Defense News*, March 2-8, 1998, p. 2. The U.S. decision marks a protracted internal debate among regional command authorities over who would gain responsibility for the Caucasus and Central Asia. U.S. Atlantic Command, which received responsibility for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, had sought to extend its responsibility over Central Asia, where it had previously planned and coordinated the CENTRAZBAT exercises in Kazakhstan in September 1997. The victor in the Pentagon struggle would likely receive an increased budget for the new regions. U.S. Central Command, however, triumphed over Atlantic Command in the struggle for the Eurasia heartland by gaining responsibility for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The breakdown of regional command authority for Eurasia marked a vacuum in U.S. strategic planning that had existed since the breakup of the USSR. From 1991 to early 1998, no regional command authority had existed for the Caucasus and Central Asia. Interestingly enough, the U.S. State Department apparently had delayed the decision due to its strong reservations over the political

repercussions that this would have on U.S.-Russian relations. This strongly accounted for the delay. In the internal Pentagon struggle U.S. Atlantic Command had sought to assume responsibility for the region due to its role in overseeing exchanges through the PFP program. Much to the resentment of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Atlantic Command gained the upper hand in the Pentagon infighting, which had significant implications in future defense budget outlays among the regional commands. Even with the resolution of the dispute, Russia still has not received any designation among the U.S. regional command authorities. Russian commentators reacted harshly to the Pentagon decision, noting that the creation of a Caspian "zone of responsibility" is a step aimed at drawing the Caspian region into the U.S. sphere of responsibility. For the Russian reaction, see Sergei Putilov's article in *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, No. 8, 1998, p. 8.

43. R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S., Russian Paratroops Join in Central Asian Jump," *The Washington Post*, September 16, 1997, p. A12.

44. *Ibid.* The second and final stage of the CENTRAZBAT-97 military exercise was held on September 18-20, 1997, at the Chirchik training range outside Tashkent in Uzbekistan. Participants in the CENTRAZBAT included a joint Uzbek-Kazakh-Kyrgyz joint battalion; a reinforced company of the U.S. Army's 82nd airborne division; and one platoon each from Turkey, Latvia, Georgia, and Russia. The exercise tested the coordination of command, control, and logistics of national units in a U.N.-authorized, NATO-led international peacekeeping operation in Central Asia. In all, Russia contributed only 40 out of the total of 1,400 troops that took part in the exercise. The scenario envisaged a Bosnia-type operation in Central Asia.

45. Kenneth Weisbrode, "Time to get Serious About Turkey," *Washington Times*, January 9, 1998.

46. *Reuters*, September 25, 1997.

47. *Ibid.* Turkey's oil requirements will rise to 40 million tons annually by 2010 from 28 million tons now, and it plans to double its crude output to 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 2000. Turkey's natural gas imports are expected to rise to 30 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year in 2010 from the level of eight bcm in 1997. Western estimates for Turkey in 2010 calculate that the country's oil needs will rise to 40 million tons, up from the current level of 28 million tons *per annum* according to Muharrem Turkarslan, deputy general manager of the state oil and gas exploration company, Turkish Petroleum (TPAO). TPAO is involved in exploration and production projects abroad including one in the Caspian off-shore zone. TPAO is actively seeking more ventures abroad because

Turkey's remaining oil reserves are only 202 million barrels, which is not considered very large. TPAO is involved in several exploration ventures around the globe, including projects in North Africa, Iraq, and Kazakhstan. Its total foreign investments total about \$400 million.

48. *Reuters*, April 28, 1997.

49. Turkey's military inroads into Central Asia and the Caucasus are largely attributed to the slow pace of establishing relations with the Caspian region by the United States after the breakup of the USSR. Virtually no American military attachés were assigned to the Caspian region until recently, and the absence of U.S. military attachés in regional capitals made Ankara well-suited to assist NATO in running the PfP program in the Caspian region. At the urging of the United States and NATO, Turkey quickly tapped into this network to facilitate all of the logistical arrangements for regional PfP activity in the early days of the program. Turkey responded in variety of ways; for example, Ankara assisted these countries in making travel arrangements for military officers from the Turkic speaking republics when they visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and assisted in the selection of prospective candidates for the PfP program. The above mentioned information is based upon conversations with the first-ever U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan.

50. General Cevik Bir, "Turkey's Role in the New World Order: New Challenges," *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, No. 135, February 1998, p. 3.

51. Based upon a conversation with a Turkish diplomat.

52. *Ibid.*

53. As of 1994, nearly one of out every four officers in the Azeri military was an ethnic Russian.

54. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, April 11, 1997, p. 3.

55. In October 1997, Turkey's Cabinet debated the notion of creating a new government fund to provide loans to prospective arms buyers. Such a fund would prove to be a major means for boosting Turkish defense exports. The pending decision comes as Turkey has embarked on a \$31 billion, 10-year defense procurement program, under which Ankara intends to gain significant industrial benefits designed to strengthen its indigenous industry including licensed production deals that involve potential third-country sales. A leading Turkish defense expert called for Ankara to target "Southeast Asia, Pakistan, the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia as new arms markets." The analyst

noted that "the mainly Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, would be an excellent future arms market for Turkish arms." However, Turkey's vision of a vast untapped arms market in Central Asia is unmatched by the realities of its own limited arms export capabilities. For example, presently Turkish defense exports are small and total only about \$200 million annually. *Defense News*, October 6, 1997, p. 3.

56. *Xinhua*, June 10, 1996.

57. General Cevik Bir, "Turkey's Role in the New World Order: New Challenges," p. 3.

58. Shortly after Aliyev's visit to Ankara, the leader of Azerbaijan's parliament, Murtuz Aleskerov, stated that Azerbaijan was using the Baku-Ceyhan route as a bargaining chip for greater security. After Aleskerov made these statements, a senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official told the *Turkish Daily News* that the cost of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is in line with Turkish interests in the Caucasus. "Therefore," he said, "we are ready to pay that cost," as cited in *Turkish Daily News*, May 27, 1997.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. The agreement also states that the two countries will establish the necessary mechanisms for developing this strategic cooperation along economic and social lines as well. It is fair to conjecture that this part of the agreement implies that Turkey will begin assisting Azerbaijan in improving its defense-industrial base that may include joint-production of some weapons. "Turkey and Azerbaijan Improve Strategic Cooperation," *Turkish Daily News*, May 6, 1997.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Interfax*, April 25, 1996.

64. *New Europe*, January 12-18, 1997, p. 44. Ironically, shortly after these discussions, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana became the first ever Chief of Staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to travel to the Caucasus.

65. "Stanet li 1997-y 'Godom NATO' dlia Azerbaidzhana?" [Will 1997 be the Year of NATO for Azerbaijan?] *Zerkalo*, January 11, 1997, p. 19.

66. Gabala is an extremely important missile detection facility that formed part of the USSR's early warning system for Soviet missile defense. Russian officials have sought to expand their presence at Gabala. Former Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov visited Azerbaijan in early 1997 for the very purpose of negotiating an expansion of military relations with the Azeri military that included a provision of spare parts for the ailing Azeri military. Rebuffed during his talks with the Azeri General Staff, Rodionov abruptly cut short his visit to Azerbaijan and returned to Russia empty-handed.

67. See *Bakinskii rabochii*, May 17, 1996, p. 7.

68. *Zerkalo*, February 8, 1997, p. 1.

69. *Ibid.* A primary focus of the meeting was on how to address problems in accommodating NATO's military structure for an enlarged membership. General Sadikhov's trip to Brussels was a historic first in the short history of Azerbaijan's General Staff as it marked the first-ever visit by a Chief of the General Staff to NATO headquarters.

70. *AssA-Irada*, May 26, 1997.

71. *Zerkalo*, January 18, 1997, p. 2.

72. "The U.S. Role in Azerbaijan's Security," Remarks by the Honorable Ashton B. Carter to the U.S.-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, February 18, 1997, Washington, DC.

73. *Jamestown Monitor*, October 20, 1997.

74. *Ibid.*

75. Eduard Shevardnadze, "Georgia's Security Outlook," *NATO Review*, August 1993, pp. 7-10.

76. *Ibid.*

77. *FBIS-SOV-97-164*, June 13, 1997.

78. *Ibid.* Shevardnadze believes that the best venue for building closer relations between NATO and the Caucasus, and for that matter the newly independent states is the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which in 1997 was renamed as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). According to Shevardnadze, this NATO-sponsored body can best be viewed as a sort of training course for potential members of NATO.

79. *Armenian Reporter*, August 12, 1995, p. 19.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Jamestown Monitor*, October 20, 1997.
82. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline*, hereafter, cited as *RFE/RL Newsline*, March 25, 1998.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Associated Press*, February 11, 1997.
85. *FBIS-SOV-96-112*.
86. "Turkey to Train Officers from Georgia, Albania," *Defense News*, September 22-28, 1997, p. 2.
87. *Interfax-Ukraine*, March 12, 1996. Georgia has laid claim to at least 25 ships. At least 10 warships had been stationed at the Russian Black Sea naval base of Poti in 1991, but were appropriated by Russia afterward.
88. Ukraine immediately responded to Georgia's appeal for naval assistance by initiating a training program for Georgian naval officers at the Ukrainian naval academy in Sevastopol. Ukraine naval officers noted a major aim of the program is to "develop a Ukrainian-Georgian naval partnership in the Black Sea." *Jamestown Monitor*, March 26, 1997.
89. *Jamestown Monitor*, March 11, 1997. Ukraine in 1996 endorsed Georgia's claim to a share of the Black Sea Fleet. President Eduard Shevardnadze described that share as "symbolic"—a statement reflecting Tbilisi's plan to develop no more than a coastal guard force, to be subordinated to the border troops' command, rather than acting as a navy in its own right. Georgia is about to receive a first coastal guard ship from Ukraine, which is currently completing the training of that ship's Georgian crew. Captain of the First Rank Otar Chkhartshvili, who served until recently on a Russian guided-missile cruiser, was appointed the first commander of the Georgian navy.
90. *Jamestown Monitor*, November 20, 1997.
91. On October 14, the group met with Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze, who was reported to have reminded the Russian delegation that Georgia had been totally ignored when the Black Sea fleet was divided. Shevardnadze noted that nearly 80 percent of the

Soviet military equipment once stationed in the republic had been repatriated to Russia. Cited in *Jamestown Monitor*, October 20, 1997. After his meetings with Shevardnadze, General Mayev announced that Russia was prepared to transfer to the Georgian Navy "a certain number of our warships" once President Boris Yeltsin had approved the decision. General Mayev failed to specify the exact quantity or particular type of vessels to be transferred, but other sources in Tbilisi said that four ships would be handed over. A Russian member of the delegation indicated that Moscow was prepared to assist Georgia in building up both its navy and air force.

92. James A. Baker, III, "America's Vital Interest in the New Silk Road," *New York Times*, July 21, 1997, p. A21.

93. *Ibid.*

94. S. Enders Wimbush, "On Eurasia's Crossroads," *Journal of Commerce*, July 18, 1997, p. 9A.

95. Interfax, February 5, 1998.

96. For the best recent analysis of the history of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, see Christopher Panico, *Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh*, Human Rights Watch: Helsinki, December 1994.

97. *The Armenian Reporter*, November 30, 1996, p. 26.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

100. *Ibid.*

101. Some American specialists at the U.S. Atlantic Command point out that Armenia's new found interest in the PfP program is partially attributed to Azerbaijan's stepped-up activity in the PfP program which occurred midway through 1997.

102. *Noyan-Tapan*, November 24, 1997.

103. The NATO-Russia Founding Act created a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.

104. *Armenia's Security Policy: The Vision of Senior Policymakers*, Yerevan, Armenia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, July 1997.

105. *Ibid.*
106. Agence France Presse, February 13, 1997.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Tbilisi Iprinda, in Russian, May 5, 1997, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Military Affairs* (henceforth cited as *FBIS-UMA*)-97-125.
109. Ara Tatevosyan, "New Alliances Centered on the Caucasus," *Moscow News*, July 27, 1997, p. 4.
110. *Interfax*, June 20, 1997.
111. *Interfax*, July 15, 1997.
112. *Ibid.*
113. Tatevosyan, "New Alliances Centered on the Caucasus," p. 4.
114. *AssA-Irada*, March 7, 1998. The training will be held at the expense of the Ministry of National Defense of Greece, *AssA-Irada* was informed at the Greek Embassy in Baku. Azerbaijani representatives will take a complete course at the Military Academy of Greece where they will receive training as military pilots.
115. The exercises focused on eliminating armed groups not under the control of the government. Hypothetical attacks on road convoys carrying humanitarian aid were launched with multinational forces providing protection. Multinational units also guarded refugee camps and swept minefields during the 10-day exercise. *British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts* (hereafter cited as *BBC*), December 3, 1997, SU/D3092/S1.
116. Akis Tsokhatzopoulos also called for the creation of new collective security institutions in Eurasia. The Defense Minister noted that Greece supported the expansion of the European Union to the east and the inclusion of new states in a single economic area. He said that in this regard Greece sees NATO as a field for new initiatives in the creation of new common security and cooperation organizations.
117. *Jamestown Monitor*, November 25, 1997.
118. The treaty documents are based on an agreement for collective security, on a single air-defense system, and on the protection of the

external CIS borders with due account of a Russian military base in Armenia. *Interfax*, September 1, 1997.

119. The agreement was signed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian and lasts for 25 years, with automatic 5-year extensions unless denounced by either side with 1 year's advance notice. The preamble defines the treaty's goals as protecting both countries' security interests as well as the "CIS borders" along Armenia's borders.

120. *Jamestown Monitor*, April 21, 1997. According to Dr. Carl Van Dyke, the concept of buffer states as an integral part of Soviet Russia's military strategy dates back to the 1920s when Belarus became the first forward outpost for this defense strategy originally conceived by the Soviet military strategist General Joffe. Joffe first conceptualized this theory when he went to Belarus in 1920. This strategic view has been resurrected over 70 years later by Ryzhkov as Moscow refuses to abandon the notion of establishing buffer states for forward defense.

121. Russian arms were supplied to Armenia, by air, land, and sea (Batumi), and from military bases in Mozdok (northern Caucasus) and from Russian weapons depots as far away as Siberia. Since 1994, Armenia has received enough arms (600 railroad boxcars of arms and ammunition) to mount a major military campaign beyond the territory that Armenian-backed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh currently possess.

122. *New Europe*, February 16-22, 1997, p. 45.

123. *Interfax*, June 2, 1997.

124. Ironically shortly before the attempted *coup* on Aliyev in late February, there had been a similar attempt in Georgia to murder Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze.

125. *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, January 19, 1996, p. 3.

126. *Monitor* (Baku), November 1996, pp. 22-23. The Azeri reference to Alsace-Lorraine is a curious historical analogue to its dispute with Armenia over its claims to Nagorno-Karabakh. For the over 2,000 years of its recorded history, the territory of Alsace-Lorraine has been hotly disputed by European powers. In one of the major highways of Europe, this territory has generally been an apple of discord in European politics. Ceded by France to Germany in 1871, retroceded to France in 1919, and annexed by Germany in 1940, it was finally recovered again by France in 1945.

127. The OSCE was previously known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which was formed on August 1, 1975. The 35-member CSCE was formed in a ceremony in Dipoli, near Helsinki, where it became a multilateral forum for dialogue involving Eastern and Western Europe. In 1994 the CSCE was renamed the OSCE. Membership has now risen to 55 states over three continents including the United States and Canada, and all the newly independent states of the former USSR. Since its inception in 1994 the OSCE has committed itself to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It has the task of monitoring elections and acting as a primary instrument in early warnings, conflict prevention and primary management. It has deployed nine missions in actual and potential conflict areas, from Tajikistan to the Baltic.

128. *Interfax*, April 25, 1996.

129. *Energoresursy Azerbaidzhana: Politicheskaya stabilnost i regional'nye otnosheniia*, Baku, 1997. The study further encourages the use of oil as a tool for luring NATO members, particularly Germany and France, into expanding the perimeters of NATO to the Caspian. Moreover, according to a former high-ranking American participant at the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) talks in Vienna, a major foreign policy figure in Azerbaijan had told him that if the OSCE Minsk Groups fail to show any progress in the near future, then Azerbaijan would close down its OSCE office in Vienna and switch its ambassador to NATO-headquarters in Brussels and begin lobbying for NATO intervention in the region.

130. The interim peace plan would likely involve an OSCE peacekeeping operation that would be closely modeled on NATO's experience in Bosnia and involve a small battalion size deployment of American military personnel to the region from NATO bases in Europe. The U.S. experience in implementing the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia is undoubtedly highly relevant to the OSCE in any future effort to field an international peacekeeping force in the Caucasus. See Daniel Williams, "Nominee Form Dispute Enclave Wins in Armenia," *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1998, p. A28.

131. Georgia in 1992 sent in rag-tag troops to try and smash an autonomy drive by the local Abkhaz minority in the lush Black Sea province, but they were driven out of the region after a year of fighting which took at least 10,000 lives. At least 150,000 ethnic Georgian refugees have not been able to return to Abkhazia despite U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding they be allowed to go home.

132. Shevardnadze and other leading Georgian officials have hoped that Russia could use its considerable influence with the Abkhaz to bring about a peace agreement giving the region wide autonomy inside a single Georgian federal state. It is generally accepted that elements in the Russian military gave the Abkhaz crucial weapons and logistical support during the 1992-93 war. Tbilisi has attempted to use carrots for Moscow by allowing Russia to keep its military bases in Georgia in exchange for tacit Russian promises to help rein in the Abkhaz.

133. *Reuters*, February 1, 1998.

134. *Ibid.* Shevardnadze stated that: "If we cannot achieve results at the negotiating table and the conflict drags out, then we will be compelled to think about the use of force, as happened in Bosnia." Shevardnadze added that: "When I talk about the Bosnian option, I talked about compelling peace, as provided for under the U.N. charter." Shevardnadze indicated that this could include "the use of police units," but did not say which countries might provide troops.

135. The Georgian newspaper *Resonansi* wrote in July 1997 that Kuchma had raised the possibility of Ukrainian peacekeepers for Abkhazia earlier that year when the two countries signed a strategic partnership agreement. Ukraine refused to consider dispatching any troops to Abkhazia under the aegis of the CIS. Instead, the Ukrainian President remains more interested in the possibility of sending Ukrainian troops to Abkhazia under the aegis of the U.N. rather than NATO. Since the expiration of the CIS peacekeeping mandate on July 31, 1997, Shevardnadze has continued to explore other options. Shevardnadze has strongly hinted that the Russian peacekeeping role would be rejected at some future point if Moscow's continues to delay the implementation of returning Georgian refugees to Abkhazia. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gennadi Udovenko visited Tbilisi in mid-July 1997 and reiterated Ukraine's interest in resolving the conflict in Abkhazia. Ukraine and Georgia issued a joint communique that stated that the two countries had agreed to intensify joint efforts toward a peaceful settlement. Udovenko hinted of Ukraine participation in a future peacekeeping force in Abkhazia at a July news conference in Tbilisi. The Ukrainian Foreign Minister however downplayed a possibility that Ukrainians would be sent into the conflict zone, and expressed concern over whom would finance such an operation. Udovenko further linked Ukraine's hesitation to commit troops to the position of the Ukrainian parliament and its pro-Russian chairman, Alexander Moroz. Cited in *Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States* (hereafter cited as *BISNIS*), U.S. Embassy Georgia, July 24, 1997.

136. The U.N. option for resolving the conflict is to hold an international conference to settle the Abkhazia conflict that would include the participation of the OSCE, Russia, and the "Friends of Georgia" group of countries at the United Nations. This group includes the United States, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. Interestingly enough, Shevardnadze has explored the option of diluting Russian diplomatic leverage in the "Friends of Georgia Group" by asking that Ukraine be added to the list of members. See *Jamestown Monitor*, July 22, 1997.

137. *Ibid.*, January 5, 1998.

138. *Ibid.*

139. As the mediator between Abkhazia and Georgia's central government, Moscow has condoned Abkhazia's rejection of a federal solution. In July and December 1997 the leading Western powers, acting as observers, attended two rounds of Russian-mediated negotiations and accepted Russia into the Friends of Georgia group, renaming the latter "the Friends of the U.N. Secretary General."

140. "In the Gray Zone," *The Washington Post*, May 18, 1997, p. C6.

141. *Itar-Tass*, November 25, 1997.

142. *Jamestown Monitor*, November 26, 1997.

143. *Ibid.* The meeting produced a joint five-part protocol defining common goals. The organization's objectives include political cooperation on the international level; resistance to "separatism" and mutual support regarding the settlement of regional conflicts; a common approach to peacekeeping operations; development of transit routes; and preparation of eventual accession to West European and Atlantic institutions.

144. Liz Fuller, "Introducing the Other GUAM," *Radio Liberty / Special Report*, December 1, 1997.

145. *RFE / RL Newslines*, December 2, 1997.

146. *Ibid.*

147. *Jamestown Monitor*, March 13, 1997.

148. Greece's regional strategy has developed a series of strong regional alliances with neighboring states, ranging from close military

ties to Syria and support for the PKK, to close bilateral military ties with Bulgaria.

149. "In the Gray Zone," *The Washington Post*, May 18, 1997, p. C6.

150. *Gunay* (Baku), February 15, 1997, p. 1.

151. Conversation with Georgian diplomat.

152. *ANP English News Bulletin* (Stichting Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau), October 21, 1997.

153. *RFE/RL Newslines*, December 2, 1997.

154. Tim Thomas, *European Security*, forthcoming 1998.

CHAPTER 9

NATO'S EXPANDING PRESENCE IN THE CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

Rachel Bronson

The convergence of two unrelated trends forecasts trouble for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance: a constant push for NATO expansion and increased energy exploration in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Although there is currently little connection between these two trends, NATO's expanding reach and the press for alternative sources of energy could collide in an unpredictable and potentially disastrous manner. The irony is that an area that has not played a central role in strategic thinking since "the Great Game" of the 19th century could challenge the integrity of one of the most successful security institutions in European history.

NATO's responsibilities are increasing in one form or another in all states of the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO members were quick to protect the vulnerable newly independent states (NIS) through the establishment of economic, political, and military ties. The most significant development is the possibility of full-fledged membership in the Alliance for three new member states, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Other security arrangements have been extended as well. Special agreements between NATO and Ukraine, for instance, demonstrate an increased Western commitment to Ukraine's security. Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises have occurred throughout the former Soviet Union for the dual purpose of preparing states for NATO membership and establishing closer military ties. Several arguments have been advanced in favor of expansion, ranging from preventing domestic instability, which could drag Europe inadvertently into war, to containment of a potentially reassertive Russia. In most cases, the justi-

fication for increasing NATO's geographic responsibilities has little to do with the countries themselves and more to do with maintaining stability and independence on the European continent, the central objective of the NATO Alliance. NATO's expanding presence is taking place for its own internal logic, rather than for reasons specific to a particular country or region.

A second and concurrent trend is the international scramble to secure economic resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This trend is specific to the region itself. A 1997 U.S. State Department report estimates there are 178 billion barrels of proven and possible energy reserves in the Caspian Sea, second only to the Persian Gulf.¹ The lure of such reserves is pulling new actors into the region. Uzbekistan alone is host to over 52 international joint ventures, up from 12 in 1996.² Kyrgyzstan opened its first oil refinery in May with U.S. and Canadian assistance.³ Iran actively supported the construction of a Turkmenistan-Iranian pipeline which became operative in December 1997. The United States and Britain, in particular, are contracting for significant portions of the oil agreements. Not far behind are Japan and China. India and Pakistan are also expressing interest in the region as their growing populations demand increasing energy resources.⁴

If not carefully managed, these two trends—NATO expansion and increased energy exploitation—will converge in southwest Asia with dangerous consequences. Three scenarios for conflict are possible. First, local crises threaten to draw the Alliance unexpectedly into regional conflict. Second, actors such as Russia, Iran, and China have established interests in the region which could lead them to view NATO expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia as directly threatening. Third, competing economic and political interests among NATO members could reverberate back and affect Alliance cohesion. There is the possibility that NATO will become embroiled in unwanted military confrontations. As importantly, the economic and political conflicts among NATO constituent states could

erode the unity of the Alliance, affecting it far beyond the borders of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Logistically, the Caucasus and Central Asia could become the true testing ground for NATO out-of-area operations. The region poses problems which dwarf the complications associated with operations in the former Yugoslavia. Conflict in Eastern or Central Europe, while problematic for NATO, would at least involve parties that are familiar: ex-Warsaw Pact countries. In Central Asia and the Caucasus this is not the case. The actors involved are as likely to include China, Iran, and India, as they are Russia. In addition, projecting power into Central Asia and the Caucasus is also much trickier than in Europe or even the Persian Gulf. In short, out-of-area in this region is truly out-of-area.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, the extent of NATO's involvement in southwest Asia is discussed. Because Central Asia and the Caucasus are usually considered within the context of the "politics of pipelines," security developments there are often given short shrift. But as the above paragraphs suggest, energy arrangements are not the only important developments occurring in this region. NATO, through Partnership for Peace (PfP), is steadily expanding its previous commitments. In addition, NATO already has assumed treaty commitments in the region through the Flank Zone Agreement, a part of the Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Once the extent of NATO's presence in the region is established, we turn to a consideration of other international interests. The United States, Europe, China, Russia, Iran, and Turkey all have interests in the region outside the scope of NATO enlargement. This discussion provides a brief overview of the international context in which NATO is operating. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the conflicts that are likely to plague the NATO Alliance as it becomes more deeply entrenched in the region.

It is certainly possible that the mix of economic windfalls and great power politics will compliment each other to allow all parties involved to benefit equally and thus decrease the likelihood of conflict. It is also possible that the region's conflicts will abate once economic resources flow into the region, and governments are able to co-opt domestic opposition. More likely, local conflict will escalate and international interests will clash. Resource distribution always raises the thorny question of who gains more, and rarely is there a universally agreed upon answer. Arms flows are increasing as cash becomes available and barter arrangements are being concluded, while outside powers are establishing defense agreements with regional actors with alacrity. Such developments within the context of NATO's expanding commitments are a dangerous and alarming mix.

NATO's Role in the Region.

NATO is involved the Caucasus and Central Asia in two central ways. The first is through the CFE Flank Zone Agreement, and the second is through increasing PFP activity.

*The CFE Treaty.*⁵ NATO's formal involvement in the Caucasus began somewhat unexpectedly with the 1990 Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The CFE was negotiated between two "groups of states," namely the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It stipulated limits and position of five categories of military equipment: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. The treaty's jurisdiction extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.

Negotiated at the end of the Cold War, the treaty was designed to increase confidence between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries by reducing the likelihood of war in Central Europe. Being that the states on Russia's southern flank were not yet independent, let alone important security concerns, the area was included in the agreement only to

bolster Central European security. This decision caused, and will continue to cause, friction between NATO and Russia, as Moscow reassesses its security agenda and locates vital national interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

While the CFE treaty stipulated a ceiling on the quantity of military equipment that the blocs could maintain, it did not specify national limits for individual states. That is, limits were assigned to two groups of states, but not, for example, to Russia or Germany. The blocs were then further divided into zones constructed mostly around Central Europe. One zone however—the Flank Zone—included Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and the Caucasus, along with some states and areas in North Europe.

As the Soviet Union collapsed and strategic realities in Europe changed, Russia became increasingly concerned with developments in its “near abroad” and announced it could not meet its promise of reduced forces in the Flank Zone. Moscow requested that NATO remit Russian CFE obligations owing to changed strategic realities. This request directly challenged NATO to either accommodate Russia in the Caucasus (and thereby ignore Turkish and Caucasian concerns) or risk the collapse of an important and successful European arms control agreement. In May 1996 in Vienna, NATO countries agreed to allow Russia an increase in its permitted force levels in the Flank Zone. It also granted Russia an extension of meeting those goals until 1999. NATO therefore recognized Russia’s changing security assessment and its need for time in managing internal unrest, most notably in Chechnya.

This concession forced regional actors to contend with an increased Russian presence in their own backyards. Also problematic is the fact that Russia seems to be transferring weapons to Armenia in contravention of the CFE agreement, which calls for increased transparency through regular data exchanges. Conflict in the Caucasus could therefore push NATO countries into a dilemma. Should

Russia continue covertly supporting Armenia, for example, or keep troops in the Southern Zone past 1999, NATO countries will have to consider whether to accept treaty violations in the Caucasus in order to secure CFE benefits in Central Europe, or protect the sovereignty and interests of Caucasian states.⁶ Certain European countries may wish to preserve the CFE in Central Europe, even if this means sacrificing flank areas like the Caucasus. Turkey and others more intimately involved in the region are likely to have diverging interests in terms of how to weight the trade-offs. Unfortunately, statements by then Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov calling for "preventative" strikes against renegade bases in Chechnya do not suggest that Russia will be reducing its forces in the Flank Zone any time soon.⁷

Should Russia fail to meet its new equipment limits and continue violating transparency regulations in the Flank Zone, NATO members with a strong interest in maintaining Caucasian and Central Asian autonomy could demand a reexamination of the CFE accord. While the West is unlikely to overlook the many benefits that the CFE agreement has brought to Central Europe, it may be forced to take an increasingly tough line on Russia since any violation in the Caucasus would support Western hard-liners who view Russia as still geo-politically ambitious with only temporarily reduced means to achieve such ambitions. Turkey, still smarting from being frozen out of the European Union, may also reevaluate its role in NATO. The year 1999 will be pivotal for NATO-Russian relations, not only because of the admission of three new members to NATO. If Russia has not reduced its forces in the Flank Zone by then, NATO may have to reevaluate the success of the CFE agreement. One could also easily envision a tacit trade-off whereby Russia begrudgingly accepts the three new NATO members in return for the West ignoring CFE violations in the Caucasus. This would challenge Turkish strategic interests and would directly weaken the independence of Caucasian states that the

United States and Western Europe seem so eager to bolster. However, a NATO decision to defend Caucasian interests as part of its overall trend of expansion could risk many of the benefits gained through the CFE.

Partnership for Peace Activity. NATO is tied to the Caucasus and Central Asia even more explicitly through the PfP program. PfP was introduced in Brussels in January 1994 in order to expand and intensify political and military cooperation between NATO and Partner countries. All Central Asian and Caucasian states, except Tajikistan, signed on. PfP was designed to promote civilian control of military forces, enable joint operations with NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and open communications among PfP countries. As NATO documents indicate, PfP "offers participating states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities."⁸ PfP exercises are "designed to improve practical military cooperation and common capabilities in the areas on which PfP focuses and help to develop interoperability between the forces of NATO allies and partner countries."⁹

Initially, PfP activities were seen by the NIS as a first step to inclusion in NATO because NATO members made overly ambitious statements and because regional leaders held unrealistic expectations. As stated in NATO documentation, active participation in the PfP will play "an important role in the evolutionary process of including new NATO members."¹⁰ A more realistic understanding is emerging in which PfP offers benefits of access to NATO members, aid and military support. Its goal has been modified to offering participating states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO countries.

Nonetheless, it is important to note that PfP activity in the Caucasus and Central Asia is increasing at a remarkable rate. (See Figure 1.) In 1994, the first year of PfP, no exercises took place in the region. A year later, there were 6, which were followed by 11 and then 19 in each

subsequent year. Each year, more countries in the region participated, and by 1997 every country except Tajikistan had participated in some way. More importantly, the number of exercises involving local troops has increased, suggesting a more important role for military training. Local troops did not participate in any exercises in 1994, and in 1995 and 1996, only one exercise took place that involved troops from the region. In 1997, however, five exercises took place, with most states in the region committing forces in one exercise or another.¹¹ There has also been a trend toward a higher level of exercises. The commitment of local forces has increased from platoon to brigade level maneuvers.




Figure 1. PfP Activity.

The most spectacular example of NATO involvement was the September 15, 1997, exercise which included 500 U.S. paratroopers from the elite 82nd airborne jumping into Central Asia. The jump, organized under PfP, included over 800 participants from the United States, Turkey, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. troops flew 7,700 miles from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the longest nonstop aerial deployment in U.S. history. The exercise entailed an imaginary border dispute between two fictitious

countries, with the goal of enforcing a U.N. brokered agreement, enhancing regional cooperation, and increasing interoperability. The fact that Russia was involved could lead some to argue that the connection between the jump and a NATO operation was quite loose. But the operation was organized a year earlier, and, not surprisingly, agitated Moscow which made clear that such an exercise was unacceptable and would be deemed as an offensive maneuver unless Russian troops were included. Their inclusion was a political corrective. September's exercise with its striking pictures of American soldiers falling from the sky under a PfP mandated exercise should serve as a warning that economic developments are not occurring in a military vacuum. Planning for another such exercise is underway.

The point is that NATO is becoming increasingly involved in the region. The discussion above does not include the hundreds of workshops and day-to-day contacts on-going in the region. The fear is real that it could unwittingly be dragged into a conflict despite the preferences of NATO to avoid such a situation. It has led one Norwegian diplomat to state that "the last thing we want is any hint of an implied responsibility . . . for guaranteeing a PfP country's security."¹² Presence in the region does not guarantee involvement in local conflicts, but it certainly increases the likelihood. Regional conflicts become all the more perilous when the interests of other external states are considered. The following section shows that not only NATO is becoming involved. The United States and European nations are pursuing independent policies in the region to secure potentially lucrative oil and gas deals. In addition, China, Russia, and others are establishing economic and related defense relations. This is all happening independent of NATO's expanding reach.

International Interest in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

U.S. Involvement. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has become increasingly involved in Central Asia and the Caucasus. To date, its involvement in the oil and gas sector has garnered the most attention. More than 80 oil and gas-related joint ventures are operating in the region currently, with over 30 U.S. companies involved in commercial activities.¹³ U.S. companies are awaiting ratification of four product-sharing arrangements with Azerbaijan which would involve the United States in seven of nine product-sharing arrangements in Azerbaijan. Chevron has already spent more than \$1.3 billion in Kazakhstan's Tengiz project.¹⁴

Examining U.S. economic and military assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia reveals increasing U.S. interest in the region.¹⁵ (See Figure 2.) States most involved in PfP such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia continue to receive a high percentage of the aid to the region. Notably, assistance to Armenia is decreasing. As the United States pushes for pipelines originating in and transmitting through Azerbaijan to carry the region's increasingly important energy resources, assistance to Armenia will necessarily decline as historic and domestic reasons for assisting Armenia are overwhelmed. Aid to all countries, with the exception of Armenia and Turkmenistan, is increasing.

Assistance is also being given in less formal ways. Taking \$5 million from the U.S. Government's Warsaw Initiative Fund, Washington is setting up the PfP Information Management System, a new computer network designed to promote communication that will tie NATO's 19 nations with all countries involved in PfP programs. The new network is expected to increase military-to-military ties with all PfP countries, since members will be expected to place data ranging from peacekeeping doctrine to defense budgets on-line.¹⁶





Figure 2. U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia (1992 U.S. \$ millions).

Sources: United States Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*, Washington, DC: USAID, 1998; USAID, *Congressional Presentation 1998: Summary Tables*, Washington DC: USAID, 1998. Since amounts for 1997 and 1998 are forecasts, they do not include the disbursement for foreign disaster assistance, regional or other programs. Actual assistance will therefore ultimately be higher for these years, meaning that the trends will be even starker, when full data are available. All data were converted into 1992 U.S. \$ (millions) by author.

Militarily, officials from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan repeatedly emphasize the assistance they received from U.S. forces in learning modern military tactics including procedures for conducting combat operations. This is achieved in many different ways including trips to U.S. bases for training under PfP exercises. Georgia has sought and achieved closer defense relations with the United States. In 1997, Georgia had 23 military contacts with the United States, up from 9 in 1995. In case U.S. commitment to the region was in doubt, after he parachuted into Central Asia, Marine General Jack Sheehan, Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command and NATO's SACLANT, announced that, if the United Nations ever decided to authorize a peace support operation involving Central Asian military forces, "then the United States is ready to stand beside them and participate."¹⁷ His remarks appeared to be the first such assertion of a U.S. commitment to dispatch military forces to this remote former Soviet Republic. Secretary of State Albright made clear that "assistance to the strategically-located and energy-rich democracies of Central Asia and the Caucasus is strongly in our national interest."¹⁸ President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary of Energy Pena, and Deputy Secretary of State Talbott have all met with the region's leaders and made statements encouraging the developing relationships.

European Involvement. Europe's involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus is not as deep as the U.S. commitment. Most of the ties result primarily from the oil exploration. The United Kingdom, Italy, and France are three of the most active states. British Petroleum, for instance, maintains a 17 percent share in Azeri consortium. British Gas has a production-sharing agreement for the Kazakhstan Karachaganak oil and gas field. In addition, Italy, through Agip, has production-sharing agreements for the Kazakhstan Karachaganak oil and gas field. It also has a 30 percent share of Azerbaijan's Karabakh field in the Caspian.

England and Germany have established military relations with Georgia, but have not been as active as the United States, Russia, or China in securing border arrangements throughout the region. The activity is primarily confined to economic assistance and regular diplomatic interaction. Europe's involvement, though by no means slight, is not as aggressive as other interested states. This is likely to strain relations within the NATO Alliance as the United States pushes for stronger NATO relations there through PfP exercises, and European countries consider alternative areas for involvement.

Russia. Russia's role in the region oscillates between benign neglect and intense involvement. In the early 1990s, Moscow's interest in the region was minimal as the "near abroad" was taken for granted before the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia adopted a much more direct strategy by becoming financially and militarily involved in conflicts in Tajikistan, Armenia/Azerbaijan, Georgia and Chechnya. Russia worried that domestic conflict would spill into its own territory. The Kremlin also recognized that domestic strife provided an opportunity to extract concessions from embattled leaders.

Potential economic windfalls in the area are also causing Russia to assume a higher profile. Of the pipelines that run through the region, 80 percent are in Russia proper.¹⁹ The Galvtransneft System, a network of pipelines which connects 14 different countries, was established by Soviet engineering and financing. The Russians have taken a direct interest in maintaining their monopoly in the region. Its involvement is often coercive and takes the form of sending troops and shutting off pipelines. A recent example is Russian refusal to export Turkmen gas via Russian pipelines because of a dispute over financing.

Russian involvement in the region has been documented extensively elsewhere. It bears repeating, however, that Moscow continues to view its former southern republics as

important geo-political and economic assets and that Russia's weakened position in the region is not necessarily permanent. The southern republics hold resources vital to Russia's future and the Kremlin will continue to eye independent thinking with unease. For these reasons, Russia will be a central player in the region for the foreseeable future.

Iran. One of the most efficient routes for bringing gas and oil to Asia, the area with the greatest potential growth in energy demand, is through Iran. Armed with geographic good fortune, Iran has been actively promoting its presence in the region. Iran has been pursuing ties to the region through the spread of Korans, by assisting the construction of pipelines, and by trying to influence political behavior.²⁰ On December 29, 1997, for instance, Turkmenistan and Iran opened the first natural gas pipeline outside Russian territory. The 200-kilometer pipeline extends from southwest Turkmenistan to the village of Kord Kuy in Iran. The \$195 million pipeline will supply power stations in northern Iran for 25 years, which will allow Iran to redirect its own natural gas to centers of demand in the south, including Tehran. At the same time, Shell Oil, Iran, Turkey, and Turkmenistan have signed an agreement authorizing Shell to draw up plans for extending the pipeline. The U.S. State Department is currently investigating whether or not this violates U.S. sanction laws.

It is doubtful that the U.S. isolation of Iran will continue to the degree Washington desires. Even with the sanctions, Iran is able to muster the technological strength to construct its own pipeline. Tehran is pursuing other projects such as the Mashad-Serakhs-Tedzen railway which links Iranian and Central Asian rail networks. As Iran becomes increasingly involved in the Caucasus and Central Asia, it will likely bump against U.S., European and NATO interests. There is no doubt that this will further strain political relations within the Alliance, as differences over policy toward Iran are exposed.

China. China has three overlapping interests in Central Asia: providing for its growing energy needs, promoting stability on its western border, and increasing trade, which all combine to ensure a growing geo-political interest in the region. China's need for energy will increase dramatically over time. A one-time oil exporter of over three million barrels per day in the mid 1980s, it became a net oil importer in November 1993.²¹ Chinese demand for oil is expected to increase from 18 million barrels per day in 1995 to 32 million barrels per day by 2010. This has driven Chinese investment in Central Asian energy industries. Preliminary discussions to construct a pipeline from Central Asia to eastern China, South Korea and Japan are underway. Such a project, running over 3,900 miles will be inordinately expensive, costing in the range of \$10 billion. Chinese commitments to Kazakhstan's energy industry exceed \$9.5 billion to date.²²

China's interest in the region stems not only from its energy needs, but from its desire to minimize ethnic problems on its western border as well. China has had continuous problems with its western province of Xinjiang which abuts the Kazakh border. China's support of the Kazakh government is, in part, an effort to dissuade Almaty from supporting the autonomy movements of China's indigenous Turkish Muslims. To date, the Kazakh government has honored its part of the bargain. Beijing's concern is that, should a different and more nationalistic government come to power, Almaty may support rebellion among its ethnic brethren in China. Therefore China has supported, the best that it can, Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry, as well as other infrastructural projects. In 1992, 50 percent of Kazakh imports of consumer goods were from China.²³ Xinjiang is also home to 150,000 ethnic Kyrgyz and, not surprising, trade between China and Kyrgyzstan is also increasing.

Beijing believes that stability is best promoted through economic growth, and is therefore actively pursuing trade relations with Central Asian states. China is investing

heavily in infrastructural development, which has taken its leaders as far west as Armenia and Georgia in discussions over joint ventures in rail, road, and ferry links. Its western border is relatively open, and China views itself as the natural exporter to the region. Since 1995, China has signed multiple border treaties throughout the region. What the region will be able to provide in terms of markets is still an open question.

These three overlapping interests have made Central Asia an area of increased Chinese attention. Analysts in Beijing view the region not only as an opportunity, but as a place where its interests could collide with other international actors. Xu Xiaojie, a researcher at the Petroleum Economic Research Center in Beijing, argues

that future Asian oil-and-gas security will be affected by the new geopolitical game, ensuing among the West (the U.S.), Russia and China, and some sensitive areas, like the Black Sea, Iran-Afghanistan corridor and South China Sea. China certainly has a great geopolitical advantage to expand its economic and political will in Asia. Its involvement in the region's oil-and-gas affairs will be an important component of this new geopolitical game . . . *China's future geopolitical priority certainly will be to regenerate an aggressive geostrategy that reestablishes a leading role in not just Asia, but the world scene.*²⁴

Thus, as oil and gas export increases, China is positioning itself to be an active regional player.

Turkey. Turkey has played on its ethnic ties to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara presented Turkey as a model for economic and political development to the region. Turkey has both economic and strategic reasons for considering Caucasian and Central Asian developments as key to its own planning.

Turkey is poised to become a major player in the region's energy exportation. To date it has invested \$2 billion in Turkmenistan alone.²⁵ U.S. policy toward Iran, and

international interest in promoting a diversification of pipeline routes, means that the port of Ceyhan in Turkey is one of the most attractive export transit points for regional reserves.

But exporting gas and oil is not the only reason for Turkey's interest in the region. A historic rival of Russia, Turkey worries about Russian activities in the region. Russian military support of Armenia puts Russian weapons too close for Ankara's comfort. The fact that CFE limits on troop deployments permitted in the Southern Flank have been eased alters the balance of power in the region away from Turkey. Turkey's status as a NATO member thus directly implicates the Alliance in regional developments. The possibility of a Russo-Turkish collision means Ankara's activities are of direct consequence to NATO planners.

The above discussion suggests that, as NATO moves east, it will run into a host of conflicting interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia that do not exist on the European continent. The problems in Europe are confined primarily to NATO/Russian relations. The concern of including new members is discussed in terms of what effect it will have on Russian security and how best to deal with the consequences. Extending security assistance to the Caucasus and Central Asia, however, encounters not only other potentially powerful international actors, but also intrudes on important economic arrangements. The likelihood for conflict increases as the two trends of NATO expansion and energy exploration converge.

NATO's Potential Conflicts.

The likelihood of NATO becoming involved militarily in the area increases as international interests diverge. But perhaps even more important than possible military confrontations are the political tensions that are likely to develop among NATO constituent members as new actors, interests, and goals are confronted. Not only must NATO planners now consider the logistical and operational

problems confronting them in the ex-Soviet southern republics, but a host of local political problems also confronts NATO. The possibility of domestic crises pulling NATO into unanticipated crises with regional actors is real. A NATO presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not only raise questions about how best to engage Russia and provide for out-of-area operations, but also about the regional role Turkey should assume and the appropriate geo-political focus of NATO. NATO activity into the Caucasus and Central Asia both reinstates familiar problems and introduces new ones.

Domestic Crises. Local conflicts have the potential to drag NATO into situations that it might otherwise choose to avoid. Strife in Kazakhstan, Ngorno Karabakh, and Georgia, for instance, historically has drawn Russian participation. The most recent example of this tendency was the assassination attempt on Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze in which Moscow has been implicated. As NATO pushes eastward, such conflicts could inadvertently draw Russian and NATO forces into unwanted confrontation. Georgian calls for a Bosnia-type operation in Abkhazia suggest that regional actors foresee a role for NATO security assistance in their own strategic calculations. Similarly, Kazakhstan's defense pact with Ukraine and Ukraine's special arrangements with NATO link the Alliance to the regional conflicts in unexpected ways. In fact, most Central Asian states are tying themselves closer to Ukraine, viewing it as their link to Europe. Domestic crises often draw in international allies. NATO must be careful to avoid overextending its commitment to the region as it trains and supports local forces.

The prospect of continued fighting in Chechnya will also certainly involve NATO, if only indirectly. As discussed above, the CFE treaty has been altered to allow Russia until 1999 to reduce its Southern Flank forces. Because of the current state of events, it is difficult to believe that Russia will actually meet its obligations there. NATO must choose

whether to support Turkey and the Caucasian states and demand a reduction in Russian forces, or support gains in Central Europe under the CFE flank and allow Russia to remain in violation of the treaty.

Because domestic crises often involve outside powers, NATO needs to be very careful about the commitments it makes as it shifts east. For those who would argue that NATO would never allow itself to overextend its commitment to the Caucasus and Central Asia, consider the statement made by Azerbaijan Prime Minister Artur Rasi-Zade that his country's leadership has had informal consultations with NATO on safeguarding oil export pipelines "should the need to do so arise."²⁶

Inter-State Conflicts. NATO also risks clashing with other states with interests in the region. To date, NATO officials have argued that no country should view PfP as threatening. NATO repeatedly points out that PfP includes operations such as humanitarian intervention and search and rescue procedures. But few countries view the operations in such light. Beijing, for instance, viewed the recent parachute expedition as inimical to Chinese interests. A senior policy planner at one of Beijing's foreign policy think tanks argued that "NATO's move eastwards was an example of Christian expansion which was psychologically threatening to China and which could lead eventually to the clash of civilisations."²⁷ Most states in the region view such operations as threatening. The April 1996 Agreement on Mutual Military Confidence-Building Measures, the first collective agreement among Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, suggests that China and Russia might, in some cases, view geo-political threats similarly. Should Russia regain its strength, or China improve its regional presence, it is unlikely that opposition to PfP activity in the region would be limited to verbal disagreement.

Diverging Interests among NATO Members. The most likely way in which the Caucasus and Central Asia will

affect NATO is through the political conflict it will cause among NATO members themselves. The extent to which member states are invested in the region is likely to dictate how seriously NATO considers Russian moves into an area previously thought of as Russia's legitimate sphere of influence. To date, there has been compromise, most notably over the CFE agreement. But highly invested states, such as the United States, are likely to view Russian moves in the region with much greater apprehension than other states not as commercially involved.

Different investments will dictate different regional preferences. NATO members already worry that the Alliance could be pulled into the region because of one member's interest. Denmark, the United States, and Italy are key supporters of developing a regional focus for PfP whereby one or more NATO countries form stronger ties with certain PfP countries. Other allies, skeptical of such an arrangement, worry that this could lead certain states to secure a hegemonic position under the cover of PfP. As *Defense News* reports, "what all the allies wish to avoid, however, is a regionalization that leads to special obligations by some NATO members or distinct spheres of influence."²⁸ Should the United States, for instance, expand ties to the region and continue using PfP as an international cover, other NATO allies are likely to begin questioning their support to such a program. What would happen if PfP activities were pursued against the will of some NATO members has yet to be answered. It could be, in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Differences among the allies also exist about how prominent a role Turkey should play in the region. The United States has actively supported a strong role for Turkey, but European states are not as supportive. With over a half a million Kurds now residing in Europe, and notably disproportionately concentrated in Germany, Germany in particular is hesitant to back a militarily strong Turkey.²⁹ European states worry that Turkey, in its role as a NATO partner, will draw the Alliance unexpectedly into

the region's conflict. As Graham Fuller points out, "several NATO states, especially Germany, are concerned about the implication of potential 'new' NATO borders on such trouble spots as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraqi Kurdistan."³⁰

Inter-Alliance interests will also diverge over which area of the globe should preoccupy NATO if indeed it pursues an out-of-area agenda. It is not clear that the Caucasus and Central Asia are the most demanding of Western attention, especially because they do not immediately affect the security of Europe. Control over energy reserves is already diversified; Central Asia and the Caucasus present yet another route, not the only route. Despite the U.S. desire to promote Turkish involvement, other areas of the globe are perhaps more worthy of NATO attention. For instance, the millions of North Africans living in Europe make North African political stability a more pressing concern for southern European politics and security. The possibility of a massive influx of refugees from Morocco, Tunisia, or Egypt, resulting from an Algerian-style crisis, is a very real concern to southern Europeans because of the potential for instability. Where to spend NATO's scarce resources becomes increasingly debatable as allies redefine their geo-political priorities.

Conclusion.

Two trends are intersecting in the Caucasus and Central Asia that have important ramifications for Western security. As discussed above, the scramble for resources and NATO expansion are converging in a way that will cause new opportunities and problems for Western interests. What is truly worrisome is the lack of attention being given to such developments.

To date, the region has been discussed primarily within the framework of "the politics of pipelines." Analysts are devoting considerable attention to where pipelines are being laid, what the most likely routes will be, and the political fall-out from all such decisions. But "energy

politics" is not occurring within a strategic vacuum. As the above discussion has pointed out, energy politics is occurring simultaneously with an expanding NATO presence in the region. PfP exercises are increasing in level and scope on a yearly basis. Western interests are becoming increasingly tied to the region not only because of the significant wealth it offers, but because of the strategic opportunities the region provides as well.

Also problematic is the uneven support among NATO members for Alliance expansion. Clearly the United States is taking a central role in this area. Washington is involved disproportionately with the training of local troops, and provides training facilities within the United States. The United States is also actively supporting Turkey's increased presence in this area. It is not clear whether this interest in the region is shared equally among NATO partners. This might not be a problem, except for the ugly reality of resource trade-offs. In addition, increased NATO involvement by definition includes other European states, which do not seem as enthusiastic about its involvement there. What role Turkey should play, what kind of resources should be invested, how the Alliance will manage confronting international actors it never intended to face in such a direct manner, and what should happen if NATO were to become involved in a military conflict in the region are all important questions to be addressed before increased involvement continues.

As NATO continues to redefine its roles and missions, the problems faced are as likely to be political as military. The challenge of how best to engage Russia and provide for out-of-area operations that are truly out-of-area will continue to plague the Alliance, especially in this new and demanding region. More immediately, the political problems that NATO expansion is likely to cause will prove cumbersome. Pushes into the Caucasus and Central Asia, because of all the overlapping interests, are likely to result in political quagmires. The Caucasus and Central Asia may therefore inadvertently become the true test of NATO's

ability to respond and adapt to the changing security environment of the post-Cold War era.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9

1. See Frank C. Alexander, Jr., "Caspian Reserves Luring Operators," *Oil and Gas Journal*, July 21, 1997, p. 23. Industry analysts tend to give a lower figure for the amount of oil in the Caspian Basin of 30 to 90 billion barrels of oil.

2. Richard Matzke, "Tengiz Experience Example of Oil Revitalization Advancing in FSU," *Oil and Gas Journal*, August 4, 1997, pp. 20-25.

3. Gordon McLeod, "Kyrgyzstan Starts Up Its First Refinery," *Oil and Gas Journal*, May 5, 1997, pp. 108-112.

4. It is interesting to note that exports from Pakistan and India to Central Asia are increasingly steadily and dramatically. See International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook*, Washington, DC: IMF, 1997. In addition, Pakistan is reputed to be trying to increase its political influence by supporting Islamic movements in various countries. See "Are Central Asian Islamic Militants Being Trained in Pakistan?," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Vol. 2, No. 32, Part I, February 17, 1998. Work on a \$1.9 billion dollar gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan is also expected to begin in December 1998. See "Turkmen Gas Line Work to Start in December," *Reuters*, January 26, 1998.

5. For good discussions of the CFE, see Jack Mendelsohn, "The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review," *Arms Control Today*, April 1996, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 7-11; and Richard A. Falkenrath, "The CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings" *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring 1995, pp. 118-144.

6. I thank Minas Khoudaghoulou for his insights on this point.

7. Similarly, Colonel-General Yurii Baluevskii, a senior member of the Russian General Staff, has recently argued that ongoing tensions in the North Caucasus would prevent Russia from fully complying with the restrictions on the number of forces it was allowed to deploy in that region under the revised Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. See "Russia 'Cannot Fully Comply' with CFE Treaty," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Vol. 2, No. 56, Part I, March 23, 1998.

8. "Partnership for Peace," *NATO Basic Fact Sheet*, nr. 9, March 1996, p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

11. "PFP Unclassified 1997 NATO/PFP Participation Matrix as of January 7, 1998," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partnership Coordination Cell*. The exception to states exercising and involving local troops are Armenia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, although on August 23, 1997, President Niyazov approved a program for 1997-99 that would allow Turkmen officers not only to act as observers in NATO joint military exercises but also would allow the participation of Turkmen armed forces in international emergency situations. "Turkmenistan adopts NATO Partnership for Peace Programme," *ITAR-TASS*, 17:01, August 20, 1997, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 23, 1997.

12. Reported in Brooks Tigner, "Alliance May Tap Security Funds for PFP Infrastructure," *Defense News*, January 20-26, 1997, p. 14.

13. Rosemarie Forsythe, *The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Adelphi Paper 300, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, p. 37.

14. See Frank C. Alexander Jr., "Caspian Reserves Luring Operators," *Oil and Gas Journal*, July 21, 1997, p. 23.

15. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*, Washington, DC: USAID, 1996; USAID, *Congressional Presentation 1998: Summary Tables*, Washington DC: USAID, 1998. Amounts for 1997 and 1998 do not include disbursements of foreign disaster assistance, regional, or other programs because they have not yet been compiled. The actual assistance for these years is likely to be higher than what is reported below. Data for 1997 and 1998 are a conservative estimate.

16. Brooks Tigner, "US Plans Information Network for NATO, Partner Nations," *Defense News*, March 10-16, 1997, p. 30.

17. R. Jeffrey Smith "US, Russian Paratroops Join in Central Asian Jump," *Washington Post*, September 16, 1997, p. A12.

18. "Prepared statement by Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, before the Senate Appropriations Committee Foreign Operations Subcommittee," *Federal News Service*, May 22, 1997.

19. Richard Dion, "How Oil, Gas Investment Prospects Compare for Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan," *Oil and Gas Journal*, July 28, 1997, pp. 25-31.

20. See "Iran 'Spies' Detained in Kazakhstan," *RFE/RL Newsline*, Vol. 2, No. 38, part 1, February 25, 1998.

21. "China's Deregulation, Expansion not Enough to Restore Market Balance," *Oil and Gas Journal*, September 29, 1997, Vol. 95, No. 30, pp. 33-39. See also Calder, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1996, p. 56.

22. Richard Dion, "Should Kazakhstan Go East?," *Oil and Gas Journal*, October 6, 1997, Vol. 95, No. 40, pp. 24-25. China has committed \$5.3 billion to pipeline construction and development of Kazakhstan's Uzen field, and committed \$4.4 billion for development of its Aktubinsk field reserves.

23. Ross Munro, "China's Waxing Spheres of Influence," *ORBIS*, Fall 1994, p. 601.

24. Xu Xiaojie, "China Reaches Crossroads for Strategic Choices," *World Oil*, April 1997. Italics added.

25. Gareth Jones, "Turkmen Chief Keeps Grip, Woos Neighbors," *Reuters*, January 7, 1998.

26. *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, Vol. 2, No. 20, Part I, January 30, 1998.

27. "China's Worry About America," *Foreign Report*, No. 2465, September 25, 1997.

28. Brooks Tigner, "Alliance May Tap Security Funds for PfP Infrastructure," *Defense News*, January 20-26, 1997, p. 14.

29. A disproportionate number of Kurdish immigrants reside in Germany.

30. Fuller, p. 34.

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